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Abstract 
Since women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia, two campaigns were launched in June 
2011 and October 2013 calling to lift the ban. Both proponents and opponents of women 
driving have their own reasons to legitimize or de-legitimize women driving. This study is 
mainly concerned about the use of language as a legitimization tool in society. It seeks to 
reveal the strategies used by both proponents and opponents on mass media to legitimize their 
attitudes and to find out how do public react and reflect on this discourse through the little 
available space of YouTube comments. 
 
    The data are in two types and they are all gathered from YouTube; first, videos of TV 
shows that are uploaded on YouTube representing the mass media content. Second, the online 
public comments and reflections posted on these videos as the User-Generated Content 
(UGC). An interdisciplinary framework based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theory, 
the researcher adopts a Discourse-Historical approach (DHA) for the analysis of strategies of 
positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Wodak, 2001). Moreover, 
employing analytical tools from Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) when needed to gain a 
deep understanding of the manipulation of linguistic elements to attain legitimization by both 
parties on mass media (Halliday 1985). Comments posted with regard to lifting the ban on 
women driving were coded into three responses; (opposing, support or neutral). Comments 
under each response were monitored and analysed and showed the formation of various 
discursive themes (e.g. racist, evaluative, supportive, feminist grievance). However, the study 
originality stems from the fact that it develops and proposes some key strategies of 
legitimization by applying them in a different social context (Van Leeuwen 1996, 2007; Van 
Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes, 2011). It also compares and contrasts the legitimation 
strategies with their similar argumentation schemes (e.g.  Argument from consequence, 
analogy, expert opinion…etc) proposed by Douglas Walton (1995). Through comments 
analysis, the circulation and recurrence of many stereotypical statements, used to demonstrate 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the status quo, was noted.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
The ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia is an issue that is globally linked to women’s 
rights and gender inequality. According to the 2014 Global Gender Gap Report, Saudi Arabia 
is ranked at 141 out of 144 globally, despite recording the region’s largest improvement on 
overall index (economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival and 
political empowerment) over the past decade. Among numerous related issues in Saudi 
Arabia, women driving appears as one of the most controversial, yet it remains unsettled. 
However, to date, only three campaigns calling to lift the ban have been launched in Saudi 
Arabia. During these three campaigns, the discourse of both proponents and opponents has 
changed and developed under the influence of the national socio-political situation. For 
example, in 1990 (during the first campaign) the ban was based on a religious fatwa, while in 
recent years, religion has been open to women driving; thereby demonstrating a dramatic 
change in the religious establishment discourse. Regardless of the reason/s behind the ban, 
the issue of not allowing women to drive has been taken out of context by some advocates 
and opponents of women driving to probably change or perpetuate the status quo in cases 
beyond merely women driving.  
In the last decade, women rights in Saudi Arabia have progressed considerably in terms of 
education, work, political participation and judicial amendments. Several consecutive 
governmental reforms stimulated the public and women in particular, to demand the 
authorities to take greater steps towards change. The issue of women driving was high on the 
list of some Saudi activists. During the 2011 and 2013 campaigns, social media paved the 
way for activists to be part of the public sphere, deliver their initiatives to larger communities 
nationally or internationally, and therefore gain more support. Overall, calls for women 
driving trivial gained very limited popularity and women driving is still considered as a 
secondary issue within Saudi society.        
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1.2 Purpose of the Study  
Considering the importance of language and discourse (what is beyond language) in shaping 
or maintaining identities, changing social values and naturalising dominance, this research 
endeavours to investigate how legitimisation is exercised within the discourse of two 
dichotomous groups. The ban on women driving appears to be a social problem that is 
seemingly a consequence of gender social inequality. From a linguistic perspective, language 
has played a significant role in the portrayal of the issue; thus, the study discusses what 
strategies of legitimisation are used by proponents and opponents of women driving to de-
legitimize or legitimize the ban, and what micro-linguistic devices are used to perform 
legitimacy of Self and de-legitimacy of Other. It seeks to uncover the potential hidden 
practice of power, exploitation of authority, and hegemony of one group over the other. 
Through this, the study will result in greater understanding of how social change can be 
legitimised or de-legitimised through words, thereby minimising the practice of inequality in 
society. Moreover, the discourse surrounding women driving is similar to other previous or 
current discourses discussing comparable issues within Saudi society (e.g. girls schooling, 
shura council participation, feminisation of shops). There is potential for this to raise public 
awareness and limit unequal power relations between social groups (Fairclough, 1992; Van 
Dijk, 1993a). It is noteworthy that the issue has significantly greater scope than being for or 
against women driving; it is a matter that evokes the interrelationship between women, 
politics and religion. Whenever this subject is brought to the table, somehow religion and 
politics are involved to varying degrees and used to perform legitimisation or de-
legitimisation. Consequently, this study adopts a discourse-historical approach (DHA) that 
attempts to clarify and understand the problem of the women driving ban by exploring it from 
the socio-political perspective.   
 
 
1.3 Research Questions   
Taking into account the study’s main objectives in providing a wider contextualisation of 
how legitimisation is constructed and substantiated via discourse, the study attempts to 
provide a macro-level analysis by answering the following research question: 
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- What discursive mechanisms do proponents and opponents of women driving cars in 
Saudi Arabia use to legitimise their arguments?  
Furthermore, the study considers the micro-level analysis of this discourse and examines its 
micro-linguistic mechanism as an essential component in the construction of Self and Other 
legitimacy. Thus, the study seeks to answer the following sub-question: 
- What strategies of legitimisation do proponents and opponents of women driving use 
to legitimise their arguments in the mass media? 
- How do proponents and opponents’ arguments in the mass media differ from their 
counterparts in the online public comments/user-generated content?  
- How are the Self and the Other groups represented in the discourse of women 
driving?   
 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study  
This study contributes to the literature of critical discourse analysis (CDA) by combining and 
considering the use of social and linguistic theories to tackle a social problem from a critical 
linguistic perspective; specifically, the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia. It triangulates 
three important components in one CDA enterprise; socio-political context, linguistic 
analysis and argumentation theory. Answering the questions will enhance the understanding 
of the powerful effect of legitimisation and the aspects of behind discourse, which empower 
these discursive strategies in societies. The study accounts not only for what legitimisation 
strategies are used but also emphasises the comparison between the discourse and 
argumentation of two dichotomous groups. The online public opinion is not studied 
adequately and perhaps neglected despite its power in instigating social change. In this 
particular study, online comments are regarded as a valuable resource in examining how the 
public deliver their opinions through user-generated content; thereby yielding new insights 
into the interrelationship between mass media content (e.g. TV, newspapers) and user-
generated content (e.g. online comments, tweets).  
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Moreover, this study adopts and develops Van Leeuwen’s (1996; 2007) four categories of 
legitimisation, and proposes some new ones by applying them in a different context. It 
highlights the potential development of legitimisation strategies when they are applied to new 
contexts and discourses. Furthermore, to the researcher’s knowledge, discourse on women 
driving in Saudi Arabia has not been researched or investigated critically from a linguistic 
perspective; in particular, investigating the representation of Self and Other, which accounts 
for a further unique aspect of this study.       
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1.5 Terminology 
 
 TERMS & 
ABBREVIATIONS 
EXPLANATION 
1 CDA Critical Discourse Analysis 
2 DHA Discourse-Historical Approach  
3 CL Critical Linguistics 
4 CMC Computer Mediated Communication 
5 UGC User Generated Content 
6 Fatwa A religious opinion presented by a cleric/s 
7 Ulama Religious scholars  
8 Qiyas Analogical reasoning 
9 Bay’a Oath of Allegiance for new rulers  
10 Wah’y Revelation from Allah  
11 Khutba Religious preaching  
12 Sharia The Islamic law 
13 Al-Sahwah A religious reforming stream that emerged during late 1960s.  
14 Sadd Aldharayie A jurisprudential principle that is coined and heavily adopted by clerics 
15 Sunnah Nabawiya The prophetic sayings, actions and silent assertions 
16 Ijma The consensus of Ulama upon a specific opinion   
17 Katateeb Early forms of schools where education is limited to literacy, the Quran 
and maths  
18 Shura An Arabic word that signifies the state or groups’ consultive act prior to 
making decisions.    
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1.6 Thesis Layout  
This thesis comprises eight chapters. Firstly, an introductory chapter provides a brief 
illustration of the topic under investigation. The purpose and significance of the study, the 
research questions and key terminologies are also outlined. The second chapter presents a 
theoretical background and a framework of the study, reviewing literature and other intrinsic 
notions related to CDA; for example, discourse, critique, power and ideology. It also 
discusses the major approach used in this study; namely, DHA with the discursive practice of 
legitimisation in discourse. Moreover, it explains the notion of the online public sphere 
represented in the UGC, paying specific attention to YouTube as a central platform in this 
research.  
Chapter Three provides a cultural history in relation to the study, and is divided into four 
parts. The sections cover: the establishment and sacredness of Saudi Arabia and the formation 
of its discourse; the principles of legitimisation in Islam; a historical review of Saudi 
women’s status, from its establishment until the present; and a synopsis of mass media and 
social media in the Kingdom.  
Chapter Four presents the research methodology by outlining the historical background of 
women driving in the Saudi context, alongside a brief biography of speakers. It also touches 
upon some common critiques and methodological issues related to CDA, and illustrates the 
conceptual design of the study alongside the data collection and sampling procedure. The 
chapter concludes by presenting a display of the methodology of analysis for both mass 
media content and public comments. The data analysis section is distributed over two 
chapters: Chapter Five represents the analysis of both proponents and opponents discourse on 
mass media; whereas Chapter Six presents the analysis of public opinion through online 
comments. Chapter Seven summarises and discusses the findings of the analysis, provides 
brief answers to the research questions, and compares them with the literature. Finally, a 
conclusion to the thesis is proposed, highlighting the study limitations, contribution, and 
recommendations for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide readers with a general synopsis of the various essential axes 
about Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and this study in particular. It briefly illustrates the 
notion of CDA, its objectives and aspirations to social change. Other concepts linked to CDA 
(e.g. critique, power. ideology) will be discussed extensively. Furthermore, a particular 
attention has been given to the Discourse-Historical Approach (Wodak et al. 1999) -regarding 
its principles and mechanisms- as the primary analytical approach used in this study. 
However, parts of the structure and order of this chapter, including some referenced 
quotations and paraphrasing, were drawn from KhosraviNik (2015). On the macro-
argumentative level, legitimisation is debated extensively as a central theme in this study, 
with particular reference to Van Leeuwen’s (1996) four categories of legitimisation 
(Authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopesis). Finally, a discussion on the 
concept of the online public sphere and the computer-mediated communication – or user-
generated content- has been presented, touching upon YouTube as a public opinion platform 
from which both types of data (mass media content and user-generated content) have been 
retrieved. 
 
 
2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical linguistics, also known as CDA, is considered as a notion of analysing discourse in 
its various forms seeking a better understanding of any potential occurrence of power abuse, 
inequality, discrimination among societies from a linguistic perspective. Connerton (1976:20) 
describes the aim of critical linguistics as “changing or even removing conditions of what is 
considered to be a false or distorted consciousness”. This concept of raising awareness struck 
a chord with scholars across Britain, Europe and Australia who together were the leading 
proponents of CDA. 
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The use of the term critical can be linked back to the Frankfurt School, which founded 
‘critical theory’. Critical theory attempts to provide an accurate interpretation of Marxist 
philosophy, and the work of Jürgen Habermas shaped its adoption in the social sciences. In 
language studies, the term ‘critical’ first took hold in describing the approach of ‘critical 
linguistics,’ which emerged in the 1970s and was first used by a group at the University of 
East Anglia (Fowler et al, 1979). Among other ideas, language was perceived as a tool that 
could lead to a mystification of social events (e.g. the construction of a passive sentence 
whereby reference to an agent is concealed might be seen as ideologically motivated) 
(Chilton, 2008). CDA, though it was situated initially under a host of titles including Critical 
Language Studies, Critical Language Awareness and Critical Linguistics. Critical Linguistics 
has been used interchangeably in reference to CDA. Critical theories, including CDA, 
attempt to convey critical knowledge to allow humans to emancipate themselves from forms 
of domination through the process of self-reflection. The aim is to achieve ‘enlightenment 
and emancipation’ through description and explanation while extracting particular forms of 
delusion. As described by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991) theories of ‘violence symbolique’ and 
‘meconnaisaance’ (lack of knowledge), critical theory endeavours to foster awareness in 
agents of their personal needs and interests. Fairclough describes ‘critique’ as ‘making visible 
the interconnectedness of things’ (1995: 747). 
 
critique brings a normative element into analysis…it focuses on what is wrong with a 
society (an institution, an organisation etc), and how ‘wrongs’ might be ‘righted’ or 
‘mitigated’, from a particular normative standpoint. Critique is grounded in values.     
                                                                                                              (Fairclough, 2010: 7)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Essentially, this addresses the reality that a society denies or hides by claiming to be the 
opposite of that reality (e.g. claiming equality while enacting discriminatory laws). Criticality 
is linked with the concept of contextualisation in CDA covering both the top-bottom and 
bottom-top dynamics. Van Dijk (2006) prefers the term Critical Discourse Studies by way of 
a more generalised term that encompasses critical theory as well as critical applications. He 
summarises critical studies of discourse to typically analyse and contribute to the solution of 
a social problem, such as social inequality and social power abuse. Secondly, the analysis 
within a normative perspective, i.e. standard guide pertaining to international human rights, 
should critically assess abusive discursive practices and formulate guidelines for effective 
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intervention and resistance against illegitimate domination. The crucial point is that it is not 
sufficient to merely describe a social inequality, but to contribute to its solution. Finally, 
analysis should consider the interests, expertise and resistance of the groups who are the 
victims of discursive injustice. 
 
However, although CDA emerged primarily in the late 1970s, its development can be 
attributed broadly to a unique gathering of scholars in the early 1990s. In collaboration with 
the University of Amsterdam, Teun Van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo Van 
Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak met over a period of two days to share theories and methodologies 
of discourse analysis, namely that of CDA. The approaches discussed at the time have been 
since developed and improved to a large extent; however, the meeting served as a catalyst in 
aiding this early development and progression. The founding collective identified CDA as a 
school/programme that united competing methodologies and theories together to form a 
multidisciplinary approach offering an abundance of methods from which to choose (Wodak 
& Meyer, 2009). 
Despite these varying methodologies and scholarly influences, Wodak and Meyer highlights 
the broadly agreed agenda among researchers as comprising of “fundamentally concerned 
with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to 
investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted and legitimised, 
and so on by language use (or in discourse)” (2001: 2). 
 
2.3 The notion of critique in CDA 
Critique is central to the theory of CDA. Both terms critique and critical are used 
interchangeably in CDA studies with little distinction; this could be attributed to the 
interdisciplinary nature of CDA as it combines theoretical and methodological reflexivity 
with socio-political critique (KhosraviNik, 2015). This concurs with the view proffered by 
Weiss & Wodak (2007), which demands critical analysts be self-critical and considers the 
term critical as a reflexive process. Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts 
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view themselves as critical of the present social order, taking into account the ‘macro’ 
dimension of society rather dealing primarily with text and talk, and hence a typical ‘micro’ 
dimension (for example, Van Dijk, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Fairclough, 2010). In a 
discussion of CDA, Jonathan Potter, indicates that CDA addresses “criticism as if it were 
intrinsic to the enterprise (and, implicitly, absent from other forms of discourse analysis)” 
(1996: 227). This highlights that CDA is distinguished because it perceives critique -
including self-critique- as the core of any CDA project. This agrees with Wodak and Meyer’s 
view, “Critical theories, thus also CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that 
enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-
reflection. Thus they are aimed at producing enlightenment and emancipation” (2009: 7). 
 
Furthermore, critical discourse analysts tend to see the approaches of conversation analysis 
and traditional linguistics as ‘non-critical’, as such approaches disregard the connections 
between language and power (Wetherell & Potter 1992). Conversely, Van Dijk (1993a) 
claims that the targets of CDA are power elites that sustain social inequality and injustice. 
Meanwhile, Fairclough (1985) argues that the notion of critique should include the process of 
denaturalising the naturalised ideologies, or as he further adds, “Critical implies showing 
connections and causes that are hidden” (1992: 9). In other words, decoding the operations of 
ideology discursive practice will conceal features of domination in society (Billig 1995, Van 
Dijk 1996). This is achieved by providing insight into the mutual effect between social 
structures and discourse which will enable us to understand social determinations and effects 
of discourse better. Critique takes into account the wider socio-political context as it plays a 
major role in shaping discourse (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Wodak et al., 1994; Resigil 
& Wodak, 2001, 2009; Baker et al. 2008: KhosraviNik, 2010, 2015). The inclusion of the 
socio-political context in the process of critique appears to be essential in the CDA principles, 
the importance of the notion critique can be extracted from the primary objectives of CDA as 
proposed by Bloor & Bloor (2007: 12): 
- to analyse discourse practices that reflect or construct social problems; 
- to investigate how ideologies can become frozen in language and find ways to break the ice; 
- to increase awareness of how to apply these objectives to specific cases of injustice, prejudice, 
and misuse of power. 
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Being critical can be an enterprise that may include different forms of analysis, ranging from 
the identification of a social problem, the data selection to the methodology of analysis. 
However, CDA analysts must be aware that their work is driven by the same economic, 
political and social motives as any other academic work and that they are not in a superior 
position. “Naming oneself ‘critical’ does only implie specific ethical standards: an intention 
to make their position, research interests and values explicit and their criteria as transparent 
as possible without feeling the need to apologise for the critical stance of their work” (Van 
Leeuwen, 2006: 293). Although CDA tends to take an inductive or deductive approach when 
explaining the connection between the linguistic analysis and socio-political context, it 
highlights the necessity to a close examination of microlinguistic categories and macro-
argumentative assumptions. The analytical requirement of a particular context can also 
explain the extent of criticality in CDA. CDA considers the textual-linguistic characteristics 
as essential but the primary level of analysis. The criticality of CDA is distinctive since CDA 
researchers endeavour to unmask the mediation between language and society through taking 
into account macro-sociological structures or socio-historical concepts (KhosraviNik, 2015). 
“Criticality in CDA is associated with having a reflexive view on both the level of the 
research methodology and the contextualisation of the findings of the (descriptive) discourse 
analysis level” (Wodak, as cited in KhosraviNik, 2015: 52). This contextualisation seeks to 
emphasise the role of the history in the process of production and interpretation and shaping 
discourse through an interdisciplinary procedure that includes looking at social, 
psychological and political components (Meyer, 2001). Another significant CDA 
commitment to critical theory, is its aspiration to engage with actual social change. This 
stemmed largely from the ideas of the Frankfurt School and critical theory, which both goes 
beyond the mere descriptive approach to adopt emancipatory insights within the social 
sciences (KhosraviNik, 2015). Therefore, CDA is not critical because of the methodological 
identity. Instead this is the result of CDA being rooted in a fundamental critique of social 
relations (Blommaert, 2005). 
 
However, how discourse is categorized or identified reflects implicitly the notion of critique. 
In other words, the correspondence between the name of the discussion and the attitude of the 
analyst can indicate the recognition and engagement with the given discourse, such as 
discriminatory, feminist and neoliberal speech. As KhosraviNik suggests: 
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The subject matter of the critique in this approach to discourse identification becomes 
mere analysis of the qualities of such discourses because the point of critique should 
automatically be clear through the discourse-naming process, e.g. feminist discourse 
entails the critique of sexist ideologies, among other lines. That is, engagement in the 
critical analysis of these discourses will simultaneously be the operationalization and 
realization of critique.                                                                                            (2015: 54)                                                                                                                                  
 
KhosraviNik expands on this by comparing the approach with the ‘Wodakian’ approach 
which involves ‘macro-topic relatedness’ alongside with a potential ‘pluri-perspectivity’ in 
attitudes rather than a mono-perspectivity. This Wodakian discourse analysis requires to 
some extent an autonomous level of justification for critique, in which analysts draw more 
explicitly on critical theory (2015: 54). Overall, it is important to highlight that most CDA 
studies tend to avoid engaging specifically in debates of ‘critique justification’ and find it 
enough to make some normative assumptions instead. 
 
 
2.4 The notion of discourse in CDA 
It is hard if not impossible to reasonably describe ‘Discourse’ in one holistic definition that 
can be applicable across various disciplines of social sciences. This might refer to the 
constitutive nature of discourse within a society and its function in drawing beliefs, thinking 
patterns and understandings of social phenomena through language. The term ‘discourse’ is 
used frequently to represent both written and oral texts. In CDA, social practices e.g. racism 
against refugees and xenophobic attitude are thought to be shaped by particular discursive 
events (Weiss & Wodak, 2007). 
 
Regarding Laclau’s social-constructivist approach, discourse is seen as an abstract ‘system of 
meaning-making’ where various entities or groups allocated with different values (Laclau et 
al, 2001). In harmony with Laclau’s notion, Jager (2001) highlights that all meanings are 
extrapolated from an epistemology that is controlled by discourse, and any changes of values 
and meanings are linked to a change in discourse. Drawing on the Foucauldian perspective of 
discourse, Jürgen Link defines discourse as “an institutionalised way of talking that regulates 
and reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (1983: 60). In response to Link’s definition, 
Jager and Maier (2009: 35) portray the image of discourse as being ‘a flow of knowledge 
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throughout time’, in which ‘different discourses are intimately entangled with each other and 
together from the giant milling mass of overall societal discourse’. Fairclough (1995) states 
that the role of language is not limited to the construction of social identities; rather, it is also 
constitutive in creating paradigms of knowledge and beliefs. This perspective is likely 
influenced by Systemic Linguistics, since Fairclough views language as having three primary 
functions: Ideational, Interpersonal and Textual (Halliday, 1994). Similar to CDA, the 
ideational aspect of language emphasises the use of discourse/language moves beyond being 
representative of the world; it constitutes, defines and characterises it (KhosraviNik, 2015). 
Moreover, Fairclough elaborates in explaining the notion of discourse: 
I see discourse as ways of representing aspects of the world- the processes, relations and 
structures of the material world…different discourses are different perspectives on the 
world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world, their social and personal 
identities, and social relationships in which they stand to other people. Discourses not 
only represent the world as it is (or rather is seen to be), they are also projective 
imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from actual world, and tied 
in to projects to change the world in particular directions.                                  (2003: 124)                                                                                             
 
Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that discourse is thoroughly constitutive and not partially 
constitutive or only constitutive under some conditions, concluding that reality has different 
versions in which each is represented through various discourses. However, Weiss and 
Wodak (2007) highlight a distinguishing factor regarding defining discourse; that is, the level 
of abstractness. In connection with the sociocognitive theory (Van Dijk, 1984, 1993b, 1998), 
the Discourse-Historical Approach, view ‘discourse’ as “a form of knowledge and memory, 
whereas text illustrates concrete oral utterances or written documents” (Weiss & Wodak, 
2007:13). Many CDA scholars, including Wodak and Fairclough, stress the differentiation 
between the theoretical aspect of discourse and its linguistic recognition. This is also 
emphasised by Van Dijk who argues that CDA “needs a solid-linguistic basis while 
understanding language in a broad structural-functional sense” (2001: 112). Although Wodak 
preserves the view of CDA as a form of social practice, she considers the linguistic element 
her priority in the ‘demystification journey’ of a CDA study. She describes discourse as: 
A complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which 
manifests themselves within and a cross social fields of action and thematically semiotic, 
oral and written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, that is 
genre.                                                                                                                     (2001: 66) 
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Fairclough combines aspects of perspective and topic and considers them as major elements 
in the process of discourse construction/identification. According to Fairclough, discourse is 
perceived as “(a) representing some particular part of the world, and (b) representing it from a 
particular perspective” (as cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 60). Similarly, Chouliaraki views the 
notion of discourse as ‘constitutive of social practice’. She points out that power is obtained 
through social positions and that a “discourse sets up a constitutive relationship between 
meaning and power within social practice” (2002: 84). Wodak and Meyer note the 
similarities in the relationship between discourse and language use, and that between 
grammar and realised language, they illustrate that “in the same way as grammar 
characterises the structure of sentences, discourse rules characterise utterances/ texts that are 
acceptable within a certain practice” (2009: 17). In other words, discourse “implies patterns 
and commonalities of knowledge and structures whereas a text is specific and unique 
realisation of a discourse”, meaning, “a text creates no sense in itself but only in connection 
with knowledge of the world and of the text” (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008: 6, 8). 
 
However, it is important to highlight that many CDA scholars do not consider discourse as 
being restricted to verbal communication. For instance, Bloomaert regards discourse as ‘a 
general mode of semiosis’ and describes it as ‘language in action’ (2005: 2). In a similar way, 
Van Dijk attempts to compile the different dimensions of discourse under one definition and 
concludes that discourse:  
[is] at the same time a linguistic (verbal, grammatical) object (meaning sequences of 
words or sentences), an action (such as an assertion or a threat), a form of social 
interaction (like a conversation), a social practice (such as a lecture), a mental 
representation (a meaning, a mental model, an opinion, knowledge), an interactional or 
communicative event or activity (like parliamentary debates), a cultural product (like a 
telenovela) or even an economic commodity that is being sold and bought (like a novel).   
                                                                            (Van Dijk, cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 61) 
 
Furthermore, Wodak explains that that although discourse is described as a ‘linguistic action’, 
its more accepted interpretation is that it can be realised by in all semiotic forms; e.g. 
“written, visual or oral communication, verbal or nonverbal, undertaken by social actors in a 
specific setting determined by social rule, norms and conventions” (2008: 5). In this 
particular project, discourse is perceived as a medium that plays a role beyond utterances or 
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written texts, it is a tool by which social identity is represented, power is practiced, and 
domination is legitimised. Discourse is the way whereby a small group could control large 
groups willingly.   
 
 
2.5 Analysis in the context of CDA 
Initially, it is essential to understand the interdisciplinary nature of CDA. This is confirmed 
by several theoretical paradigms, from various schools to achieve its explanatory aspirations. 
Therefore, CDA is theoretically and methodologically diverse which supplies CDA with a 
defiant, eclectic aspect (Kendall,2007; Weiss & Wodak 2007; KhosraviNik 2015). Based on 
research questions and the available data, CDA demonstrates a notable flexibility, offering 
researchers to choose from a wide range of grand to micro-level theories along with a broad 
spectrum of methodological frameworks. However, since the central value of CDA is its 
aspiration to uncover the inequality practice or misuse of power within societies, it is 
essential to highlight that CDA is heavily interconnected with other disciplines like politics 
and sociology. Bloor & Bloor argue that: “CDA shares interests, and sometimes methods, 
with disciplines that study social groups and social structures, such as anthropology, 
sociology, ethnography and ethnomethodology, and with disciplines that are concerned with 
human cognition and behaviour, such as cognitive and social psychology” (2007: 2). In other 
words, at any CDA project, the relationship between the social and the linguistic theories rely 
heavily on the aspirations of that particular project. This relationship could lead to difficulties 
when operating the research process (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; KhosraviNik 2015). Weiss 
& Wodak highlight that “the complex interrelations between discourse and society cannot be 
analysed adequately unless linguistic and sociological approaches are combined” (2007: 7). 
Furthermore, Wodak emphasises the need to develop a model of analysis that incorporates a 
combination of cognitive, linguistics and sociological categories (2006). Moreover, she 
asserts that CDA researchers should take into account the conceptual tools that relate best to 
their research questions, rather than questioning the need, or otherwise, for a grand theory (as 
cited in KhosraviNik, 2015). Seeking to decode the relation between discourse and society, 
the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) depends significantly on the integration of the 
socio-political, cultural and historical characteristics of society; thereby rendering it highly 
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eclectic. This eclectic aspect does not appear to be limited to DHA. KhosraviNik points out 
that “Eclecticism, in any case, seems to be a common analytical feature of most applied CDA 
studies carried out by different researchers in different contexts” (2015: 63). 
 
However, Chilton (2005) argues that attempts to integrate cognitive procedures within 
discourse-analytical approaches are to some extent insufficient in relation to their cognitive 
contents. As a solution, he suggests that a discourse analysis enterprise should adopt an 
entirely cognitive scheme, giving more attention to human-cognitive capacities. Chilton 
(2004) claims, if we do so, this will demonstrate how CDA is redundant as bringing nothing 
new to human knowledge. Nonetheless, such a view seems to minimise CDA’s awareness 
and interest in social change. Wodak highlights that discourse analysis “provides a general 
framework for problem-oriented social research”, and at the same time is open for “the 
integration of different dimensions of interdisciplinary and multiple perspectives on the 
object investigated” (Wodak, cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 63). The criticality of discourse 
studies is not limited to analysis. Indeed, they are critical in terms of theory and application 
(Van Dijk 2009); thus, “the interdisciplinarity of CDA is not only geared towards academic 
rigour, it also contributes to critique in terms of commitment to change” (KhosraviNik 2015: 
63). In response to Chilton’s (2004,2005) arguments, Fairclough acknowledges that 
cognitively-oriented research on discourse can ‘complement the dialectical-relational 
approach’. nevertheless, he rejects the claim that “an absence of attention to cognitive issues 
is a ‘blindspot’ in the approach, still less that it in some sense invalidates the approach” 
(2009: 183). Fairclough argues: 
The fact that people have cognitive capacities which make them in principle capable of 
seeing through manipulative intentions and even doing their own political critique (which 
CDA, far from discounting presupposes) does not mean they are generally capable in 
practice of seeing through the complex dialectical relations between semiotic and non-
semiotic elements which constitute the social, political and economic conditions of their 
lives.                                                                                                                     (2009: 183) 
 
Another criticism of CDA was presented by Billig (2008) who alerts analysts to using 
technical language (particularly, nominalisation and passivisation) in the construction of their 
CDA research. He argues that critical discourse analysts “sometimes depict language (rather 
than language-users) as doing things, as if language, or particular forms of language, is the 
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agent of action” (as cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 64). Meanwhile, many language analysts 
predominantly use active verbs that commonly attribute agency to humans. He goes on to 
suggest that “critical analysts can use this way of writing even when warning of the 
ideological dangers of attributing agency to non-agentic entities” (2008: 793). In response, 
Van Dijk (2008) refutes this critique and refers to Billig’s concern over the use of 
nominalisation in CDA writings as a ‘pseudo-problem’ claiming that nominalisations are 
modestly utilised and that CDA does not consider power as an outcome of language per se. 
According to Weiss and Wodak (2007) and Fairclough (2008), power can be challenged, 
manipulated, maximised or minimised by language but it is not driven by language per se, 
and the context of the language used should be considered within the analysis (as cited in 
KhosraviNik 2015: 64). 
 
2.6 Power and Ideology within CDA 
The notions of power and ideology are core in any critical enterprise and CDA studies in 
particular since CDA interest is ‘revealing structures of power and unmasking ideologies’ 
(Wodak & Meyer 2009: 8). The relationship between language and power yields a particular 
interest in CDA, Within this context, power refers to ‘relations of difference’ and, more 
specifically, to ‘the effects of differences’ in social structures (Weiss & Wodak, 2007: 15). 
However, power is indicated not only by grammatical forms within a text, but also by an 
individual’s social status and the control they wield over a group. This could elucidate why 
CDA typically pays more attention to the language of those in power, ‘who are responsible 
for the existence of inequalities’ (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 9). Weiss and Wodak argue that 
“power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to 
subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and the long term” (2007: 15). This 
interpretation does not downplay the role of language in constituting social power at all but 
explains the interrelationship between both language and power in which the former could 
strengthen the latter and vice versa. Habermas claims “language is also a medium of 
domination and social force. It serves to legitimise relations of organised power. Insofar as 
the legitimisations of power relations…are not articulated…language is also ideological” 
(1967: 259). 
18 
 
 
 
However, despite the complexity of power relations and the distinct concepts in which it can 
be defined, CDA is concerned specifically with power ‘abuse’, which includes unaccepted 
social practices such as: ‘dominance’, ‘control’, ‘hegemony’ and ‘inequality’. Regarding 
CDA, power is often perceived as being “central for understanding the dynamics and 
specifics of control (of action) in modern societies, but power remains mostly invisible” 
(Wodak & Meyer 2009: 10). Similarly, Van Dijk (1993b) argues: “Power involves control, 
namely by (members of) one group over (those of) other groups. Such control may pertain to 
action and cognition: that is, a powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, but 
also influence their minds” (p. 254). He highlights that power can be exercised directly using 
‘force’ to take control of an action (e.g police Vs. protesters), or through what he calls 
‘modern’ and ‘more effective’ power, which is exercised subconsciously through 
‘persuasion’, ‘dissimulation’ or ‘manipulation’(Van Dijk, 1993b). 
 
With regard to the relationship between power and language, Fairclough (2001) identifies 
two major aspects of this relationship; power ‘in discourse’ and power ‘behind discourse’. 
Power in discourse refers to the exercise and enactment of ‘relations of power’ within a 
specific discourse. This could manifest in a face-to-face conversation (e.g. professor vs. 
student) or a ‘cross-cultural’ discourse (e.g. job interviewer vs. foreign applicants). 
Conversely, power behind discourse pertains to the effects of power relations in shaping and 
constituting the dimensions of social orders within individual institutions or societies 
(Fairclough, 2001). A remarkable characteristic of ‘power behind discourse’ is that it often 
subtly controls access to orders of discourse and elite social institutions or positions 
(Fairclough 2001). This view concurs with Van Dijk, who claims: 
 
Lack of power is also measured by its lack of active or controlled access to discourse: in 
everyday life, most ‘ordinary’ people only have active access to conversations with 
family members, friends or colleagues. They have more or less passive access to 
bureaucrats in public agencies ot to professionals (e.g. doctors, teachers, police officers).  
                                                                                                                           (1993b: 256)                                                                                                                                        
 
From a post-structuralist view, power is connected primarily to human agency and regarded 
as a non-transitional practice; whereby no individual/group can be dominant across all 
discourse. Indeed, an individual/group might be influential in one context and powerless in 
another (Rudvin 2005; Baker & Ellece 2010). Overall, it seems that there is a consensus 
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among many CDA analysts that power is not an individual practice. Wodak and Meyer claim 
“it is rare that a text is the work of only one person” (2009: 10). Fairclough also adds a 
crucial note and asserts that “power, whether it be ‘in’ or ‘behind’ discourse, is never 
definitely held by any one person” (2001: 36). Furthermore, Van Dijk argues, that power and 
social dominance are commonly ‘organised and institutionalised’, therefore they are ‘not 
merely enacted individually’, they could be supported by other group members, ‘legitimised 
by law’ and ‘reproduced by media’ (1993b: 255). 
 
Conversely, the concept of ideology is firmly connected to power and therefore, to 
language/discourse. The ideology/power relationship is manifested in the role that power 
relations play and underlie many ideological assumptions, and thus, ideologies work as 
legitimising tools for existing social relations and power variation. Fairclough (2001) depicts 
the relationship between ideology and language as ‘closely linked’ and explains that “because 
using language is the commonest form of social behaviour, and the form of social behaviour 
where we rely most on ‘common-sense’ assumptions” (2001: 2). This concurs with Van 
Dijk’s view that, “ideologies are the fundamental social cognitions that reflect the basic aims, 
interests and values of groups” (1993b: 258). Similarly, Thompson points out that ideology 
refers to social forms and processes within which, and using which, symbolic forms circulate 
in the social world (cited in Weiss & Wodak, 2007). For CDA, ideology is perceived as an 
intrinsic factor in “establishing and maintaining unequal power relations”; therefore, it is not 
regarded positively (Weiss & Wodak, 2007:14). Another aspect of ideology is that it is 
mostly inexplicitly exercised and indirectly presented as a typical everyday belief. Van Dik 
describes ideologies as being “(metaphorically and hence vaguely) be seen as the 
fundamental cognitive ‘programmers’ or ‘operating systems’ that organize and monitor the 
more specific social attitudes of groups and their members” (1993b: 258). Wodak and Meyer 
(2009) characterise it as being the more ‘hidden and latent’ pattern of our common beliefs. 
Fairclough holds a more Marxist view of ideologies and sees them as discursive practices 
stemming from particular stances or perspectives: 
Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and 
maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in 
ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities 
(and therefore styles).                                                                       (Fairclough, 2003: 218) 
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However, he argues that ideologies can not be ‘read off’ from texts because ‘meanings are 
produced through interpretations of texts’ (Fairclough, 1992: 88-89). Critical analysis of 
ideology offers us the chance to dismantle the construction of cognitive, vague relationships 
between ideas and discourse on the one hand and the relationship between ideology and 
‘mental management’ of discourse on the other (Van Dijk 1995, Balfaqeeh 2007). 
 
 
2.7 The Discourse-Historical Approach  
One of the most influential approaches to discourse analysis and CDA, in particular, is DHA, 
developed by Ruth Wodak and collaborators at Vienna University (Wodak, Menz, Mitten & 
Stern 1994; Wodak, 1997a; Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart 1999). The DHA claimed 
to be the most linguistically focused on the approaches; it is concerned with establishing a 
theory of discourse through a connection of fields of action, genres, discourses and text. It is 
an approach that works interdisciplinary, multi-methodically and utilises a variety of 
empirical data to unite the textual and contextual levels of analysis. Although the emergence 
of DHA was centred on political issues, it “seeks to integrate as many as of the genres of 
discourse referring to a particular matter as possible, as well as the historical dimension of 
that issue” (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999: 91). It is known for its openness to 
interdiciplinarity and combining theoretical discourse studies with ethnographic fieldwork 
(Baker, Gabrielatos, KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, McEnery & Wodak 2008). Together with 
Van Dijk’s approach, DHA constitutes a distinctive paradigm in analysing the presentation of 
Self and Other (KhosraviNik, 2105). As its name suggests, the DHA pays great attention to 
the historical dimension of the issue under investigation, by emphasising the historical 
analysis of ‘discourse in place’ (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). The DHA distinguishes 
between ‘discourse’ and ‘text’; it perceives text as being a component of discourse, and 
characterises discourse as having ‘(a) a macro-topic relatedness, (b) pluri-perspectivity and 
(c) argumentativity’ as its constitutive elements (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 89). In application, 
the DHA takes into account three required procedures; ‘the content of the data, the discursive 
strategies employed and the linguistic realisation of these contents and strategies’ (Van 
Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999: 91). Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 95) summarise the most important 
principles of DHA as follows: 
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1. The approach is interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity involves theory, methods, 
methodology, research practice and practical application. 
2. The approach is problem-oriented. 
3. Various theories and methods are combined, wherever integration leads to an 
adequate understanding and explanation of the research object. 
4. Research incorporates fieldwork and ethnography (study from ‘inside’) if it is 
required for a thorough analysis and theorising of the object under investigation. 
5. Research necessarily moves recursively between theory and empirical data. 
6. Numerous genres and public spaces, as well as intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationships, are studied. 
7. Historical context is taken into account in interpreting texts and discourses. A 
historical orientation permits the reconstruction of how recontexualisation functions 
as an important process linking texts and discourses intertextually and 
interdiscursively over time. 
8. Categories and tools are not fixed once and for all. They must be elaborated for each 
analysis, according to the specific problem under investigation. 
9. ‘Grand theories’ often serves as a foundation. In specific analyses, however, ‘middle-
range theories’ frequently provide a better theoretical basis. 
10. The application/applicability of results is an important target. Results should be made 
available to and applied by experts and be communicated to the public. 
 
Compared to other CDA approaches, Wodak and Meyer (2009: 87-119) describe DHA as 
‘the most linguistically oriented of the approaches’. In comparison with Van Dijk’s socio-
cognitive approach, DHA appears interested in the broader impact of the socio-political 
events on the process of discourse production and interpretation (KhosraviNik, 2015). Being 
historically-oriented, the DHA addresses the historical dimension of a discursive act 
methodologically in two ways: ‘The first is the integration of all available information on the 
historical background and the original course in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded, the 
second is the exploration of the ways in which particular types and genres of discourse are 
subject to diachronic change’ (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 69). 
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2.7.1 The representation of Self/Other in CDA 
An effective way in the constitution of social power and shaping power relations and 
ideologies is the construction of group identities within discourses. Group identities equip 
those in power to preserve their own ascendancy, legitimise inequality, and naturalise 
discriminatory practice. “Social identities reflect the way individuals and groups internalise 
established social categories within their societies, such as their cultural (or ethnic) identities, 
gender identities, class identities, and so on. These social categories shape our ideas about 
who we think we are, how we want to be seen by others, and the groups to which we belong” 
(Zevallos, 2011). The group's identification/representations in societies based on race, 
ethnicity, religion…etc., paves the way for unequal power relations “where hegemonic 
ideologies enforce a dichotomous representation of Us vs Them” (KhosraviNik, 2015: 71). 
Andrew Okolie argues: 
Social identities are relational; groups typically define themselves in relation to others. 
This is because identity has little meaning without the “other”. So, by defining itself a 
group defines others. Identity is rarely claimed or assigned for its own sake. These 
definitions of self and others have purposes and consequences. They are tied to rewards 
and punishment, which may be material or symbolic. There is usually an expectation of 
gain or loss as a consequence of identity claims. This is why identities are contested. 
Power is implicated here, and because groups do not have equal powers to define both 
self and the other, the consequences reflect these power differentials. Often notions of 
superiority and inferiority are embedded in particular identities.                            (2003: 2) 
 
Whether through media, education, law or even politicians statements, language contributes 
significantly to the construction of Self and Other group/s. Moving from the theoretical level 
to the operational level, DHA (Wodak, 2001) proposes a set of strategies, utilised in varying 
degrees in analysing the prejudiced discourses against the minority out-groups. These 
include: Referential strategies which aim to construct the in-groups and out-groups through 
membership categorization devices such as: biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing 
metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches; Predicational strategies which occur by labelling 
social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively through the 
use of some stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits; Argumentation 
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strategies which rely on some topoi1 in the justification of positive or negative attributions, 
political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment of the receptive 
persons or groups; Perspectivation where speakers express their involvement in discourse, 
and position their point of view; finally Intensification and mitigation which aim to modify 
the epistemic status of a proposition through emphasizing or de-emphasizing the illocutionary 
force or discriminatory utterances (see Table 1, p.24).       
Nevertheless, the contemplation of all or some of these strategies is determined by the type of 
data and the socio-political characteristics of the context. In the interest of the dichotomous 
representation of Us vs Them, many studies explore the construction of Self and Other group 
in discriminatory discourses and discuss various functions of these strategies (Wodak et al., 
1990; Wodak & Matouscheck, 1993; Wodak et al., 1994; Wodak et al., 1999; Resigil & 
Wodak, 2001, 2009; KhosraviNik, 2015). These studies have developed an analytical 
paradigm that embraces strategies of argumentation, perspectiviation and mitigation together 
with topoi analysis. Other studies integrate features from cognitive psychology (Van Dijk 
1987, 1989, 1991; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) and investigate how social practices; for 
example, racism and ethnic prejudice are exercised through the construction of in-group and 
out-group. 
                                                          
1 Reisigl and Wodak (2001) characterize topoi as “parts of argumentation which belongs to the obligatory, either explicit or 
inferable premises” (2001: 5-74). They justify the transition from the argument to the conclusion.      
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Table 1. Strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (adapted from Wodak, 2001) 
 
Strategies Objective Devices  Examples from the news corpus 
 
Referential/Nomination Construction  of in-groups and out-
groups 
Membership categorization 
Biological, naturalizing and 
depersonalizing metaphors  and 
metonymies 
Synecdoches  
‘. . . the pitiful convoy’ 
‘. . . an army of 110,000 Iraqi 
refugees’ 
Predication         Labelling social actors more 
or less positively or negatively, 
deprecatorily or appreciatively 
 
Stereotypical, evaluative  attribution 
of negative or positive traits 
Implicit and explicit predicates 
‘Calais is still crawling with asylum 
seekers trying to break into Britain.’ 
Argumentation   Justification of positive or negative 
attributions 
Topoi used to justify political 
inclusion or exclusion, 
discrimination or preferential 
treatment. 
‘… if too many arrive in an 
uncontrolled manner, the structure of 
society in an already overcrowded 
island cannot cope’ 
 
Perspectivation, framing or  
discourse representation 
Expressing involvement positioning 
speakers’ point of view 
Reporting, description, narration or 
quotation of events and utterances 
‘BRITAIN was warned last night 
it faces a massive benefits bill 
to pay for the looming influx of 
immigrants . . .’ 
Intensification, mitigation Modifying the epistemic status of a 
proposition  
Intensifying or mitigating the 
illocutionary  force or 
(discriminatory)  utterances 
‘. . . the politically correct dictators of 
liberal fashion . . . will never concede 
that most asylum-seekers are 
economic migrants,  rather than 
people fleeing persecution.’ 
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2.8 Legitimisation in Discourse 
Since CDA aims to reveal structures of power and ideological practice in societies from a 
linguistic perspective, it also identifies the discursive strategies used by social actors to 
achieve them. Different systems of authority frequently seek to use language to persuade or 
legitimise their audience of taking or not taking action to change or perpetuate the status quo. 
Although this is not always the case as sometimes legitimisation may occur by forcing others 
to do or believe what we want them to do or believe (Balfaqeeh, 2007), language, undoubtedly, 
is considered the most important vehicle for constructing legitimacy (Van Leeuwen, 2007). 
Therefore, in this study the researcher draws more attention to language of ‘legitimisation’ as 
a core aspect of achieving goals through the discursive practice of words. Various strategies 
may occur by social actors within discourse consciously or subconsciously, to legitimise or 
de-legitimise an action. That is to say, “through discourse, social actors constitute knowledge, 
situations, social roles as well as identities and interpersonal relations between various 
interacting social groups” (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 92). 
 
Van Leeuwen and Wodak identified four types of strategies in which discursive acts can be 
socially constitutive: 
 1- Constructive strategies 
 2- Strategies of perpetuation and justification 
 3- Strategies of transformation 
 4- Destructive strategies                                                                                              (1999: 92) 
 
First, they can work as constructive policies where they serve to build and establish social 
groups using linguistic utterances which determine the in-group ‘we, us’ and the out-group 
‘they, them’. This is usually achieved by calling for audience solidarity with the in-group and 
at the same time widening the gap and creating more barriers with the out-group (e.g. 
conservative vs. liberals). Secondly, strategies of perpetuation and justification are intended to 
preserve identities by justifying the rejection of a potential change to the status quo. For 
example, it is claimed that the rejection of women driving will save the nation’s religious 
identity. Thirdly, strategies of transformation, endeavour to change one situation into another, 
for instance, by reformulating words of the laws into others that serve the oncoming 
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transformation. Finally, destructive strategies are thought to be adopted more frequently by 
the opposition, as they aim to eliminate the current situation (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). 
 
 
2.8.1 Van Leeuwen’s four categories of legitimisation 
In this study, the researcher’s primary interest is to discover which legitimization strategies 
are utilised within the discourse of both the opponents and the proponents of women driving 
in Saudi Arabia. The researcher believes that focusing on the language of legitimation would 
raise critical awareness of many issues that are worth considering. Van Leeuwen (1996, 
2007), developed a set of four major categories of legitimation with several sub-types that 
aimed to uncover the mechanism of constructing legitimation in discourse and reflect on the 
problems that currently encounter legitimisation. The four major categories are as follows: 
 
1- Authorisation 
2- Moral Evaluation 
3- Rationalisation 
4- Mythopoesis 
 
 
Authorisation 
Authorisation is a common strategy employed to legitimise or de-legitimise actions by 
referring them to an authority figure. It may take different forms (e.g. personal authority, 
impersonal authority, expert authority…etc) but all lead to a single goal; legitimisation. Van 
Leeuwen (2007), classified authorisation into six sub-types: personal authority, expert 
authority, role model authority, impersonal authority, authority of tradition and authority of 
conformity. 
 
- Personal authority occurs when a whole legitimate authority is represented in one person 
decision or opinion because of the position or role he/she occupies in a particular institution. 
Although such authorities may provide explanations to support their arguments, in some 
institutions they are not expected to justify what they ask others to do for the sake of their 
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authority. For example, when teachers or parents give verbal instructions containing some 
form of obligation modality, such orders specify the relationship between the speaker and the 
addressee, as the speaker positions himself in command and others are expected to obey; for 
example, open the book on, wash your hands…etc. (Halliday, 1985; Hu Zhuanglin, 1988). 
 
- Expert authority occurs when an expert voice is expressed. This may include naming a well-
known figure’s opinion in the context rather than constructing a strong logical argument. This 
type of authority gains its power from the fact that although those experts are trusted and 
heavily respected among their societies, the use of exact numbers and statistics adds a more 
compelling feature to their arguments (Van Dijk, 1988; Reyes, 2011). For example: 
 
Dr. Paul says it is best not to use a computer for more than four hours each day. 
 
- Role model authority is legitimisation through the reliance on a role model popularity 
among people. Whether in the form of a group (e.g. Chelsea footballers support the decision 
of...) or as an individual celebrity (e.g. Lionel Messi agrees with...), the fact that those role 
models believe or adopt a certain stance or attitude is enough to legitimise their followers’ 
actions without further questioning. This role model authority may occur implicitly by 
revealing the celebrities involved in the activities purporting to be legitimised (Van Leeuwen, 
2007). 
 
- Impersonal authority is practiced through reference to rules, policies and regulations. Unlike 
personal authority in this authority an action might be legitimate not because ‘the boss said 
that’, instead because the ‘rules say that…’. This legitimation does not always take the 
explicit form as in (e.g. the regulations state that….). However, it may occur in the shape of 
some obligatory adjectives or adverbs (e.g. compulsory, mandatory); for example: ‘It is 
compulsory to achieve an overall score of 7 in IELTS to be accepted’. 
 
- Authority of tradition is another type of legitimation where terms like ‘ traditions’, ‘ habits’ 
and ‘customs’ can be used to persuade the audience of the legitimacy of a particular action. In 
this type of authority, it is assumed that ‘because we have been doing this in the past’ it is 
enough to claim legitimacy (Van Leeuwen, 2007). 
28 
 
 
 
- Authority of conformity occurs when the speaker assumes that ‘because everyone else is 
doing this, we should do it as well’. This conformity legitimation can be performed implicitly 
(e.g. everybody is doing that) or explicitly by comparison with others (e.g. my classmates 
have done that, so I did). However, these days conformity is mostly practiced by the inclusion 
of high-frequency modality (e.g. most, many, the majority of…etc) that reflects a statistical-
based argument, although no real numbers are revealed. “Contemporary law makers 
increasingly believe that, if most people are doing it, it cannot be wrong. And should be 
legalized” (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 97). 
 
Moral Evaluation 
Moral evaluation legitimation is constructed in accordance with morality and values. The use 
of evaluative adjectives such as ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ when describing 
social acts or actors triggers a moral concept for audience. Therefore, an action to stop ‘evil’ 
will be morally accepted and welcomed (e.g. the US ‘war on terror’). Moral evaluation has 
three sub-types: evaluation, abstraction and analogies. Moral evaluation abstraction is 
practiced by foregrounding desired status or qualities (e.g. ‘freedom’ ‘independence’) within 
discourse in a straightway that adds a moral value to a potential action. For instance, instead 
of saying ‘women will drive soon’ we might say ‘women will be independent soon’. 
Another type of moral evaluation in discourse is the analogy comparisons. This kind of 
legitimation is practiced implicitly by comparing an activity to a similar one who had positive 
outcomes, or a one with adverse results in the case of de-legitimation. This can be stemmed 
from the fourth source of legitimation in Islam called in Arabic ‘Qiyas’ meaning analogical 
reason, as we will see later in more details. However, an analogical comparison can also be 
expressed explicitly using similar conjunctions (e.g. like, similar to, same as). 
 
Rationalisation 
Rationalisation is another strategy of legitimation where a speaker pictures his/her proposal to 
the audience as a result of a thoughtful, pre-planned and discussed procedure. This type of 
rationalisation is recognised linguistically by clauses that contain verbs or phrases of 
‘consulting’ or its equivalents, such as ‘after consultations, recommendations, discussions, 
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advise’ (Thompson, 2004; Reyes, 2011). According to Van Leeuwen, there are two types of 
rationality, instrumental and theoretical. Instrumental rationalisation is constructed in 
discourse to explain why social practices exist, what are their purposes? To some extent, it is 
similar to legitimisation whereby they explain the purposes of taking or not taking action, but 
to serve as a legitimisation, Van Leeuwen believes: “Purpose constructions must contain an 
element of moralization” (2007: 101). Theoretical rationalisation is close to the process of 
naturalisation in which legitimation is grounded in whether the action is established on some 
kind of truth, ‘on the way things are’. Van Leeuwen states three forms of what he calls 
‘theoretical legitimation’: 
The first is the definition, in which one activity is defined in terms of another, moralised 
activity. The second is the explanation, where one or more of the actors involved in the social 
practice are defined or characterised therefore, the legitimisation is because ‘doing things this 
way is appropriate to the nature of these actors’. The final form of theoretical legitimisation is 
the predictions, they are meant to be based on expertise and they can therefore be denied by 
contrary experience at least in principle. Like moral evaluations, they function as common-
sense knowledge, regardless of whether they originate in theoretical rationalisations or not, 
but they are more explicitly formulated, and therefore more open to debate (2007: 104). 
 
Mythopoesis 
Another legitimation strategy is through the narrative and storytelling. On the one hand, this 
can take the form of moral tales, where in case of legitimation, a story character is rewarded 
and praised for engaging in noble social practices. This hero may face some difficulties 
throughout the story but at the end, consequences are usually happy and valuable. On the 
other hand, cautionary tales is mainly the opposite since instead of following the norms of 
social practices, the story character engage in an odd activity that normally leads to a 
shameful and unhappy ending. These strategies of legitimation may take place individually or 
in combination. They have been adopted to the analysis of the political discourse of some 
Austrians officials when justifying the rejection of immigrants’ petitions to be reunited with 
their families in Austria (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). 
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However, legitimisation is not limited necessarily to these four main categories proposed by 
Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007, 2008) they are possible to some further developments and 
alterations. Antonio Reyes (2011) in his analysis of the political speeches given by George 
W.Bush and Barack Obama to justify their military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, applied 
and developed some of these categories. He proposed five strategies of legitimisation that 
have been used to justify social practices; these strategies are: legitimatisation through 
emotions, legitimatisation through a hypothetical future, legitimatisation through rationality, 
legitimatisation through voices of expertise and altruism (Reyes, 2011). 
 
2.9 Computer-Mediated Communication and the Online Public Sphere 
2.9.1 The online public sphere 
With the growing popularity and the quick spread of the Internet, many people around the 
globe turn daily to the online media or social media for interacting, sharing news and 
information. Online media attract millions of users for its ease of access and the speed of data 
transferring. Another important reason is the low cost they offer, since browsing online 
newspapers cost less than buying its hard copy version, and predominantly they are free of 
charge. After decades of the mainstream media domination on news reporting, commercial 
advertising and shaping public opinion, the Internet era and the burst of new media outlets 
(e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) has broken to some extent the hegemony of the old 
media (e.g. television, radio and journalism). New media platforms that stem from the power 
of the Internet technology in all its different versions trounce mass media; whereby they offer 
ordinary people the chance to free themselves from being in the recipient position. Unlike the 
mass media norms where public involvement is limited and highly monitored, new media 
facilitate the inclusion of public into an extensive broadcasting network, sharing their 
opinions about a certain topic or news, exchanging experiences or even broadcasting 
themselves. 
In fact, in some cases new media allowed the ordinary people to be the primary source of 
information and to act as the news agency that provides main TV channels with exclusive 
video clips regarding a particular issue of public interest. These distinctive features opened 
the road for public to create their own communities of discussion, widen their freedom of 
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speech and to enjoy safer platforms of expression regarding their political, social or personal 
matters, this is noted most in the authoritarian and repressive states (Lynch, 2007). These 
spaces of discussions are considered as the online public sphere where public use computers, 
or its equivalents (e.g. tablets, mobile phones) as a mediation to do so away from the unjust 
censorship. Jürgen Habermas, a pioneering scholar on this topic defined the public sphere first 
as: “An entity that comes into being when private individuals assemble to form a public body. 
They then behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor 
like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy” 
(cited in Elvin 2002: 49). Later, Habermas (1989) developed his concept of the public sphere: 
“A domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to 
the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens….citizens act as a public when they deal 
with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion” (1989: 231). Ordinary 
people who used to claim that their voices have been neglected, marginalised or suppressed 
by their authoritarian regimes who usually control mass media, those people can now 
participate online in various taboo topics with more identity privacy. Whether they post 
comments following a news published on an official journal website, make their fora or pages 
where debates and discussions occur after events or even having a dialectically mediated 
conversation following a video uploaded on YouTube. According to Habermas (1989), a 
public sphere is viewed as an independent arena, accessible universally, where public opinion 
is constructed by tackling bold unfiltered discussions. 
However, Nancy Fraser (1992) argued that Habermas’s original theory of the public sphere 
was not reachable nor perceived by all. Habermas’s first envisioned the public sphere as a 
solo space where privileged men gather to discuss and debate in a more democratic 
atmosphere, with an exclusion of women and other marginalised groups in society (Loke, 
2013). Fraser (1992) disagrees with this single concept as she theorised that the public sphere 
comprises multi-public spaces offering ordinary people to anticipate regardless of their sex or 
class.  
Moreover, the public sphere is regarded as a democratic online plaza where public opinions 
are heard and discussed on their own merits, without paying attention to the blogger’s race, 
religion or social class (Poor 2005). Further studies favour the democratic conception of the 
public sphere and enhance its role in facilitating the online civic engagement (e.g. Paulussen, 
2004; Lowrey & Anderson, 2005; Ng & Detenber, 2005). Anonymity is another essential 
32 
 
 
 
feature that encourages a massive number of people to create their accounts in these public 
spaces, interact and deliver their voices safely (as will elaborate on later). 
However, this excessive visualisation about the democracy of online public spheres was faced 
with some constraints regarding the Internet’s limited ability (Dahlberg, 2001; Cammaerts & 
Audenhove, 2003). Dahlberg (2001) evaluated the conception of the online public sphere 
based on a set of six normative conditions stemmed from Habermas’ theory of democratic 
communication. These normative conditions are autonomy from state and economic power, 
Exchange and critique of criticisable moral-practical validity claims, reflexivity, ideal role-
taking, sincerity, and finally discursive inclusion and equality. After observing and evaluating 
cyber discourse using these conditions, Dahlberg argues that cyber discourse that is 
constructed when people engage in political discussions does not meet the criteria of a public 
sphere model because: 
First, the increasing commodification of cyberspace threatens the autonomy of public 
interaction online. Second, reflexivity is often a very minimal part of cyber-deliberations. 
Third, many online fora experience a lack of respectful listening to others and minimal 
commitment to working with difference. Fourth, there is difficulty verifying identity 
claims and information put forward. Fifth, extensive exclusions from online fora result 
from social inequalities. Finally, discourse tends to be quantitatively and qualitatively 
dominated by certain individuals and groups.                                                      (2001, n.p)                                                                                                                          
 
In evaluating Habermas’s model, Poor (2005) does not see that ‘online’ is enough to 
distinguish an online public sphere from a face-to-face public domain. He presented four 
criteria for the online public sphere to be called so: 
1- Public spheres are spaces of discourse, often mediated 
2- Public spheres often allow for new, previously excluded, discussants 
3- Issues discussed are often political in nature 
4- Ideas are judged by their merit, not by the standing of the speaker. (p.4) 
 
A further critique about the online public spheres as Dahlberg (2001) noted, that discussions 
that occur in online communities or as he call it “communities of interest”, are not helping to 
establish a rational and critical debate. He illustrates this is because people online tend to join 
discussions with others of similar or same interests, beliefs and values, to offer each other or 
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seek from others emotional support and advice. This results in displaying sympathy and 
reinforcing each other’s ideas, rather than evaluating them critically. 
However, if these critics struck a chord with some sceptics, this is not always the case. 
Occasionally, the public sphere reflects not only the content broadcast on mainstream media, 
but also covers and discusses some real-world actions, subsequently inspiring or imposing the 
mainstream media to do so ‘as will see later’ (Ayres, 2009; Van Langendonck, 2009). Social 
media generally, and the YouTube website more accurately as our study interest are thought 
to provide more democratic and independent public sphere than other online platforms. Their 
democracy appears in the fact that they provide equal opportunities to all users to represent 
their opinions. Whether by creating a private channel and uploading videos, posting 
comments, rating others video or reporting inappropriate content, YouTube thrusts the public 
into an unprecedented era. 
 
2.9.2 YouTube comments as the online public sphere 
February 2005 saw the launch of the online video-sharing website, YouTube. The site was 
designed to allow people on the web to share vlogs of notorious events (Hopkins, 2006). 
Within a short space of time, YouTube spread widely and grew its popularity worldwide; 
soon becoming the second most popular website (Alexa.com, 2017). Its fast growing 
popularity stems from the fact that YouTube as a social media site with its slogan “Broadcast 
yourself”, came to break the mainstream media monopoly by allowing people with online 
access from all over the world to simply and independently broadcast themselves. Although 
YouTube videos are available for everyone to watch; registering is essential to be able to post 
comments. This may explain the small proportion of comments (0.5% of viewers leave a 
comment) compared with the number of hits (Thelwall, Sud & Vis, 2012). Nevertheless, 
online comments are worth investigating as they provide a deeper insight into the YouTube 
audience and discussions. Many studies have examined the potential differences between 
online communication and offline communications (Herring, 2002). “In contrast to typical 
face-to-face communication, online communication might be anonymous, textual, 
asynchronous, remote, permanent, and very public, although some online forms can be none 
of these…public comments in YouTube have them all” (Thelwall, Sud & Vis 2012: 617). In 
YouTube, the public sphere in its textual form is constructed through the comments made on 
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the uploaded videos. Whether a video that was broadcast previously on mass media and re-
uploaded to YouTube or was aired exclusively by the channel owner to interact with his/her 
subscribers, registered users tend to communicate intensively through comments. 
 
Alongside alternative social media platforms, YouTube is considered a haven for those who 
have been unable to express their real opinions of mass media. This is not necessarily due to 
repression or marginalisation, but perhaps the result of other cultural, social or religious 
constraints (Friedman, Khan, & Howe, 2000). Building on Fraser’s theory of the online multi-
spaces, YouTube offers people a safer and less monitored public space than some other online 
spaces (e.g. political fora, comment sections in news’ websites). Many online fora are usually 
controlled or monitored by a person or a group with certain orientations. Other online public 
spaces like the commentary section presented by some news or journals’ websites to allow 
readers to interact and share their voices with others are not much different. Although this 
service seems to provide a convincing space of public discussions ensuring the anonymity of 
commenters, yet the comments are not instantly published as they are highly monitored and 
subject to some content regulations by the website administration before they are posted (Al-
Saggaf, 2006). Such acts of interference may affect the reader's trust of whether or not their 
opinions will be delivered to others safely, which may minimise the quality of the posted 
comments. Furthermore, in similar public spaces, online tracking or surveillance may even 
threaten free speech and hinder natural public interaction (Dahlberg, 2001). 
Unlike these online public spaces, the YouTube comments section is regarded as an 
autonomous platform free from the monitoring of the authoritarian states and groups (Al-
Saggaf, 2006). YouTube is also considered a neutral platform where all opinions are 
welcomed with no ideological bias; thereby distinguishing it from other online public spheres 
where pressure may be exerted to express a particular opinion. This might occur explicitly; for 
example, by creating a specific political forum or page with opposing orientations against a 
specific party where opinions criticising this party are usually welcomed but those in favour 
are not. It may also happen implicitly by monitoring and filtering comments, and tracking 
down bloggers as in some authoritarian states.  
It used to be less flagrant for these states to block or remove any online fora that are known 
locally and attract little or no attention globally. However, as a global phenomenon with more 
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than 1 billion users (Youtube.com, 2017) and a powerful tool for political activism, YouTube 
is placing some authoritarian states in a real bind. Blocking such a website perhaps uncovers 
the hidden intentions of these regimes in limiting and controlling people freedom of 
expression; thus, rallying global condemnation (e.g. Al-Assad’s regime blocking YouTube 
after the spread of Syrian protests’ videos at early 2011). Another example of the counter 
effect that YouTube videos may have on the outside world is the video of the death of Iranian 
protester, Neda, in June 2009 (Van Langendonck, 2009). There is also evidence that some 
salient news events were broadcast on mass media after several YouTube video posting 
(Sykora & Panek, 2009). YouTube would facilitate interactivity between users in various 
ways unless the owner disabled these features. This includes: posting a video response, 
posting a comment, liking or disliking the video or a comment and reporting a spam or abuse 
on both the video or any comment. Although users need to create accounts with some 
personal information (e.g. name, DOB, gender and location) to be able to use these features, 
they typically tend to use pseudonyms (Thelwall, Sud & Vis, 2012). 
However, this anonymity is justified, as it seems to be a crucial component for those who use 
comments on YouTube as their online public sphere and seek refuge from their state 
repression or other society constraints. In fact, anonymity induces discussants to critically 
evaluate others’ comments on their own merits (Poor, 2005). Moreover, anonymity is thought 
to encourage commenters to speak their true opinions (Loke, 2013) freely. Although YouTube 
videos popularity are measured quantitatively by the number of hits, the number of comments 
and the positive or negative rating a video has, yet comments and discussions that follow a 
video are thought to enhance a better understanding of the content (Thelwall, Sud & Vis, 
2012). 
The second part of this study focuses on the online public sphere that exists on YouTube; 
namely, the textual comments that follow some videos regarding the issue of women driving 
in Saudi Arabia. These comments are thought to reflect videos that are broadcast on TV 
before being uploaded to YouTube. They are considered an excellent tool with which to 
gauge the public pulse and reveal society’s cultural ideologies (Lange, 2008; Loke, 2013). In 
addition to the various interactivity features that YouTube offers its users, navigation through 
a massive video library is easy using a smart search engine that suggests any similar or 
relevant videos to the searched one. YouTubers can gain access to videos of their own interest 
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so they can share, discuss, argue and challenge opinions with others through the comments 
function. They can create accounts to be able to create their channels, upload videos, and post 
comments on others’ videos.   
 
 
2.10 Summary 
Since critical discourse analysis is the study’s central methodology, this chapter endeavoured 
to provide a broad understanding of the interdisciplinary nature of CDA. In this chapter, a 
summary was provided of the notion of CDA, alongside an explanation of CDA criticality, 
and its perception of other notions (e.g. power, ideology). The chapter also discussed how 
CDA views the concept of discourse, and language in society. Moreover, the central value of 
CDA that aspires to uncover and reduce the inequality practice in society was discussed, 
together with the CDA’s commitment to social change and its applicability. A background 
was given of the DHA as a fundamental approach in this study and the strategies of Self and 
Other presentations. Furthermore, Van Leeuwen’s four categories of legitimation 
(authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis) are explained extensively. 
Finally, a brief discussion of the concept of computer-mediated communication and the online 
public sphere are given, with particular interest in the YouTube comments as the source from 
which this study retrieved its data. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CULTURAL HISTORY 
Since, in the Saudi context, women driving is perceived by many outsiders and insiders as 
purely a social issue, it is crucial to review the historic background of the Kingdom to gain a 
deeper understanding of its structure. In the hope of uncovering any potential historic reasons 
for the status quo, this chapter explores the political and social formation of the Kingdom, 
alongside their development, since its establishment in 1932. The researcher believes that this 
chapter will present the reader with brief but substantially associated factors, which 
influenced the formation of the Saudi social discourse and continue to do so.          
 
 
3.1 Historical background of Saudi Arabia 
 
3.1.1 The establishment and the sacredness 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 by King Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman 
Al-Saud, a man belonging to the tribes of Najd; the central region in the Arabian Peninsula. 
King Abdul-Aziz began unifying the tribes and states of Arabia motivated by the emersion of 
the religious movement, Wahhabiya, by its founder Muhammad Abdulwahhab. Wahhabiya 
was considered an Islamic reformative movement that aims to eliminate the practice of 
blasphemy and rectify incorrect applications of many acts of worship in Islam. “Wahhabiya 
transformed personal piety into a public project, the objective of which was to create a moral 
community under the authority of a political centre” (Al-Rasheed, 2013:43). The ruling 
system of Saudi Arabia is monarchy, where the country’s leaders are among the sons of the 
founder King Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman Al-Saud and their descendants. The most eligible 
receive the ‘bay’a’ (oath of allegiance) from family members and other citizens expressing 
their loyalty in times of hardship and ease.     
With a population of almost 30 million spread over an area of 2,149.690 km2, modern Saudi 
Arabia comprises 13 main provinces. Each has a capital and many governorates; moreover, 
each province is ruled by a Governor who is typically a member of the Royal Family and is 
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appointed by the king. Islam is the main religion and Arabic the official language in Saudi 
Arabia; however, English is taught as a foreign language in schools and is used modestly in 
some urban cities. Arabs represent the vast majority of the population in Saudi Arabia, with 
few Afro-Asian ethnicities. The Kingdom plays an important role in the region and 
internationally. Economically, it derives its importance as the world’s largest producer and 
exporter of oil. Given that the country is home to approximately 25% of the world’s oil 
reserve so, there is no doubting the potential of a major impact on the energy market and the 
global economy. 
Of greater significance is the historical and religious sacredness of the Arabian Peninsula; 
specifically in Hijaz, the western region of the current Saudi Arabia, which has its roots of 
thousands of years ago. The holy city of Makkah is where prophet Ibrahim built al-bait al-
haram (the God’s home) and started practicing ‘Al-Hajj’ (pilgrimage) based upon the ‘wah’y’ 
(revelation from Allah). Since then, Makkah is known as the holiest place on earth (Al-Badah, 
2010). However, the dramatic influence began more than 14 centuries ago, when the first 
revelation of Quran occurred; prophet Muhammad started spreading the message of Islam 
from the holy land of Makkah, where he was born and raised. He immigrated to Yathreb (a 
city know currently as Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah), where he built and established the first 
mosque in Islam known as ‘Masjid Quba’. Moreover, prophet Muhammad built the holy 
mosque of Al-Madinah and his house within where he was interred in year 11 Hijri (632 AC) 
since then and to the present day, Muslims from around the globe gather every year to pray in 
the two holy mosques and occasionally practice Umra and Hajj. 
Alhussein argues that “since the country is the birthplace of Islam and the land of the 
religion’s two most holy cities, Saudi Arabia must preserve a unique Islamic identity and the 
distinct social characteristics of Saudi society” (2014:2). This distinctive Islamic heritage and 
the sacredness of the places make Makkah and Madinah the primary holy destinations for 
Muslims worldwide; therefore, this has a significant influence on the Saudi role and political 
weight among the Islamic world and internationally. Furthermore, it adds pressure to the 
Saudi ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) as their voice is constantly sought, heard and heavily 
respected among other Muslims. This could explain the prestigious nature of Islamic religious 
discourse generally, and that delivered by the Saudi ulama in particular (Al-Badah, 2010). 
However, the power of religious discourse in Islam stems from the fact that the Holy Quran 
was the miracle of Prophet Muhammad. He was sent for some Arab people known for their 
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rhetoric and oratory in versification, storytelling and giving public speeches, hundreds of 
years before the creation of Islam. The words of Allah (the Holy Quran) was outstanding, 
unpredictable and above and beyond human oratory. The fascinating power of the Quranic 
discourse was unprecedented; therefore, the people of Makkah where astounded on their first 
hearing of it. 
 
However, after the vast spread of Islam and more than 14 centuries of its existence, the Holy 
Quran is the book read most widely by Muslims worldwide. Moreover, every Friday, 
Muslims attend the ‘Khutba’ (religious preaching); consequently, the effect and power of the 
religious discourse in Islamic societies are deeply rooted. Quranic and prophetic discourse is 
used extensively as authoritative references in many aspects of Muslim life, upon which we 
will touch later. It is important to be aware, as a conservative Muslim society, Saudi people 
respect and trust the voice of ulama in their daily issues that relate largely to the principles of 
Islam. However, this voice is not always taken for granted. In fact, it should be legitimised 
and reasonably explained under the cover of ‘Sharia’ (Islamic law).  
 
 
3.1.2 The formation of the Saudi discourse 
It is essential for any researcher examining the Saudi context with a specific interest in a 
social issue (or as it seems to be), such as women driving, to adopt an ethnographic attitude in 
order to understand its roots and causes. In this study, although the main interest is how 
language is used as a legitimation tool among opponents and proponents of women driving, 
the researcher believes there are different socio-political factors that play varying roles in the 
formation of the interlocutors discourse. For this reason, the researcher adopts a discourse 
historical approach to display some of the main historic events influencing or shaping the 
discourse of the Saudi society in general; thereby, having a remarkable effect when discussing 
women driving (as will be presented in the data analysis) or similar issues.  
In the Saudi case, there is an enormous overlap between society and the state, as reflected in 
the writings of many researchers. This overlap refers to the nature of the Saudi state as it is 
closer to the multi-tasking state, “where the state is everything therefore, it can positively or 
negatively engage into all aspects of life. It is above the civil society and prevails it” (Ibrahim 
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et al, 1996: 68). Saudi Arabia was established through the formation of a tribal coalition 
supported by the Wahhabi call; the state has specific constants that shape its political, 
religious and social identity. The Salafist ideology had a huge influence when it constructed 
its religious school and appeared strong through the emergence of Wahhabism since the 
establishment of the 1st Saudi state more than two centuries ago. Moreover, the tribe has 
social and political importance as it is perceived as the main organising unit socially, 
politically and economically in the Arabian Peninsula (House, 2013).  
However, it seems that the Saudi political development remained slow in comparison with 
other economic and social spheres. According to Al-khedr (2011), the strategy of speeding up 
the development more than three decades ago aimed to maintain political stability and 
marginalise the notion of any political change. This view agrees with Huntington, who states: 
“Presumably, also, rapid economic growth creates new opportunities for entrepreneurship and 
employment and thereby diverts into money-making ambitions and talents which might 
otherwise go into coup-making” (1968: 49). 
This is not always the case as he also sees that economic development may enhance political 
ambitions and create instability. This could occur through the emergence of a new wealthy 
class that does not adapt to the political order; thereby, calling for a political participation or 
empowerment (Ibrahim et al, 1996). In Saudi society, it appears that political awareness 
remained comparable to four decades ago and did not develop, as evidenced in other Arab 
countries (for example, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait). In their resistance to the 
colonisers, these nations formed western-style political parties with the aim of gaining 
independence. However, the Saudis did not have any experience of colonisation; therefore, 
they established a national liberation movement to represent their voices.  
 
Social structure 
Numerous studies address the structure and development of Saudi society. They tackle issues 
such as the change of some social values associated with economic development and 
investigate the effect of media, education or the prevalence of crime, drugs addiction, and 
divorce….etc (Shalabi, 1990; Al-Tuwaijri, 2000; Al-Shehri, 2012). However, these studies 
provide neither deep critical insight nor intelligent characterisation since the results and 
interpretations are repeated and discussed as normal explanations; for example, working 
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parents, lack of education, family financial crisis. Saudi society comprises three different 
structures: Bedouin, rural and urban. Bedouins represent 21.77%, rural represents 26.87%, 
while 51.36% are urbans (General Authority for Statistics, 2016).  
 
At this point, it is worth noting that attempts to provide pragmatic insight into Saudi society 
are challenging. The developmental leap since the early 1970s transformed the society from 
the Bedouin, rural and simple urban mentality to one of modern and fast-growing cities and 
settlements. This included rapid progression in the economy, industry, education and health; 
all of which fell under the supervision of the state and are based on its political, religious and 
media plans, and criteria. For this reason, during this social transition over a period of three 
decades, there was no other essential resource of societal change. During this period, three 
generations were raised under a specific governmental attitude where there were no parties, 
organisations or media; thereby holding an evaluative independent discourse or perspective 
towards society and the world (Cordesman, 2009; House, 2013). However, it is essential to 
highlight that this extensive control over influential sources in the Saudi discourse is not 
necessarily a result of an authoritarian scheme; indeed, the society structure was mostly 
illiterate, which can be a part of a spontaneous historic paternalistic development.  
The sources of knowledge that formed these generations were limited to an educational 
governmental discourse based on traditional cultural vision and agendas in religion and 
politics. Also a religious preaching discourse where multi-jurisprudence is not allowed 
within the state’s religious organizations and finally to a media discourse (TV, broadcast 
and journalism) that is controlled by an official stance in the follow-up and coverage of 
every social, economic and political change or event.                          (Al-Khedr, 2011:48)                                                        
 
        
Saudi society has been exposed to other influential sources that should have shaped its 
features; for instance, during the economic boom of the 1970s, high numbers of foreigners 
and other Arabs who arrived from different cultures and multi-faiths. Moreover, the increase 
in individuals’ income helped increased incidences of travelling outside the Kingdom for 
purposes of studying and tourism, alongside the thousands of students who obtained 
scholarships to study overseas. Many researchers were relying on the elite members of society 
to return and help create an enlightenment narrative. However, the reality was completely 
different, since many contributed in the society development, albeit in the same governmental 
way. A few others adopted an enlightening role in the 1970s through the press, but before 
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long they followed the governmental discourse and became part of its theoreticians. Since 
then, the majority of Saudi elites have two different worlds that form their discourse, which 
has transferred gradually to the rest of the society. These are the official and public presence; 
whereby society should retain its values and identity, and the private and non-official 
presence in which society is portrayed as a strict and backward society. Unfortunately, this 
social hypocrisy is symbolised as a smart individual skill that is socially accepted to maintain 
personal interests; “otherwise, if you couldn’t master this social, cultural, political and media 
hypocrisy, you will be considered as a naïve” (Al-khedr, 2011: 50). This situation led elites to 
strive for key government positions and focus on personal benefits rather than enlightening 
society.  
 
Another critical factor in shaping the Saudi discourse emerged in the 1980s, following the rise 
of Al-Sahwah (a religious stream that aimed to adopt an Islamic attitude rather than a 
national), which promoted the narrative of adherence to values with an Islamic character. 
Manifestations of conservatism began to appear in society to shape its political and media 
discourse. The emphasis on privacy and similar allegations that enhance uniqueness and 
adhere to customs, became a main component of Saudi logic and speech. This discourse was 
the highest among Saudis, since it is practised in schools, universities and mosques; thereby, 
touching almost all aspects of life from a religious perspective. It is important to mention that 
although the Wahhabi school protected Saudi society from sinking in many of the polytheism 
acts common in many other societies in the region, it failed to maintain pace with the rapid 
developments experienced by Saudis. At the time, it appeared that Saudi social life became 
more and more complicated as generation after generation were living and struggling with the 
contradiction of developmental growth and a constant narrative that did not address the new 
changes in society. This narrative was sceptical and adopted a precautious attitude towards 
many emerging events that relate to social or individuals’ life without considering the creation 
of a religious awareness of social, political and economic problems. This attitude led many 
clerics to issue fatwas that forbid what is permissible in other non-Saudi contexts (e.g women 
driving), claiming the privacy of the Saudi society and based on a jurisprudential principle 
called ‘Sadd Aldharayie’ (عئارذلا دس), which depends on forbidding the permissible if it is 
thought to lead to a forbidden act (Al-Munajjed, 1997; Abou El-Fadl, 2001). In his book 
Ayam M’a Juhiman ‘Days with Juhaiman’, Nasser Al-Huzaimi states:  
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This the Salafi thinking mechanism and it is still the same as we find them keeping 
templates of ready-made arguments….but you find in their rhetoric, the prevention as a 
precaution and activating the Jurisprudential principle ‘Sadd Aldharayie’ which through it 
they prohibited what Allah has permitted.                                                              (2011:90)                                                                                                                                                                                
 
This rhetoric was heavily dominant and powerful in Saudi society until the 9/11 attacks. At 
this point, it began losing some of its power as a result of the emergence of some writings and 
critiques that unprecedentedly attacked many of Al-Sahwah’s biggest names (such as Salman 
Al-Ouda and Saad Al-Buraik). These critiques blamed the extreme interpretation of some 
religious texts by the Saudi religious schools, claiming that these attacks were a normal 
reaction to such an extreme rhetoric. However, this response was motivated by the heavy 
international campaign that targeted the Saudi state in the wake of the 9/11 attacks; in 
particular, religious schools. These international pressures and the expansion of mass media 
encouraged opposing voices (whether liberals or reformists), which were once silent or 
marginalised, to appear less timidly on the scene. These developments were regarded as a first 
step towards a slow but a growing change of Saudi social discourse (Al-Ghadhami, 2004).  
 
 
3.2 Principles of legitimisation/ legislation in Islam 
Since the dawn of Islam, Muslims were encouraged to ask and seek ‘fatwa’ (religious 
opinion) from clerics whenever they the feel the need, and about any issue. This means that 
when it comes to the application of their ‘deen’ (religion), Muslims can seek knowledge from 
their ulama, which gives those clerics the honour of being respected among their societies. 
However, according to the doctrine of Sunnah, seeking fatwa in Islam is set by four principles 
of legislation (sources of Sharia). In order of importance, these sources are: 
1- The Holy Quran 
2- ‘Sunnah Nabawiya’  (Prophetic sayings, actions, silent assertions) 
3- ‘Ijma’ (Consensus of ulama)  
4- ‘Qiyas’  (Analogical reason) 
(Zidane, 1969). 
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Fatwa should be issued by referring to Quran primarily and Sunnah subsequently. Quran – as 
the words of Allah - followed by sunnah are believed to be the main sources of all teachings 
of Islam; whereas Ijma and Qiyas are considered subsidiary and dependant resources of 
legislation (Abdullah, 2005).  Actually, Ijma and Qiyas are the opinions of the clerics 
pertaining to an issue that is neither clearly stated nor discussed in either the Quran or Sunnah. 
These opinions should be derived from the Quran and Sunnah and might change over time or 
from one place to another, depending on the nature and the situation of the society. Ijma and 
Qiyas focus more on debates and argument, while Quran and Sunnah are more concerned 
with interpretation. This facilitates greater flexibility in discussions and more freedom in 
‘Ijtihad’ (diligence) among scholars prior to issuing a fatwa, while simultaneously raising the 
issue of intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992).       
 
In 1971, with a royal decree, the council of senior Ulama was established in a Saudi Arabia as 
a permanent council. It consists of a number of male clerics specialising in Islamic Sharia and 
has the primary objective of issuing fatwas regarding worship, creed and transactions (Al-
Rasheed, 2013). These fatwas are sometimes local and pertain to Saudi society issues, while 
the majority are concerned with global Muslim issues. However, since the foundation of this 
council, fatwas are thought to be more legitimate as opinions and decisions are discussed and 
evaluated among a group of privileged clerics prior to their issue. In other words, a fatwa that 
is issued officially through the council usually gains more authority and acceptance than one 
that is issued unofficially.  
However, it is worth noting that these principles of legislation in Islam have their own 
equivalents in Van Leeuwen’s four strategies of legitimisation. To clarify, a Quranic verse 
that is used within someone’s text to maintain power or legitimacy could be classified as an 
impersonal authority; whereby a speaker delivers God’s word as powerful law from heaven to 
support his/her argument. The prophetic Sunnah is equally important since it acts as a 
powerful impersonal authority; thereby contributing to the legitimacy of a speaker’s 
argument. The third principle of legislation in Islam is ‘Ijma’, which could be classified as an 
expert authority, since a speaker may refer to it to deliver to audience the agreement of 
different clerics over an issue. Similar to Van Leeuwens’ moral or analougous evaluation, the 
final principle is ‘Qiyas’ which is referred to usually by a speaker to convince the audience of 
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the similarity between the issue discussed (e.g. women driving) and another issue that has 
either positive or negative consequences to legitimise or de-legitimatise the status quo.     
 
 
 
3.3 Women in Saudi Arabia 
It is unsurprising that many arguments in conservative societies, such as the Saudi society, 
pertain to women’s issues. This is one of the biggest challenges for such societies, since they 
involve religious, social and political voices (Felemban, 1998; Baki, 2004). Although women 
in Saudi Arabia scored higher than men in the health and educational attainment, the 2014 
Global Gender Gap Report demonstrated that women lag behind in political empowerment 
and economic participation (Global Gender Gap, 2014). Saudi women have gone through 
various stages that have impacted substantially on their roles and presence within society. In 
this historic review, three stages are specified from the current Saudi state establishment until 
present to highlight some of the key issues that have shaped or changed Saudi women’s 
societal presence. This section should help readers draw a better understanding of why and 
how women driving was previously banned.  
             
 
3.3.1 From establishment to 1979 (pre-1979 incident)  
In the early stages of the Saudi state, particularly during the 1930s-1950s, there was almost no 
presence of, or tangible roles for, Saudi women in the formation of the political structure. 
Socially, women’s roles remained as they had been prior to 1932; these differed between 
regions based on local institutions, whether as Bedouins, rural and urbans. During the 1930s, 
education was delivered to women through Katateeb ‘in plural, places where education is 
limited to literacy, Quran and basics of math’. Katateeb were very limited and run by locals 
rather than official authorities. In the 1940s and 50s, home education and semi-formal schools 
appeared and started spreading with very limited numbers (fewer than 20 schools). These 
schools were considered semi-formal as some were established within the royal court, thus 
targeting certain segments of society, while others were built initially as orphanages. There 
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were extensions to the subjects taught in Katateeb, in addition to teaching music, sewing, 
embroidery and other physical activities, such as swimming (Hamdan, 2005). Teachers were 
all females and from other Arab countries; for example, Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine.  
However, women’s education was not deemed necessary initially by Saudi society, since 
female roles in society were secondary and very limited, while major roles were usually 
dominated by men. For the same aforementioned precautious attitude, religious authorities 
were against the establishment of formal girls’ education for three main reasons: 
- What they heard about teaching music and swimming in the semi-formal schools. 
- What they heard about women taking off hijab in neighbouring countries, like Syria 
and Egypt.  
- The fear of the foreign teachers’ influence (who belong to other non-conservative 
societies) on Saudi society.       
(Al-Washmi, 2009) 
 
This narrative was influential during the 1940s and 1950s, and it slowed the authorisation for 
formal girls’ schooling. Most of society was not against education itself, but rather to what it 
might lead. Their fear of the consequences besides the pressure of the social customs led them 
not to engage their daughters in the semi-formal schools; therefore, these schools were 
occupied largely by expatriates and non-Saudi residents.  
Historically, over the last five decades, Saudi society has experienced various struggles with 
issues related to women, mostly due to the gender segregation policy and the male 
guardianship policy2 adopted heavily by religious scholars in Saudi Arabia. However, since 
the state establishment to the present day, girls’ education has been the most fundamental shift 
in Saudi women’s history. Although there were demands for girls’ schooling by some writers, 
columnists and intellectuals as early as the 1920s, girls’ mass education in Saudi Arabia 
began as late as 1960. After waves of condemnations against girls’ schooling among society 
evoked by the Wahhabi conservatism, King Faisal made the revolutionary step of providing a 
non-compulsory girls education (Al-Rasheed, 2013). This was thought to be a wise move 
towards modernism, especially within a conservative tribal society where dialectical debates 
                                                          
2 The Male Guardianship policy in Saudi Arabia, is a system that assigns a male relative to each woman as her male guardian who could act 
as her representative in many governmental agencies and maybe make critical decisions on her behalf. Women are required to present their 
male-guardians approval before: e.g. issuing a passport, travelling outside the country or applying for a studying abroad scholarship. This 
policy has always been criticised for its constraints over women mobility and because some guardians could abuse it. However, this policy is 
in change after the King Salman order in April 2017, ordering governmental agencies to skip the male-guardian consent when serving 
women in many situations. 
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of whether girls should be educated outside their homes were present. However, although the 
Ministry of Education was established in 1954, it was not concerned with girls’ education. 
Girls’ education was formally introduced in 1960 and was assigned to the General Presidency 
for Girls’ Education (GPGE). This was a separate governmental institution under the 
supervision of the highest religious authority, which empowered this authority’s hold over 
educational and social sphere later on; this could explain how the state remained loyal to the 
religious authority while taking a step towards modernism. 
However, “In early 1960s, the objections of the religious scholars to girls’ education became 
notorious, marking the first clash between the state as moderniser and religious nationalism” 
(Al-Rasheed, 2013: 90). A decade after the establishment of the first school, the Riyadh 
College of Education opened in 1970 as the first higher education college for women. It 
aimed to provide female teachers to replace the non-Saudi teachers. Since that time, the 
number of girls joining schools has increased year-on-year. Women proved their excellence 
through education and gained the opportunity to share and help push the development wheel 
in the Kingdom. In conjunction with the emergence of national TV and the rapid growth of 
the Saudi economy since the mid-1960s and 1970s, more openness was witnessed among the 
conservative society. Although they were non-Saudis, more females appeared on TV, 
presenting News, acting or singing, which was perceived as a further step towards the 
integration of women into society and normalising their public presence.    
 
3.3.2 From 1980 - 2005 
After almost two decades (from 1960 to 1979) of social development, some religious 
fundamentalist were not pleased with the increase in aspects of openness among Saudi 
society. This was regarded as a result of the excessive westernisation by some religious 
extremists, whom in October 1979 besieged the holy mosque in Makkah for two weeks to 
express their anger and resistance against westernisation. One of their main views was the 
opposition of formal education for both boys and girls, claiming its outcomes were part of a 
western conspiracy (Al-Huzaimi 2011).      
 
The holy mosque crisis raised the concerns of both the state and the religious establishment 
regarding the fundamentalist forces among the Saudi society. This incident had its tangible 
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consequences on the Saudi society and on women particularly. Consequently, in the 1980s, 
“traditional and conservative religious opinions were revived, and new interpretations were 
constructed to create a strict moral order dependant on the conformity of women and their 
exclusion from the public sphere” (Al-Rasheed, 2013:109). Women’s presence in media and 
workplaces were minimised afterwards and several gender segregation policies were adopted 
by the government to appease the religious fundamentalists (Alhussein, 2014). This was in 
conjunction with the emergence of Al-Sahwah religious stream, which acted as the religious 
establishment’s spokesman. Here, many fatwas appeared to reinforce gender segregation and 
portray the truly traditional Muslim community through that image, neglecting debates, 
interpretations and opinions among other Muslim scholars. These fatwas had notable effects 
on Saudis’ daily, as they delve deeply into details regarding a woman’s appearance in the 
public sphere, to the extent of the colour or fabric of her clothes.  
 
However, in relation to the research focus, the most notable event occurred in November 
1990, when the first women driving campaign took place in the heart of the capital city 
Riyadh (see Methodology chapter for more details). This campaign was the first of its kind 
and consisted of solely women gathering to proclaim their right; it was the first protest against 
the ban on women driving. However, this campaign yielded no change. On the contrary, the 
ban continued and became a catalyst for an even stricter religious narrative, which used the 
timing (during the 1st Gulf War and the American military presence in Saudi Arabia) as proof 
of a western conspiracy targeting women in the conservative Saudi society. Many of Al-
Sahwah’s advocates nominated themselves as ‘guards of virtue’ and legitimated the calls to 
end the implementation of more strict policies targeting women for the sake of society. This 
narrative remained influential and a strong as it was since 1980; two generations were taught 
that this was the general attitude of the community and the most discreet one. However, the 
case changed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, when many international and local institutions 
placed more pressure on the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia; thereby minimising to 
some extent its sharp narrative and creating a better opportunity for other voices to emerge. 
Moreover, these pressures served to ease the tension between the state as a reformer and the 
religious nationalism establishments, who found themselves obliged to accept some 
concessions in order to avoid colliding with the state. Consequently, with a royal decree in 
March 2002, the General Presidency for Girls’ Education was integrated with the Ministry of 
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Education; yielding some objections from the religious mainstream. Many of the GPGE 
advocates accused those behind the integration of paving the way for coeducation. 
 
Overall, regarding Saudi women rights, there was no serious reforming except the noticeable 
increase of women issues being raised courageously on media and press in the post-9/11 era. 
This encouraged taking serious steps towards further future developments, as we will see in 
the next stage.    
 
 
 
3.3.3. From 2005 - present 
If girls’ schooling is considered the most fundamental shift in Saudi women history, it could 
be claimed that the ruling era of King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz (2005-2015) is the golden age 
of Saudi women (Al-Ghamdi & Al-Moheimeed, 2014; Al-Qurashi, 2015). For a decade, 
Saudis had lived in a historic reforming period that included reforms of various aspects of life; 
ranging from service sectors such as education, health and transportation, to other judicial, 
economic and political reforms. However, it seems that reforms regarding women were the 
most remarkable overall. Since the start of the King Abdullah scholarships programme in 
2005, girls were afforded the same opportunities as their male counterparts to benefit from 
studying overseas and continuing their higher education to participate effectively in the new 
reforming era. Women were given more leadership positions in universities, hospitals and 
ministries; latterly, they even appeared to shine internationally, gaining many global prizes of 
academic excellence and granting other patents in different fields of knowledge. Nowadays, 
thousands of girls are studying overseas and working in both governmental and private 
sectors. Women became more aware of their rights and gained more confidence, respect and 
support from all social classes in Saudi society. Their immunity against the social constraints 
and criticisms improved and left them less restricted than ever before. Enhanced by the 
expansion of social media platforms, women were encouraged more than ever to define their 
rights and make their voices heard. Their continuous presence through online public spheres 
made it easier for them to share their needs, express their demands and organise acts on the 
ground, as evidenced in the ‘women2drive campaign’ in June 2011 (see Methodology 
chapter). Prior to the day of the campaign, and to encourage others, some female activists in 
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Saudi uploaded videos of themselves to YouTube and other social media platforms, in which 
they appeared to be driving their own cars and gaining approval from the public. This is just 
one example of an issue that attracted significant local and global attention, while other issues 
remain concealed.        
 
 One issue presented to the Saudi Parliament and discussed widely on media is the 
‘feminisation of shops’, as women previously were forbidden from working in shops. This 
proposal was first faced with several criticisms and disapproval from many religious 
extremists, which brought to the public attention the opposition against girl’s schooling in the 
past. “This discussion of norms and practices related to gender segregation has historically 
hindered Saudi women’s access and entry to the labour market” (Alhussein, 2014: 3). 
Nonetheless, following a royal decree in June 2011, the process of feminising women shops 
began. This was followed by two other phases in 2012 and 2014 to increase the rate of female 
employment in the country. Another remarkable step towards reforming was the inclusion of 
female members in the ‘Shura council’, the Kingdom’s highest political body. In January 
2013, a royal decree by King Abduallah was issued to allocate women with 20% of the Shura 
council total seats. The importance of this step comes from the fact that Shura council offers 
women the opportunity to discuss their situations, claim their rights and make their voices 
heard on a formal platform. This step is promising for women’s future as it will allow a faster 
processing to further reforms. Not surprisingly, in October 2013, three female members 
submitted a recommendation to lift the driving ban because of its negative effects on women’s 
mobility and causing financial constraints.  
 
Furthermore, women gained the right to participate as both voters and candidates for their first 
time in the 2015 municipal elections. Moreover, Saudi women became a role player in the 
international Saudi political representation. In Jan 2015, Manal Redwan addressed the UN as 
the first female diplomat to represent Saudi Arabia; which adds more credit and opens a wider 
horizon to how far the Saudi women ambitions and aspirations could go. Again, these reforms 
were faced with, and continue to face, some opposition from active religious fundamentalist; 
however, their impact is limited, as these reforms are all legitimated by the power of the 
political authority. Although the recession of their influence, religious fundamentalist 
discourse still achieved the upper hand in Saudi society (Alhussein, 2014). Despite King 
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Abduallah’s reforming attitude, women’s rights in the Kingdom are still behind in comparison 
with neighbouring countries, such as Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Saudi 
women’s rights activists claim that although these reforms are unprecedented and sketch the 
start of a new transformation in the Saudi women future in the society, they remain 
insufficient (Al-Rasheed, 2013; Alhussein, 2014). However, the recent rapid reforms 
instigated by the promising 2030 vision of the new Saudi leadership should contribute in 
bringing more openness to women rights generally, and could accelerate lifting the ban on 
women driving specifically.  
 
 
3.4 Mass media and social media in the Kingdom  
Throughout its history, the Saudi media have been considered as distinctive, influential 
and an effective strategic tool in the Saudi interior policy. It is also known of its ability to 
respond to the constant media attacks from abroad and using the Saudi media machine as 
a mediator for enhancing the national feeling of belonging; it is also used as a tool to fight 
the deviant thought and a motivation to introduce the various Saudi cultures.  
(Ministry of Culture and Information, 2016)     
 
3.4.1 Mass media 
Prior to the establishment of the current state of Saudi Arabia, the primary official version of 
mass media was the printed one, which appeared in 1924 during the process of unifying the 
Kingdom. The weekly journal Umm Al-Qura was launched from Makkah to be the first 
official journal owned by the government and aimed to publish the state’s decisions, and 
governmental statements that relate to the Saudi citizens: it continues to be published today. 
After the establishment, Sawt Al-Hijaz was the first non-official journal that was launched in 
April 1932 from Makkah; publishing twice a week and owned by two independent persons 
(KingSaud.org, no date). Ever since, other printed journals continued to appear respectively, 
for instance: Al-Bilad in 1932, Al Manhal and Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah in 1936, Al-
Yamamah in 1953, Al-Fajr Al-Jadeed and Akhbar Al-Dhahran in 1955. Some discontinued 
while others continued to be published under the same or different names. Presently, there are 
more than 15 printed journals that are well known in Saudi Arabia. Some are issued in Arabic 
(e.g. Okaz, Al-Madinah, Al-Watan, Al-Jazirah), while others are issued in English (e.g. Arab 
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News, Saudi Gazette). After the internet revolution, all these printed journals designed their 
own websites where they offered their audience easier access and a better opportunity to 
interact with the editorial team or other readers through comment spaces.           
However, another turning point in the history of the Saudi media emerged in radio 
broadcasting. With a royal decree in 1949 that aimed to connect the Kingdom with the outside 
world and disseminate knowledge and information in the country, the official Saudi Radio 
was first broadcast from Jeddah. Another radio station broadcast from Makkah in 1952 and 
another from Riyadh in 1965 (Ministry of Culture and Information, 2016). Today, there are 
six official Saudi radio stations: Neda Al-Islam, Al-Quran Al-Kreem, Saudia radio, Riyadh 
radio, Jeddah radio and the international Saudi radios. There are other more popular FM radio 
stations, such as MBC FM, Rotana FM and Alif Alif FM. The unofficial FM radio stations are 
widely heard and attract large audiences for their renewed, modern and unconventional 
content; conversely, the official radio stations are less popular due to their repetitive 
traditional content.    
In 1965, the television broadcasting started primarily from Riyadh and Jeddah; thus 
representing another important development in the Saudi media. The Saudi official channel 
was first introduced as the only TV channel to broadcast. Two years later, in 1967, the TV 
broadcasting involved Makkah and Taif, followed by Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah in the same 
year, Qassim and Dammam in 1968, Baha and Hail in 1969 and so on, until TV covered all 
regions of the Kingdom in 1971. ‘Saudi Channel 2’ was added in 1983; broadcasting in 
English and targeting non-Arab residents. During the prevalence of satellite TV channels in 
Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s, many people started watching non-official TV channels that 
attracted audiences from different social classes; because of the wide spectrum of choices they 
provide and probably the unprecedented openness they offer. However, many of those 
network channels were owned predominantly by Saudi tycoons (e.g. ART by Saleh Kamel, 
MBC by Waleed Al-Ibrahim) or members of the Saudi royal family (e.g. Rotana by prince Al-
Waleed bin Talal). According to some western writers (Cochrane, 2007; Hammond, 2007; 
Neate, 2010), the Saudi strategy of dealing with media changed following the Gulf War in 
1990; unlike before, Saudis now own and buy newspapers and other media institutions that 
publish or broadcast to all countries in the region, which formed a powerful Saudi media 
empire. In his book, Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World, Hugh Miles 
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indicates that between 40% to 70% of what is spent on advertising on other non-Saudi 
channels in the region comes from Saudi Arabia; thereby, imposing its prestige media and 
leaving these channels subject to its media pressure (2006). After a period, it was realised that 
these network channels are an extension of the official channels, enhancing the construction 
of the same image and the formation of the same governmental discourse. Currently, six 
channels comprise official Saudi TV, covering national, political, religious and cultural 
interests; in addition to sports and childrens’ channels.   
In terms of the history of Saudi media, it is important to note that the press generally, whether 
governmental or not, were under the supervision of the State since the establishment of 
the‘General Directorate of Press and Publication’ in 1955. The radio commission was 
integrated within this directorate and its main role was; “The organization, coordination and 
supervision over all means of publication in the Kingdom” (King Saud Foundation, 2012). 
This enabled greater systematic governmental control and central censorship over the content 
delivered to the audience. Years later, as a result of the growing interest and responsibilities in 
media locally and internationally, the general directorate became the Ministry of Information 
in 1962. Later, like other mass media, when TV broadcasting begun, it was under the 
supervision of the same Ministry, which became the current Ministry of Culture and 
Information in 2003.       
Overall, the Saudi journalistic experience produced for society a special journalistic narrative 
commensurate with the political traditions of the state, formed a specific language that has 
limits of acceptable critique as a convention among journalists. Although the public opinion is 
that mass media is controlled by the state and censored strictly, Saudi media succeeded in 
creating a traditional governmental mentality and a unified national official narrative among 
both elites and the public. Radio broadcasting played a historic role in the formation of this 
narrative, followed by TV. The latter continues to be regarded as the most influential medium 
in the formation of public mentality since the 1970s.    
 
3.4.2 Social media 
Undoubtedly, there has been a tangible impact of the digital revolution on the world in terms 
of the speed, quality, cost and ease of communication. In this section, the internet is observed 
as a new medium that helped individuals free themselves to some extent from the ideological 
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ascendancy of mass media; since it offers them a worldwide interaction with less censorship 
regardless of the geographic location. In the Saudi context, the internet was introduced in 
1994 for educational, medical and research institutions; becoming publicly available in late 
1998. From 200,000 users in December 2000, the number of internet users in the Kingdom 
rose dramatically to 16 million in 2013 (Communication and Information Technology 
Commission, 2016). This indicates the high popularity and the rapid spread of the internet as 
a transforming communication medium. However, as a governmental institute, King Abdul-
Aziz City for Science and Technology was set to provide companies and citizens with the 
service, management and supervision. The city also presents other moral roles, in which it 
blocks some websites that contain inappropriate contents or violate religious and social norms 
(e.g. pornographic, drug dealing, gambling). When the internet was introduced in Saudi 
Arabia, the most popular social websites were forums where people gather to share, discuss 
and post views, ideas or interests regarding a social, political, economic, or a religious issue. 
There were also free voice/video chats communities (e.g. paltalk messenger) where there are 
no governmental restrictions; however, control and censorship are practiced by the forum or 
chat room administrators. Consequently, in most cases, these forums and chat rooms failed to 
inspire fruitful dialogues and platforms where interlocutors have equal rights to participate 
and freely express their opinions. Many of these platforms represented a stance where the 
proponents are welcomed and supported, while opponents are unwelcomed or neglected. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of the new social media, starting with Facebook in 2004, 
YouTube in 2005, Twitter in 2006 and Instagram in 2010, yielded a new era of social 
networking. In this part, it is essential to highlight the high rate of social media usage and the 
great impact in Saudi Arabia.  
According to The Online Project ‘TOP 2015 report’, a regional social media agency, in terms 
of the number of users, Facebook remains the largest social media platform in Saudi Arabia; 
11 million active users until mid-2015. Male users represents 79% while 21% are female. 
With an average of five tweets a day, Twitter is second on the list with 9 million active users; 
thus representing 40% of Twitter users in the Arab region. Instagram is third with 8.8 million 
active users posting, on average, 12 posts a week. Finally, YouTube has an average of 
606,872 subscribers per channel, and 105,900 average views per video (The Online Project, 
2015). However, the popularity of YouTube reached high levels, with more than 2.9 million 
video views; thereby becoming the second most visited website in Saudi Arabia after Google 
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(Baghdadi, 2015). In addition, the vast spread of smartphone technology helped facilitate 
accessibility to social media; therefore, increasing its users’ social engagement. According to 
Statista (the leading statistics company), the number of smartphone users in Saudi Arabia has 
reached 15.9 million in 2016 and is expected to reach 19.1 million users by 2019; surely this 
encourages Saudis to engage and communicate easily through social media (Statista, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of smartphone users in Saudi Arabia from 2014 to 2019 in millions (Statista, 2016). 
 
It is important to note the shift in Saudi society, caused by social media; ordinary Saudi 
people became free of mass media monopoly and censorship. They independently created 
their own Facebook pages, YouTube channels and/or Twitter hashtags to deliver their voices 
and represent themselves the way they like. Away from the mass media restrictions, Saudis 
proved themselves key players in the new media industry in the country and the wider region. 
They used YouTube channels to create talk shows, series’, short films and other satirical 
shows that deal with and criticise unprecedentedly the mainstream media and many social, 
economic and political issues. Saudis also became aware of the influential role that social 
media could play when putting pressure on decision makers. Twitter hashtags became a tool 
to shed light on any personal, institutional or governmental shortages. Saudis use social media 
to interact with officials, intellectuals, clerics, media people, celebrities and even members of 
the Royal Family. Mass media and social media have mutual influence; an issue or a case 
raised on social media could be discussed on mass media afterwards, and vice versa. 
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3.5 Summary 
Regarding the interdisciplinary nature of this CDA project, the cultural history chapter is a 
complementary means of explaining the socio-political context, albeit an essential one in the 
process of discourse analysis. In this chapter, since the case under investigation is located in 
Saudi Arabia, a historical background was provided to the country regarding establishment 
and its sacredness. Moreover, a brief discussion of the circumstances that shaped the Saudi 
discourse and the four principles of legalisation in Islam (Quran, Sunnah, consensus, and 
analogy) were outlined end explained. However, since the case under investigation relates to 
women, the chapter discussed the Saudi women history over three critical phases; from the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia to 1979, from 1980 to 2005, and from 2005 to present. Finally, 
the chapter provided a brief historical background to the mechanism and popularity of both 
mass media and social media in the Kingdom. In conclusion, this chapter provided a better 
understanding of the socio-political atmosphere surrounding the debates on women driving, 
which contributes to the formation of a specific discourse; thereby leading to the perpetuation 
of the status quo or social change. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Since it is crucial to justify how data were collected, this chapter outlines the historical 
background to the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia. It also provides insight into 
speakers’ history. Then, a conceptual design of the research will be clarified by introducing 
the proposed data and approaches to analysis and highlighting their importance in answering 
the research questions. Moreover, the pilot analysis, data collection and transcription will be 
discussed in detail followed by a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2 Historical Background of the Issue and Speakers 
4.2.1 Historical background of women driving in KSA 
To obtain a good understanding of the collected data and its importance in answering the 
research questions, it is essential first to clarify why the discourse of an issue like women 
driving was selected for analysis. As indicated previously, women’s issues, in general, attract 
the attention of critical analysts and feminist thinkers since they may imply gender inequality 
or discrimination in society. The ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia is an issue that 
remains controversial and surprisingly unsolved. Although Saudi traffic law does not forbid 
women to drive, driving licences are issued only to men. The issue has traversed several 
periods where the ban was legitimised from various angles. The reasons given primarily to 
legitimise the ban relate to one or more of three axes: religion, traditions and law. This was 
obvious after the first campaign to lift the ban on 6th November 1990, when a collection of 47 
female academics, teachers, businesswomen and university students gathered and drove their 
own cars in Riyadh streets. After this unprecedented movement, religious fatwas were used 
extensively to express the clerics and intellectuals’ opinions about what was considered a 
recalcitrance on the ruler which is forbidden in Islam, morally rejected and punishable by law. 
The most notable fatwa was issued by the late cleric, Sheikh Abdulaziz Ibn Baz, and other 
scholars on 7th November, the day after the campaign. The fatwa was clearly opposed to 
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women driving and was used by the Ministry of Interiors to legitimise the ban (Al-Jazirah, 
issue 6621, 16/11/1990, as cited in Al-Busairi, n.d.). 
 
However, the Saudi police arrested all 47 women on the day of the campaign; they were 
investigated and asked to write pledges to stop, and not to repeat their actions. They all were 
sacked from their jobs or studies and banned from travel for a year; however, after 32 months, 
they were reinstated in their jobs by Royal decree. It is important to note that this campaign 
was in conjunction with the first Gulf War in 1990-1991. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990 and when Saudi Arabia and the US decided to ally against the Iraqi regime, 
more than 500,000 American soldiers came to Saudi Arabia in the preparation for the Kuwait 
liberation war. These American troops were unwelcomed by the radical religious voice in the 
Kingdom. American female soldiers were seen driving their own cars freely in streets without 
Saudi police interference. According to Aisha Al-Mane’ and Hes’ah Al-Shaikh, two of the 
main participants in the 1990 campaign, the Saudi national enthusiasm and the American 
presence in the Saudi land, encouraged some women to express their demands and drag 
attention towards their right to drive (Al-Manie & Al-Sheikh, 2013). However, the timing had 
an adverse impact on the campaign as the religious fundamentalists who used to have a strong 
fist on religious discourse whether in Mosques, universities or schools, mounted a counter-
campaign. They accused those who supported the women driving campaign generally and 
those women who drove their cars specifically of being westernised and advocates of 
debauchery and vice. The counter-campaign aimed to raise social awareness about the danger 
of a secular conspiracy instigated by western liberalism. Leaflets displaying the names of all 
women who participated in the driving campaign and their males’ guardians, including moral 
and religious accusations, were distributed in streets and public institutions to generate a bad 
reputation for the activists’ intentions. The mere fact that some of those activists studied in the 
US was sufficient for some extremists to accuse them of serving American or western 
agendas and conspiracy on the state. From that time, the issue seemed to be neglected and 
forgotten until September 2007 when a group of female activists submitted 1,100 signature 
petition to King Abdullah asking to lift the ban on women driving. The group was led by 
Wajeha al-Huwaider, the co-founder of a non-governmental organisation named as the 
Association for the Protection and Defense of Women's Rights in Saudi Arabia,. However, no 
serious action were taken on ground. 
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Two decades after the first campaign, in similar conditions during the chaos in neighbouring 
countries and the revolutionary Arab Spring in 2011, appeals via social media platforms to lift 
the ban on women driving appeared to lay the groundwork for a new women driving 
campaign. Manal Al-Sharif and other female activists instigated Saudi women to participate 
in what they called ‘Women2Drive’ campaign by creating a Facebook page that encouraged 
women to exchange emotional support and to prepare to drive their own cars on 17 June 2011. 
Unlike the 1990 campaign when women planned in secret and agreed to gather and lead the 
demonstration, social media were used heavily and played an essential role in mushrooming 
the proponents of the 2011 campaign. It helped activists to gauge the pulse of the society in 
advance and seek support and empathy. In the 2011 campaign, social media played three 
essential roles: first, it helped in a fast spread of the campaign nationally and internationally, 
therefore, getting more supporters from different sexes. This was evident as more than 12,000 
visitors to the campaigners’ Facebook page declared their support for the cause. 
 
The second important role is that it was used to gauge the pulse of the society. The Facebook 
page in the first stage and the number of likes and dislikes were all indications of the 
campaign popularity. Moreover, an uploaded YouTube video showing Manal Al-Sharif 
driving her own car on 20th May was the catalyst for change. Manal’s video caused a storm of 
controversial discussions on the online public sphere; many proponents expressed their 
admiration and support to Manal and the campaigners for being courageous to stand for 
women’s rights and speak them out loud. Many others expressed a huge disapproval and 
accused Manal and other campaigners of being recalcitrant and passing seditious messages to 
the public. The third crucial role was the power of the online public sphere in creating a 
mutual sympathetic home for activists, and accommodating supporters from Saudi Arabia and 
other parts of the world. 
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4.2.2 Brief biography and historical background to the main speakers and channels 
The three videos used to investigate and analyse the proponents and opponents of women 
driving discourse included the participation of many interlocutors. However, the five main 
speakers are briefly introduced in the following paragraphs: 
- Manal Alsharief is a Saudi female who was born in April 1979, Makkah, Saudi Arabia. She 
graduated from King Abdulaziz University with BSc. in Computing and worked as an 
internal security consultant for ARAMCO. However, she was publically known after her 
call for what is called ‘women to drive’ campaign in June 2011 when she uploaded a video 
of herself driving her own car in Al-Khobar city, Saudi Arabia. Manal then introduced 
herself as women’s right activists and became well-known on both social media and 
mainstream media locally and globally. Manal gave a worldwide speech when she 
participated in one of the most famous shows (TED talks). She also appeared and spoke to 
western media on different occasions after her video on YouTube. Following her detention, 
she moved to Dubai where she continues to reside. 
- Saad Al-Buraik is a male Saudi academic and religious preacher. He was born in February 
1962 and earned his BA in Economy from Sharia school, Imam Muhammad bin Saud 
University and worked as a teaching assistant in the same college. He then received his MA 
in comparative Fiqh from the Higher Judicial Institute in Riyadh and, later, his PhD in the 
same subject. He wrote numerous books and articles and participated in several TV 
discussions surrounding various issues related to the westernisation wave and the liberal 
thought. However, Al-Buraik was known primarily for contributing to the Al-Sahwah 
movement during the 1980s. This aimed to raise awareness of the danger of western values 
on the Saudi Muslim community and focused largely on widening the gap between males 
and females in almost all aspects of life. Saad was one of the first preachers to strongly 
oppose the women driving campaign in 1990. 
- Najla Hariry and Lamia Bukhari are both female Saudi activists who drove their own cars 
during  the women driving campaigns in June 2011 and October 2013. Najla is a housewife 
who lives in Jeddah and gained notoriety after she filmed herself driving her car many times, 
including once while escorted by the MBC TV team. Lamia is also known for her activism 
61 
 
 
 
on women’s rights issues; specifically, women driving. She expressed her support by driving 
her own car in Jeddah. 
- Mohammad Al-nojaimy is a male Saudi academic in the Higher Judicial Institute in Riyadh. 
He was born in 1961. He earned his BA in Sharia, Imam Muhammad bin Saud University 
and received his MA in comparative Fiqh from the Higher Judicial Institute. He also 
awarded his PhD from Figh Department in Sharia school. Al-Nojaimi authored many books 
and supervised many other theses in Fiqh, and appeared on different TV shows. 
However, it is important to briefly introduce the three TV channels that hosted the main social 
actors. These are Al Arabiya, Al-Majd and DMTV: 
Al Arabiya: 
Al Arabiya channel, based in Dubai Media City, UAE, was launched in March 2003. It is a 
news channel that broadcasts in modern standard Arabic and is owned by the Middle East 
Broadcasting Centre group, the Saudi TV broadcaster. Since its launch, Al Arabiya has gained 
popularity in the Arab world and became the second most popular TV news channel after Al-
Jazeera (Trending Top Most, 2017). 
 
Al-Majd: 
Al-Majd TV Network was launched in November 2002 as a Saudi-owned broadcasting group 
that takes a conservative stance. The channel contains a mixture of modern standard and 
colloquial Arabic shows. Al-Majd provides its audience with a variety of shows with 
protected content (no violence, no adult contents...etc); thereby making it family-friendly. 
However, Al-Majd channel and the overall network are renowned for their religious input and 
extreme views with regards to the visual presence of women on TV. Indeed, few or no 
females appear on Al-Majd TV.  
 
DMTV: 
Launched in August 2006, the Distinguished Man TV (DMTV) is a lifestyle channel 
dedicated solely to men. It is located in Dubai Media City and broadcasts various shows 
covering men’s lifestyle, sports, health, business…etc in modern standard Arabic. The 
channel ceased broadcasting in March 2015. 
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4.3 Conceptual Design 
Since the researcher seeks to uncover the potential existence of social inequality behind the 
ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia, CDA is considered a central theory of analysis in this 
study. However, discourse is not a language, as “it is constitutive of the social world that is a 
focus of interest or concern” (Bryman, 2008: 499). In other words, the text relates to a broader 
social context in which analysts should consider avoiding a textually-oriented analysis. 
Therefore, the researcher adopts the DHA (Wodak, 2001) to investigate the interdisciplinary 
nature of the issue and maintain a proper understanding of the intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationships between genres, texts, utterances and discourses. In the current study, this 
includes looking at the history of the case under investigation, speakers’ ideological attitudes 
and any sociological variables. Further to the DHA, the researcher develops and proposes 
some key strategies of legitimisation. These are used either by both proponents and opponents 
or by one of them to legitimise and justify their arguments (Martin Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997; 
Van Dijk, 2005; Van Leeuwen, 1996, 2007, 2008; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes, 
2011). 
 
As the main study objective is to reveal which discursive strategies of legitimisation were 
used, these procedures will be identified and analysed in further detail. This will be based on a 
macro-structural category adopted from the DHA focusing on constructive strategies for the 
analysis of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Reisigl & Wodak, 
2001). This analysis includes strategies employed by social actors for reference and 
prediction. These constructive strategies are constituted through the use of some linguistics 
acts/indicators such as some lexical items/pronouns that establish an in-group and out-group 
(i.e. we and they, us and them) besides the use of some verbs and adjectives to construct 
certain identities of each group and maintain the distinction between them. Furthermore, some 
tools from SFL were applied as, alongside DHA, they explain how strategies of legitimisation 
were constructed and shaped from a linguistic perspective. However, these strategies of 
legitimisation will be compared with some of the argumentation schemes proposed by 
Douglas Walton (1995); thereby explaining how social actors’ arguments are constructed. 
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4.4 Data collection 
This section examines the method of data collection adopted, the period of data gathering, the 
criteria used when collecting videos and comments, and how data were retrieved and 
transcribed. Data collection in CDA research is not usually considered as the toughest stage, 
although a justification of the way data were collected is crucial. In this study, since all data 
are taken from YouTube, collecting data was easy and saved a lot of time and effort because 
all data are accessible on from anywhere and at any time. Before explaining how data were 
collected, it is important to mention that all target data are taken from YouTube in two types: 
1- Mass media content; all the Saudi mainstream media TV shows or officials statements 
that discussed women driving issue and were rebroadcasted on YouTube. 
2- User-generated content; the comments posted following these videos in the form of 
user-generated content representing the online public sphere. 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Mass media content 
Bearing in mind the potentially huge volume of available data and to ensure reaching the most 
valuable ones, the necessity for preliminary data collection strategies was essential to 
eliminate any redundant data (e.g. YouTube videos replication). To do so in this study, the 
process of collecting data took three main phases: specifying the appropriate timescale, 
applying certain criteria for video search (will be explained in details) and finally filtering and 
narrowing down the available data to decide what to analyse. 
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Figure 2: The process of collecting the data of mass media content.   
 
First, the timescale of data collection was determined, which was over a period of three years 
(February 2011 until January 2014) to cover both women driving campaigns of June 2011 and 
October 2013. Secondly, the main YouTube search engine was used primarily to search for 
videos using Arabic words and phrases such as: (e.g. ‘ ةدايق ةأرملا ’ women driving, ‘ ةدايق ةأرملا 
ةيدوعسلا’ Saudi woman driving, ةرايسلل ةدايق ةأرملا ةيدوعسلا  ‘Saudi woman driving car’). However, 
the search was restricted to the following criteria: 
- It should be a video broadcasted on Saudi mass media and uploaded to YouTube within the 
specified timescale. 
- When the same video is uploaded many times by different YouTube channels, the one with 
most hits or uploaded first is only considered. 
After searching for available videos that are compatible with the aforementioned criteria, the 
search resulted in 51 videos, varying from less than a minute to over an hour and a half’s 
duration. Some were uploaded by individual YouTube accounts, while others were uploaded 
by the official mass media YouTube accounts (i.e. Rotana Khalejia, Al-Majd Network), some 
All Saudi mass media videos in relation to women 
driving and uploaded from 
[Feb 2011-Jan 2014]
51 videos
- videos with no comments are eleminated 
45 videos
Top 5 most 
viewed 
Top 5 most 
commented 
3 videos to 
analyse 
(160 mins) 
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by anonymous activists (i.e. Rights905, ch905) and other videos were uploaded by individual 
media figures and intellectuals (i.e. Turki Aldakhil, Ayed Alqarni). Some videos were found 
through the search engine, while others were reached using the smart function of YouTube 
‘SUGGESTIONS’, which groups together related videos. The videos popularities (No. of 
hits) ranged from just over 500 views to over than 328,000 views and with comments from as 
few as seven to more than 1300 comments on some. Overall, it was noted that the periods 
(about six weeks) before and after each campaign had the highest rate of uploaded videos. 
This was evident in the campaign of June 2011, as 27 videos out of the total number of 51 
were uploaded in May and June 2011. 
The Final phase involved choosing the best available videos to analyse. This step was 
challenging, as a further filtering process is required to minimise the volume of data with the 
lowest level of subjectivity. Since comments are a crucial part of the study, there were five 
videos that had disabled their comments section; therefore, they were eliminated from the list 
(Fig. 2). Another video was removed later from YouTube for copyrights issues. However, 
after classifying videos based on the top 5 most viewed videos and the top 5 most commented 
on videos, it appeared that three videos existed in both lists. Most of these videos are TV 
shows that represent a stance or hosted people who are heavily supporting women driving and 
seem to be offering little or no voice for the other opposing team. For this reason, the 
researcher had to choose three videos of almost equal opportunities for both voices to be 
analysed. The first is only hosting the female activist Manal Al-Sharif (supporting women 
driving), while the second is hosting Saad Al-Buraik a well-known male academic 
(opposing). The third video took the form of a debate, which hosted both (supporting and 
opposing) guests. The first video is from the top 5 most viewed and most commented on 
videos, while the other two were not. The total length of all videos combined is about 160 
minutes; the time is distributed almost equally across all three videos. 
 
4.4.2 User-generated content 
After deciding on the videos that will be analysed, comments following these videos in the 
form of UGC were essential to gauge the public pulse and reflection on what is discussed on 
mainstream media. However, it was noted that some of these comments reflected on the video 
content and discussion, while many others took the form of a conversation where commenters 
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post responses to each other’s opinions. The least number of comments on one of the videos 
was 75; for this reason, only the first 75 posted (oldest) comments on each video were 
collected. Therefore, 225 comments in total will be considered for analysis. A few remarks 
were posted under pseudonyms while others posted under real or like real names, some 
comments were as short as three words while others comprised more than 90 words. The 
researcher assumes they all are important since they reflect the poster’s stance towards the 
central issue of women driving. However, after several checks over an extended period, there 
was cases where the number of comments decreased, which means some comments were 
removed whether by its poster, by the video uploader or by the several reports of other users 
against a comment. For this reason and for the record, all videos and comments were saved to 
a separate storage disc. The videos are: 
 
- Edaat: (Al Arabiya, 2011)  
This video is an interview of a very popular talk-show called Edaat. It is presented by the 
famous media figure Turki Aldakhil and broadcasted weekly on one of the most widely 
watched Arabic TV channels, Al Arabiya. The show is not aired live and has a one-guest 
style, where the presenter discusses particular matters related to the guest’s interests or 
activity (e.g. political, economic, literary). Consequently,the show features no phone calls, 
Tweets or any audience intervention. In this specific episode, Manal Al-Sharif discussed 
issues related to the women driving campaign of 17th June 2011, her revolutionary video that 
was filmed while she was driving her car and encouraging Saudi women to do likewise, and 
her subsequent detention and release. 
- Myadeen: (Al-Majd, 2011) 
This video is another TV talk-show called (Myadeen) and broadcasted on Al-Majd channel, 
which is known for its conservative stance. The show is televised live once a month, and 
phone calls and Tweets from the public are considered. The guest is Saad Al-Buraik, who is 
the permanent guest of the show where each episode features a current issue for discussion. 
This episode aired in the days prior to the 17th June 2011 campaign to discuss the pros and 
cons of women driving in KSA. 
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- # khaliji: (DMTV, 2013) 
This video is a debate-like TV show called (# khaliji) and broadcasted on DMTV channel, 
where guests of opposing opinions discussed the 26th October 2013 campaign of women 
driving. The guests are two female activists Lamia Bukhari and Najla Hariry, and a male 
academic Mohammad Alnojaimy. It airs live and some audience Tweets are considered 
throughout the show.  
 
 
 
4.5 Data transcription & translation 
Since all data in this study (mass media content and user-generated content) are originally in 
Arabic3, all three videos were transcribed in Arabic before being translated into English. No 
conventions were used as the mere transcription of words is adequate to gain answers to the 
research questions. “The best choice of conventions in a given instance depends on the nature 
of the interaction, the theoretical framework, and the research question” (Edwards, 2003: 
321). The comments were copied and pasted verbatim (including original misspellings made 
by some commenters), and translated later into English. Overall, the translated data were kept 
as close to its original Arabic form as possible. For example, attempts have been made to 
maintain the changes in Arabic nominal and verb forms to a minimum. In some cases, it was 
necessary to consider the linguistic forms of Arabic within the analysis to achieve a more 
accurate understanding of the text; further explanation is provided when needed.  
 
4.6 Modern standard Arabic vs. colloquial Arabic 
Modern standard Arabic (MSA) can be described as the form understood by pan-Arabs, 
regardless of their dialects or geographical origins. It is the formal form of the language, 
which is close to Classical Arabic and dominates most current formal platforms. Moreover, it 
is the common medium of formal discourse in political speeches, news channels and 
                                                          
3 Refer to appendixes for original Arabic texts: mass media content is all excerpts taken from the proponents discourse (see 
appendix I) and the opponents discourse (see appendix II). User-generated content is all comments used in this analysis 
grouped as the following: the opposing comments (see appendix III), the support comments (see appendix IV) and the neutral 
comments (see appendix V).     
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children’s books. MSA is “the modern descendant of Classical Arabic, unchanged in the 
essentials of its syntax but very much changed, and still changing in its vocabulary and 
phraseology” (Holes, 2004: 5). Conversely, colloquial Arabic is described as the informal 
language used in everyday communication between friends and family members. It relies 
significantly on local dialects rather than pure Arabic vocabulary. Colloquial Arabic could 
vary between countries regarding vocabularies and pronunciation (e.g. Gulf dialect, Egyptian 
dialect). Sometimes, these variations are observed between different regions within the same 
country; for example, where speakers are from Saudi Arabia but demonstrate some language 
varieties (e.g. Hijazi, Najdi). However, although some linguistic variations were noted in both 
forms of data, spoken (mass media content) and written one (user-generated content), these 
variations were limited to some accent diversity with little to some commonly used 
vocabulary of different Saudi dialects. Therefore, they did not appear amibiguous and social 
actors demonstrated a good perception of them. Thus, with regard to these varieties, the 
researcher did not experience difficulties in understanding, translating and analysing the data. 
 
4.7 Methodology of Analysis 
CDA as a school and method of discourse analysis has a distinctive feature. In other words, 
CDA has no fixed method of analysis, the same way as there is no specific method or set for 
data collection. This flexibility of CDA fostered the emergence of a variety of approaches and 
sub-schools as we saw earlier. Each approach has its justifications for the choice of the 
linguistic devices it uses for analysis. This depends significantly on the research questions and 
what we want to understand from the target discourse. In this study, since our main concern is 
to reveal the discursive strategies of legitimisations that both proponents and opponents of 
women driving use to legitimise their arguments and positions, the researcher expands on 
some of the legitimisation strategies that have been raised in previous works (Van Leeuwen, 
1996, 2007, 2008; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes, 2011). The researcher also makes 
new proposals and explains them by exploring the linguistics devices employed by speakers 
to construct their arguments. However, the general strategy of creating two groups (Us and 
Them) used in legitimisation constantly to construct the division between both ‘our group’ 
and ‘their group’ will be traced by analysing the discursive strategies of positive self-
presentation and negative other-presentation from Wodak (2001). This will include looking at 
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the referential and prediction strategies used by both groups to portray Self, Other and women 
driving. Furthermore, each strategy of legitimisation will be compared with and explained by 
the argumentation schemes presented in Walton (1995), while SFL tools will be deployed 
when necessary. 
Another essential component of the study is an examination of the way the public reflects on 
these videos through the comments sections. This includes exploring their perspectives 
towards the call of lifting the ban on women driving (oppose, support or neutral). It also seeks 
to discover the themes formed through these comments. This will be explained in more detail 
in the analysis of the UGC. 
 
4.7.1 Analysis of the mass media content 
In the current study, six strategies of legitimisation are highlighted and extensively analysed. 
Those are the newly proposed strategy in this study (custody), the four categories prposed by 
Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007, 2008), and the (hypothetical future/potential implication) prposed 
by Reyes (2011): 
1- Legitimisation through custody 
This strategy occurs when speakers on mass media portray themselves as custodians of the 
public, fighting and pleading for their own good. They say what they say to save civil rights 
and enlighten them about a lost right or a potential conspiracy. This is identified through the 
constitution of two groups by the use of pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘they’, in which the speaker 
of the We group is associated with verbs or phrases that reflect care and sympathy (e.g. we 
care about, we will defend, we want to save…etc). 
 
 
 
2- Legitimisation through authorisation 
Authority legitimisation is the most common strategy and it has many subtypes; personal, 
impersonal, role model, expert, tradition, conformity (Van Leeuwen 1996, 2007; Van 
Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Speakers use some of them individually or in combination with 
others to legitimise a change or the perpetuation of the status quo. This strategy can be 
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identified when social actors back up their claims with the power of a third-party knowledge, 
control and/or social acceptance. This can happen when referring to an official’s statement 
(e.g. Minister of interiors states...), rules and laws (e.g. the 8th article of the civil law...), a 
cleric or expertise opinion (e.g. Sheikh Ibn Baz said....), customs and social privacy or 
conformity (e.g. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women prohibited to 
drive). 
 
 
3- Legitimisation through analogous evaluation/moral evaluation 
In this strategy, legitimisation is based on a comparison between women driving and other 
similar activities/issues that have been conducted in the past, locally or internationally, and 
had adverse outcomes in case of de-legitimation or had positive results in the event of 
legitimation. It aims to highlight the potential results in both cases and what construction or 
destruction will happen to the values. However, this analogous evaluation might be used 
inversely to invalidate others claims, for example, Al-Nojaimi’s analogy in reply to the 
proponents use of the entire world conformity regarding women driving: “Most Islamic 
countries sell alcohol....does this mean they are right!?”. Moreover, it occurs when speakers 
try to exploit audience emotions by the process of moral evaluation whether in the form of 
evaluating themselves (e.g. Manal “I didn’t violate the law....,and I didn’t rebel against the 
ruler...) or by the evaluation of public audience (e.g. Najla: “ I trust our society....it is a society 
that is characterised with Islamic manners”). 
 
 
4- Legitimisation through rationalisation 
This legitimisation occurs when social actors present the legitimisation process as one where 
decisions have been made following thoughtful, pre-planned and evaluated procedures. This 
strategy is constructed linguistically through the use of some clauses such as Manal: “This is a 
result of a study and intensive reading”, or verbs that indicate verbal and mental processes 
like ‘consult’ and ‘investigate’. In other cases, the mere use of some hedging words that are 
not built on accurate statistics (e.g. ‘most’ and ‘minority’) but reflect some sense of precision 
can rationalise claims made by speakers. 
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5-  Legitimisation through mythopesis 
Here, legitimisation is achieved through telling stories where the hero follows a socially 
accepted practice that leads him/her to a happy ending or unhappy one when the hero is 
involved in immoral acts. Stories may also include the speaker’s personal experience in which 
he/she faced troubles or avoided them because of the status quo. 
 
 
6- Legitimatisation through hypothetical future/potential implications (public chaos or 
women independence) 
In this strategy, legitimisation occurs by creating good or bad potential future consequences 
for whether to change or perpetuate the status quo. In this study, proponents of women 
driving claims that it should be allowed for the sake of the future benefits it will bring to 
women and society in general while opponents pose a threat and severe repercussions to 
maintain the ban. This strategy is usually articulated through the use of some linguistic 
choices and structures like conditional sentences of If (e.g. If + present  will + infinitive), or 
phrases in other formats, but function as conditional sentence (e.g. Manal: “once we give a 
woman this right, we will open her a wide welcoming space”). 
 
4.7.2 Analysis of the User-generated content (YouTube comments) 
After collecting the first 75 comments posted on each video in a total number of 225 
comments for all three videos, the analysis was performed in two phases. First, comments 
were classified manually into three different responses: ‘support’, ‘oppose’ or ‘neutral’. 
Regarding the issue of women driving, any comment that demonstrated clear support for 
lifting the ban and allowing women to drive were coded as ‘support’. Comments that clearly 
object to women driving or the calls to lifting the ban were coded as ‘oppose’, while those 
reflecting none of the previous responses were coded as ‘neutral’. The second phase examined 
the main frames drawn from these observations regarding the issue of women driving. 
However, these frames are worth investigating because they may not necessarily correspond 
to what have been discussed on mass media. In fact, they may yield some taboo topics, 
present causal interpretations and moral evaluations, and suggest solutions or ideas to solve 
the problem. 
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4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, a historical background is provided to the issue of women driving in Saudi 
Arabia, highlighting the three campaigns to lift the ban since 1990. In addition, a brief 
biography of the main speakers of both groups was presented. More importantly, the 
conceptual design was discussed in brief, alongside an explanation of the method of data 
collection for both types; mass media content and user-generated content represented in the 
YouTube comments. Furthermore, it provided an explanation of the way data were 
transcribed and translated. Finally, the chapter outlined the methodology used in the analysis 
of both forms of data (mass media content and YouTube comments). 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF MASS MEDIA CONTENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Before delving into the textual analysis of the data gathered from YouTube in the form of 
both mass media content and UGC, we must first go through the questions the study aims to 
answer. Our initial interest is in discovering the discursive mechanisms used by proponents 
and opponents of women driving cars in Saudi Arabia to legitimise their arguments. This is 
hoped to be answered by analysing the discourse of some key figures who appear regularly on 
TV or during campaigns for women driving (2011 and 2013), and are watched or followed by 
many members of the public. The significance of analysing their discourse arises from the fact 
that their voice is widely heard and supported by many on social media; therefore, it may play 
a role in shaping public perspectives or reflecting certain stances. However, the strategies of 
legitimisation and self, and other representations, that are used by both proponents and 
opponents will be analysed separately in this chapter and will be compared and discussed in 
the discussion chapter. The second focus of the research is to gauge public opinion, reveal the 
themes constructed through comments and understand how their discourse is different from or 
similar to that in mass media. The UGC will be analysed in Chapter Six. 
 
5.2 Proponents discourse 
5.2.1 Strategies of legitimisation 
When examining the discourse of the women driving proponents -given in this study- from a 
macro-analysis level, they depict the ban as a hindrance that affects the whole society, rather 
than a particular group. If women are permitted to drive, society as a whole will benefit, and it 
will count as a victory for social justice in Saudi Arabia. This view seems to reflect a sense of 
dissatisfaction with the status quo among proponents; a sense of inequality and injustice. 
Legitimation can be used to perpetuate or change the status quo; undoubtedly, the latter is to 
the direction in which proponents are heading. However, in order to understand how this 
cataleptic discourse is constructed, we need to subject it to a microanalysis. This involves 
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investigating the speaker’s use of the legitimisation strategies and the positive self and 
negative-other presentations strategies; thus, it seeks to understand how some tiny linguistic 
devices leave a noticeable impression on the audience’s perspective when used purposively 
(as we will see later in the public comments analysis). This section explores the discourse of 
three female activists who called for the ban to be lifted and appeared on two TV channels. 
We will analyse their use of the six strategies of legitimisation when delivering their voices in 
mass media. 
 
1- Legitimisation through custody. 
 
Figure 3. The employment of custody in the proponents’ discourse.    
 
The first legitimisation strategy is used heavily within the discourse of the proponents. This 
involves speakers positioning themselves as the spearhead of all proponents within the Saudi 
society. Their promotion of ‘women2drive’ campaigns is for the Saudi women’s sake and the 
good of society. Although they recognise that they may pay the price for such demands in a 
conservative society, they dedicate themselves to fighting voluntarily for others’ and their 
own rights. The mere use of verbs like ‘يعون’ (enlighten) alongside the ‘نحن’ (we) pronoun 
reflects the speaker’s message to the audience that what activists are doing is positive, would 
reveal hidden, distorted or unknown facts regarding women driving. The proponents here 
introduced their custody under three different frames: enlightening and raising the public 
awareness, taking action on the ground, and by showing sympathy for other women. The 
following excerpts illustrate how proponents discursively portray their custody over Saudi 
women and society by enlightening and raising awareness: 
Strategy
Legitimisation through 
Custody
Enlightening public
Taking action on the 
ground
Sympathy
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 (5.1) 
“We enlighten women there is nothing in religion or Sharia nor in law that forbids 
you from driving, even the officials.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.2) 
“We are enlightening women with their rights, and there was a minor imitative 
called (teach me how to drive). We were teaching women who don’t know how to 
drive; we teach them driving” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.3) 
“We did this campaign especially to show the society’s voice, change and the 
growth in numbers demanding this right.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.4) 
“What is happening now is that a woman, unfortunately, doesn’t know her rights, 
or she might know them but keeps silent.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
 
After using the word ‘enlighten’ in excerpt (5.1) to deliver the good intentions and to indicate 
the activists’ aim of making women aware of their rights, Manal makes a big claim that 
attracts the audience’s attention and evokes their thinking towards a key reason for not driving 
until now. Her claim reflects how serious she and other activists take the case and confirms 
that they have reached a point where there is nothing in religion, Sharia, law and even by 
officials to forbid women driving. Consequently, they find themselves duty-bound to raise 
awareness among women and society in general. In excerpt (5.2), the speaker continues 
assuring the audience that the main idea is to make women aware of their rights. By using the 
pronoun ‘we’ followed by two verbs that reflect supremacy over the other ‘enlighten’ and 
‘teach’, Manal creates two groups of women: those who are knowledgeable about their rights 
and already know how to drive and others who still need to be taught. This is evident since 
Manal and other activists in the ‘we’ group launched an initiative called ‘teach me driving’ to 
instruct Saudi women. Even the name of the initiative reflects the complementary roles 
between the social actors (we–the activists- teach, you –Saudi women- learn); moreover, this 
is all done for the good of Saudi women. Furthermore, in excerpt (5.3), Lamia provides 
reasonable justification for the campaign; thereby reflecting society’s voice and 
demonstrating the change that occurred. Lamia discursively reveals her and other activists’ 
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role as society’s custodians; ‘we did this campaign’ and ‘to show the society’s voice’. The 
verb ‘show’ is not usually in conjunction with the word ‘voice’, but in this context it delivers 
to the audience a metaphor of a voice that needs to be heard. Similarly, in excerpt (5.4), 
Manal justifies her calls and activism by drawing the audience’s attention to another 
classification of Saudi women regarding the case of driving, whether those who are not aware 
of their rights or those who aware but keep silent. In this case, what she and other activists are 
doing is a legitimate and heroic act as they raise awareness among other women and stand for 
their own rights. However, based on this classification, Manal invites the former to learn their 
rights and the latter to speak out against the status quo. In other words, she and other activists 
belong to another classification where they already know their rights and continue fighting for 
them.  
Moreover, the proponents framed their custody as being the group taking action on the 
ground (the call and initiative of lifting the ban) on behalf of others (e.g. Saudi women), this 
was constructed in the following excerpts:  
(5.5) 
“I represent the resistant Saudi woman, who tries to live with dignity.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.6) 
“I have priorities, I ordered them…my current priority is to concentrate on the 
initiative because my concern is bigger than Manal.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.7) 
“After 17th June, I appeared again because this is the initiative launch date and I 
want to be among the girls (the members of the initiative). I will try to help because 
the issue I experienced has become an issue of getting my dignity back as well as 
all other Saudi women’s dignity who appealed for this right and were violently 
attacked. God willing we won’t stop…we won’t stop until the issue of the 1st 
driving licence for a Saudi woman.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
By using the verb ‘represent’ in excerpt (5.5), Manal nominates herself as a representative of 
all Saudi women striving to live with dignity. Within the broad context, this sentence has 
significantly more to say as it subconsciously delivers three essential messages to the 
audience: first, Saudi women’s dignity is connected to lifting the ban, which implies that 
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Saudi women’s dignity does not exist or incomplete. Second, the speaker represents all Saudi 
women who are striving for their dignity. Finally, Manal is a custodian of those women’s 
rights that require support. The use of a word like ‘dignity’ triggers audience emotions and 
yields more sympathetic reactions. She also elaborates in excerpt (5.7). By saying: ‘an issue 
of getting my dignity back as well as all other Saudi women’s dignity’, Manal explains that 
after her detention she is back not only to rehabilitate herself but all Saudi women who want 
the right to drive. She considers her detention as a humiliation for all women sharing her 
interest in driving. Furthermore, it targets other women and their dignity. Her audience is 
assured that she is not seeking a personal reward; rather, she strives for the benefit of all 
women. In excerpt (5.6), she adds that her priority is the initiative and implies her altruism by 
stating: ‘my concern is bigger than Manal’. Finally, the proponents’ custody was framed by 
expressing sympathy for other women and displaying understanding and care for their 
individual suffering. This frame was proposed as an appeal to the audience emotions to 
exchange sympathy with the activists in their fight for the right (lifting the ban) as the 
following excerpts demonstrate: 
 (5.8) 
“The divorced ladies, widowed and those earning the modest social security 
benefits -as the Sheikh said- could save some of their money to buy a car instead of 
spending it on the driver rent, accommodation and visa fees… Allah knows how 
much these cost…they all paid from the social security benefits which is modest as 
you said.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.9) 
“She has a car but the matter is already social...it is a social matter…indeed, it 
relates to women in need. The one compelled to hire a driver and pay all his visa 
expenses, accommodation, and monthly salary…..it is a bigger burden on her.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Again, in excerpts (5.8) and (5.9), proponents appeal to their audience by revealing their 
understanding and sympathy with the current situation regarding the burden of Saudi women 
being unable to drive; especially those who are divorced or widowed, and their only income 
comes from ‘social security benefits’. This was evident in reminding the audience that a 
woman that cannot drive has to ‘hire’ a driver and ‘pay’ his visa, expenses, and monthly 
salary. The speaker also demonstrated her custody by describing the issue as a ‘social matter’ 
that ‘relates to women in need’. This sympathetic tone stems from a group of Saudi women 
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who had the same or similar experiences to those of the audience, which require them to take 
responsibility on behalf of others. The activists’ understanding of women’s suffering triggers 
those who care about society and women, in particular, to sympathise with the activists and 
support the campaign. Overall, the three frames of custody served the proponents to portray 
their altruistic position, therefore, gaining legitimacy among the audience. 
 
2- Legitimisation through Authorisation. 
 
Figure 4. The employment of authority in the proponents’ discourse.    
 
The diversity of six sub-types of authority may explain why this strategy is the highest 
legitimisation strategy adopted by proponents. The advocate speakers often refer to authority 
to support their claims by a third-party opinion and to present evidence from what is 
considered as neutral but powerful people or institutions; for example, government officials, 
religious clerics, and state laws. Proponents used the following sub-types of authority –
ordered according to their frequency- to achieve legitimisation; personal, impersonal, 
conformity, as a role model and as an expert opinion. Each of these sub-types is analysed 
separately. 
Personal authority 
Personal authority is where proponents quote from or refer to an opinion or a statement of 
someone in power or a position of power to reinforce their own position. This type of 
authority is the most frequently used within the proponents’ discourse and is illustrated in the 
following excerpts: 
Strategy
Legitimisation 
through Authority
Personal 
authority
Impersonal 
authority
Conformity
Role model
Expert opinion
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 (5.10) 
“We read all officials’ statements in the state and none of them is opposing, they all 
refer to it as a social issue.” 
 (Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.11) 
“Even the Saudi traffic law, the general director of traffic, Maj. Gen./ Fahad Al-
Bisher assured that the new traffic law that will be implemented today, doesn’t 
include any term that forbids women driving, and this was published in Al-Wattan 
newspaper in 2002.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
 
(5.12) 
“Let me tell you, the foreign minister himself said; for us, it isn’t a political issue, it 
is a social one. The Prince Saud Al-Faisal (foreign affairs minister) said these 
words; - it is not a political or religious issue, it is a social one.-” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.13) 
“The Saudi society heard the King..he said it clearly, the crown prince Sultan also 
said it…it was said many times that it is a social matter, a society decision and the 
society should make its decision.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
In excerpt (5.10), Manal refers to ‘officials’ statements’ to refute allegations that women 
driving is forbidden by law or for religious reasons. She used the verb ‘read’ followed by ‘all’ 
to reflect the amount of time and effort spent reading and tracking the opinions of government 
officials (personal authority) to extract their position regarding women driving. Moreover, 
although no numbers, names or references were given, the mere use of certain words, like 
‘none’ and ‘all’, strengthens the claim raised and reflects the speaker’s rigorous research and 
confidence in her argument. 
In excerpt (5.11), Manal continued the implementation of some discursive strategies by using 
the power of personal and impersonal authority, the word ‘even’ used here to add a further 
claim or evidence to previous ones to strengthen the speaker’s argument. ‘Traffic law’ 
represents an impersonal authority that should be considered as a key reason for whether or 
not women should be allowed to drive. Furthermore, the speaker added ‘the general director 
of traffic, Maj. Gen. Fahad Al-Bisher’ to express a significant personal authority represented 
in a statement made by the general director of traffic in the kingdom. The use of the verb 
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‘assured’ is essential to refute that women driving is forbidden by law strongly. The same 
argument was supported later in excerpt (5.12) by another personal authority represented by 
Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, who stated: ‘it is not a political or 
religious issue, it is a social one’. However, the speaker here used the reflexive pronoun 
‘himself’ directly after naming the position ‘foreign minister’ to emphasise more power to the 
force of the reported speech. This occurred again when the same information was reported 
differently by reminding the audience of another form of the speaker’s authority (Saud Al-
Faisal) using the word ‘prince’ followed by another assurance clause, ‘said these words’. It 
plays two important roles in this sentence: firstly, it confirms the power of the speaker (Saud 
Al-Faisal). Secondly, it delivers to the audiences the importance of the quotation used 
afterwards. Similarly, in excerpt (5.13), Lamia cited ‘the King’ ‘the Crown Prince’ as 
personal authorities to illustrate that the issue is a society’s choice and, more importantly, to 
persuade the audience that this is not her individual opinion. However, the speaker appeared 
interested in the positions rather than the names, as she used only their titles. This may 
indicate the speaker’s interest in the power and influence of positions. Overall, the speaker's 
employment of personal authority delivered their message explicitly to the audience. In other 
words, according to our government officials, women driving is neither a religious nor 
political issue; therefore, we are calling for entirely legal action without breaking the law. 
 
Impersonal authority 
The second most used authority in the proponents’ discourse is impersonal authority, whereby 
non-personal powers matter most (e.g. law or institution). The power of impersonal authority 
relies primarily on the fact that it is regarded as “an autonomous institution which requires no 
anchoring in some overarching moral order” (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 104). The 
following excerpts explain how proponents employed this authority to earn legitimacy: 
 (5.14) 
  "The 8th article of the basic law of government is: [Government in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality according to 
Islamic Sharia].” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
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(5.15) 
“I drove my car in Jeddah more than once, each time I was stopped by the police 
they look at my driving licence and instantly let me go. I was also told by many 
officers that we have commands not to stop you.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.16) 
“You say we are minorities…Ok, we are minorities and wherever in the world, the 
minorities’ rights don’t fall. The world recoils for human rights and minorities’ 
rights.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
 
In excerpt (5.14), the impersonal authority was employed through Manal’s use of a quotation 
from some official documents by referring to ‘The 8th article of the basic law of government’. 
The simple use of words like ‘article’ and ‘basic law’ prepare the audiences to take for 
granted subsequent atatements, regardless of whether it relatttes to the point of the discussion. 
It is the power of impersonal authority that usually and subconsciously disrupts the audience 
criticality and eliminates doubts on what has been said by the speaker. However, impersonal 
authority does not always appear in the explicit form of a specific written law (e.g. the 8th 
article), it could be a verbal claim attributed to a governmental institution where it becomes 
unchallenged. In excerpt (5.15), the speaker used the impersonal authority of ‘police’ and 
‘many officers’ to highlight that this is not something forbidden by the law of traffic, as 
claimed by many opponents. Therefore, her action of driving and her demands of lifting the 
ban are legitimate. Although this claim cannot be verified, it discursively serves in the 
legitimacy of the statements because Police is an autonomous institution regarded as a 
legitimate authority. ‘Human rights’ is another impersonal authority used by Lamia in excerpt 
(5.16) to refute the opponents’ claim that driving is a minority demand. She used the 
convention of human rights as a globally agreed authority that goes beyond the Saudi context 
and should legitimise their right to demand and claim what she refers to as ‘minorities’ 
rights’. 
 
Conformity 
This type of authority occurs when the proponents try to convince the audience that when 
everyone else permits women to drive, we are no better than they are; thus, women driving 
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should be allowed. The comparison of the situation in Saudi Arabia with other parts of the 
world regarding women driving is deemed to authorise lifting the ban. The following excerpts 
reveal how proponents used the authority of conformity to legitimise their own position: 
 (5.17) 
 “Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women don’t drive.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.18) 
“We are 1% or 3% of Muslims around the world; we are the only country that do 
not allow women driving…so, are we the only Muslims who know that women 
driving is forbidden!?. How about the rest of 97%, are they non-Muslims or do not 
understand religion properly.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
In excerpt (5.17) the speaker used the oddness as a way of criticising the status quo and 
legitimising the demand change. Manal could be able to say: women drive everywhere in the 
world but by saying “the only state in the world where women do not drive”, she is 
emphasising the comparison between Saudi Arabian and the rest of the world and 
encouraging the audience to think reasonably about why this is the case solely in our country. 
By the use of words like ‘the only country’ and ‘in the world’, Manal raises many questions to 
the audience regarding the current situation and most importantly We (Saudis) are right, and 
They (rest of the world) are wrong. This information was employed and delivered 
intelligently in a negative sentence to intensify the feeling of oddness among the audience and 
to invalidate/refuse the so-called “uniqueness of Saudi Arabia” proposed by opponents as we 
will see later. Similarly, in response to some opponents’ claims regarding the religious reason 
behind the ban, Najla in excerpt (5.18) used the authority of conformity among the Muslim 
world. First, she tells the audience what percentage of Muslims of Saudi Arabia represents 
those around the world: ‘We are 1% or 3% of Muslims around the world’. Second, she states 
that Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that does not allow women to drive. Finally, 
she leaves the audience with some sarcastic questions that reflect the oddity of Saudi society 
regarding women driving compared with the rest of the Muslim world. The speakers are 
trying to evoke the audience’s thinking and encourage them to adopt a positive response 
towards the campaign and activists. 
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Role Model authority 
However, legitimisation can be embodied within a role model’s authority where speakers 
quote or use the opinion of a role model to support their own position. The role model can be 
a religious character, a celebrity, or a well-known media figure that is followed or admired by 
many in society. It can be said that the employment of a role model opinion here is similar to 
that voice of a celebrity when used in a presidential campaign to add legitimacy to one party 
over the other. In excerpt (5.19), Manal purposively names four different people, each 
referred to by the prestigious religious title, ‘Sheikh’, and mentions their own view in the case 
of women driving.  
 (5.19) 
“Sheikh Al-Muhimeed, other Sheikhs like Ahmad bin Baz, bin Jubair, and many 
others talked about the topic, now Alqarni talked as well and they all said the origin 
of the case is permissibility.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
 
The ‘Sheikh’ title portrays simultaneously an admired persona from a largely religious 
background, which perfectly constitutes a role model whose position the audience is 
encouraged accept. 
 
 
 
Expert authority 
Expert authority is when proponents referred to an expert’s opinion about women driving to 
conclude to its legitimacy. The view could be taken from experts in different disciplines such 
as: economics, politics and Sharia as long as it serves in the legitimacy of women driving. The 
position or specialisation of the expert is usually essential to differentiate between the 
opinions as an outcome of expertise or merely as a role model opinion. The following excerpt 
illustrates how expert authority is employed: 
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(5.20) 
“Qais Al-Mubarak, a member of the senior council of Ulama and a professor in 
Fiqh (jurisprudence) at King Faisal University said: the question about women 
driving should be directed to the traffic department of the kingdom…why it is 
directed to a scholar like me?” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
 
Another name mentioned by Manal was Qais Al-Mubarak, but this time as an expert authority 
Manal introduced Mr Al-Mubarak in excerpt (5.20) as a member of the senior council of 
Ulama and a professor in Fiqh (religious jurisprudence) at King Faisal University. This 
introduction was necessary since Al-Mubarak perhaps is not deemed as famous as previous 
names. Besides, it delivers to the audience what is reported based on an expert voice. Clearly, 
his speciality and membership in the senior council of Ulama frame him as a person with 
expertise from a religious perspective; therefore, Manal used his voice to persuade the 
audience that the ban has nothing to do with religion, as claimed or used to be claimed by 
many opponents of women driving. 
 
3- Legitimisation through analogous/moral evaluation 
 
Figure 5. The employment of moral evaluation in the proponents’ discourse.    
This strategy was the least explicit form of legitimisation (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). The 
proponents’ use of moral evaluation constructed three domains that together achieved 
legitimacy; those are: value of being nationalist, value of adherence to law and analogous 
evaluation. All three areas are demonstrated and analysed in the following excerpts: 
Strategy
Legitimisation through 
Moral evaluation
Nationalist
Adherence to law
Analogy
85 
 
 
 
- The value of being nationalist: 
 (5.21) 
“Harassment exists in all societies…it is shameful that someone accuses our 
youths. In our initiative, we have Saudi boys who are among our biggest 
proponents and supporters, how do you dare to accuse the Saudi man of being a 
sexual predator that cannot control himself if a woman drive..!!" 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
 
(5.22) 
“We didn’t address foreign bodies, this is clear. None of the initiative members 
addressed or got help from any foreign body. Although some of the human rights 
organisations tried to help us, we refused, we said: we are Saudis and the change is 
in our hands. I believe that the change happens from inside and if you tried to make 
it happen from outside you will fail.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
In response to one of the most common arguments made by opponents, which is the potential 
spread of harassment cases if women were allowed to drive, Manal in excerpt (5.21) defended 
the Saudi youth morality and accused the opponents of questioning it. Using words like 
‘shameful’, ‘accuses our youths’ ‘Saudi boys’ and ‘the Saudi man’ clearly highlight how 
Manal positioned her audience as part of the in-group ‘our youth’, expressed her 
dissatisfaction with the way they are portrayed, and raised the proponent’s national values by 
defending what she calls ‘the Saudi man’. Another example of reinforcing morality by 
increasing the national/ist values is in excerpt (5.22), where Manal emphatically assures the 
proponents’ rejection of any intervention of any ‘foreign bodies’ in the Saudi situation. 
Moreover, she confirms to her audience that some foreign organisations offered she and her 
group support, but they refused by saying ‘we are Saudis’. The proponents are accentuating 
their nationalism to assure the audience of their commitment to the national and traditional 
values of the Saudi society. It also falsifies the opponents’ accusations or hints that the 
activists are outsiders who are supported by foreign organisations or trying to impose western 
values in our society as in excerpt (5.86) and (5.87) (see opponents’ discourse page 112).     
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- The value of adherence to law and Islamic moralities: 
Another domain of legitimisation through moral evaluation was by highlighting the value of 
adherence to law and Islamic teachings. In this domain, the proponent’s expressed their trust 
in the public reaction to women driving, which is because they are following the Islamic 
teachings and law. It is the advocates’ way to implicitly deliver to the audience that we ‘the 
activists’ are not against the Islamic values held by society. Indeed, we appreciate them. This 
could be a reaction to some of the opponents’ traditional accusations against them being 
advocates to a very liberal society that targets our Islamic values (see excerpts 5.38 and 5.39). 
The following excerpts demonstrate how the value of adherence to law and Islamic moralities 
were constructed: 
 (5.23)  
“I didn’t violate a law; I violated a custom…I didn’t rebel against ‘wali al-amr’ 
(the ruler)” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.24) 
“When you make doubts about the society acceptance to women driving or what 
immoral acts may result from women driving, it means you are making doubts 
about the moralities of our society which adhere to religion and Sharia.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.25) 
“I trust our society that there will be no harassments or assaults because they are 
committing to Islamic moralities, there will not be any of these because I tried it 
myself I was not harassed..….because our society, our youth, and our men are 
good, they have the manners of Islam that our society is adhering to” 
 (Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
In excerpt (5.23), Manal assured her audience that by doing what she does, she has neither 
broken any law nor disobeyed ‘wali al-amr’. Her use of the word ‘law’ demonstrates respect 
for the state regulations or rules; whereas by using a word like ‘wali al-amr’4- the Islamic 
jargon of ruler- Manal implies that she also respects the religious law of being obedient to the 
ruler of the state. Similarly, in reply to the hypothetical social immorality claimed by Al-
Nojaimy, Najla in excerpt (5.24), used the verb ‘make doubts’ to reflect the speaker’s 
                                                          
4 In Arabic, ‘wali al-amr’ is a term that also refers to the person in charge of or in position of guardianship over a family or 
minor person/s (e.g. a father can be described as wali al-amr for his wife and kids). However, in Saudi Arabia this 
guardianship is an issue that is not limited to certain age in case of women, as by law they must have a male guardian 
regardless of their age, education, financial or marital status.      
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uncertainty and pessimism and to undermine his credibility. This is evident when she 
connects the subject to questioning ‘the moralities of our society’ that ‘adhere to religion and 
Sharia’. 
In excerpt (5.25), she continues with the moral evaluation strategy and criticises the 
opponents’ view by validating her previous accusation, made in excerpt (5.31). This time, she 
expresses her sympathy and understanding for any woman who attempts to drive her own car, 
and demonstrates her trust and appreciation for the men and youth of ‘our society’, as they are 
‘committed to Islamic morals’. The same compliment was used twice in this excerpt; thereby 
reflecting the speaker’s emphasis on highlighting their views and expectations towards the 
society. Moreover, it hints to the audience that unlike our counterparts (opponents), we as 
proponents hold better perspectives towards the moralities of our community. This was 
obvious through the use of words that demonstrate and construct trust and confidence between 
the speaker and audience; for example, ‘I trust our society’, ‘no harassments will happen’, and 
‘our society, youth and men are good’. However, the third domain of evaluation used by the 
proponents was the analogous evaluation where speakers remind the audience of a similar 
historic situation to legitimise their position as in the following excerpt: 
 (5.26) 
“Girls’ education is a big and important example that changed the history in Saudi 
Arabia.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Through analogy, the proponents offer the audience the opportunity to evaluate the status quo 
by reminding them of a similar case from the past that led ultimately to a successful outcome. 
In excerpt (5.26), Najla cites ‘girls’ education’ as an example of a previous similar experience 
before 1959 when girls’ education was rejected socially and by some clerics. This analogous 
evaluation of girls’ education is expected to deliver the following: 
- The current opponents are similar to those who delayed our girl's education in the past. 
- If the ban is lifted it would herald benefits to the society the same way as girls’ education 
did. This is evident as the speaker followed her analogy by a positive result ‘changed the 
history of Saudi’. 
- Reassure audience of the activists’ good intentions and to demolish the conspiracy 
accusations made by opponents against them (see excerpts 5.33 and 5.34).  
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4- Legitimisation through Rationalisation 
Legitimisation occurs when proponents display their calls as a result of deep thinking, 
consultations, and evaluated procedures. It is based on studies rather than personal interests or 
perspectives. Van Leeuwen refers to this process of rationalisation as ‘Theoretical 
Rationalisation’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007). In this sense, rationalisation is linguistically 
articulated by clauses such as: ‘This was the result of…’ or by the inclusion of verbs denoting 
mental or research processes (Thompson 2004, Reyes 2011) such as: ‘conducted’ and 
‘studied’ from the proponents’ discourse. The following excerpts illustrate how the supporters 
used rationality to serve legitimacy: 
(5.27) 
“We conducted a research-like; we found that officials don’t oppose women 
driving. We read all officials’ statements in the state and none of them is opposing” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.28) 
 “We have studied it; we did that from a legality perspective.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.29) 
“This was the result of a study and deep reading; we found that there isn’t any 
reason to ban women driving except the society itself. Even the officials used to 
say the society… the society.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
In the three excerpts above, it is obvious how the speaker wants to rationally legitimise her 
group demands by convincing the audience that all the points raised are based on studies and 
thoughtful decisions. In excerpt (5.27), Manal claims that based on ‘a research-like’ that 
advocates ‘conducted’ and after they ‘read’ all officials’ statements, they ‘found’ out that ‘all’ 
officials do not oppose women driving and again ‘all of them’ refer it back to society. She 
further adds in excerpt (5.28), the words ‘read’ and ‘studied it…from a legality perspective’, 
accentuating that the advocates' claims are legal and a result of a research-based process. 
Manal explicitly illustrates this in excerpt (5.29), ‘This was the product of a study and deep 
reading’. Although no specific studies are mentioned, the mere use of words like ‘a study’ and 
‘deep reading’ conveys to the audience the reliability and trustworthiness of the speaker. They 
all aim to falsify any claims that relate the ban to any religious or legal reasons and assure the 
audience that it is a society thing. 
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5- Legitimisation through mythopesis 
Here, proponents tell stories that are negative and attribute their adverse consequences to the 
status quo to legitimise their demands for change. The threatening story would not have 
happened if women currently were allowed to drive. In mythopoesis, one story or event can 
be taken as evidence for a general norm of behaviour (Mitten and Wodak, 1993; Wodak et al, 
1990). Interestingly, positive stories always serve as an exception (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 
1999). The following story demonstrates how storytelling could help legitimacy: 
 (5.30) 
“I was leaving my clinic in AL-Dhahran Street, they closed the clinic and I had no 
driver to drive me home back. It was 9:00 pm, I walked for 45 mins looking for a 
taxi but I could not find one. Someone in a car kept following me and I was 
terrified. I threw a stone at him because I had no other options for defending 
myself.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
In excerpt (5.30), Manal recalled a negative story that she experienced herself and explained 
clearly her situation when she left the clinic at 9:00 pm: ‘I had no driver to drive me home’, 
‘It was 9:00 pm, I walked for 45 mins’, ‘looking for a taxi’, ‘but I could not find one’. All 
these words and phrases reflect the speaker’s suffering, and it is evident that her experience 
was a dangerous one. Manal elaborates by telling the cautionary tale of being followed by an 
unknown car; she was scared and had to defend herself by throwing a stone at it. The message 
is although previous incidents are negative, they could have been worse; she was lucky at this 
time, but she might not be next time. However, by using the strategy of legitimisation through 
mythopoesis, the speaker implies that this negative and scary experience would not happen if 
she were able to drive and what happened to her could happen to any other female as long as 
women driving is banned. 
6- Legitimisation through hypothetical/potential implications 
In this context, legitimisation occurs when proponents portray the bright shiny image that if 
women are allowed to drive the future will be flourishing. To stop the current suffering and 
guarantee a better future, immediate lifting of the ban is required. This is achieved by 
highlighting the main problems caused by the ban and combining their collective solutions. 
The following excerpts illustrate the construction of this strategy: 
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 (5.31) 
“Once you give this right to a woman you are opening her a wide, welcoming 
space, how many girls didn’t continue their higher education because there was no 
mean of transportation or jobs which they quit because they pay half or 3/4 of the 
salary to their drivers….this is real and I have names and numbers" 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
 
(5.32) 
“Economically, we have over 800 thousand hired drivers who transfer about 2 
billion Riyal monthly outside the kingdom so; I would imagine the country 
economic returns will be huge.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
In excerpt (5.31), Manal states clearly that ‘once’ women are allowed to drive, this will create 
a wide, welcoming space. The use of a word like ‘once’ notifies the audience that the primary 
barrier and cause of the current suffering is the ban on women driving. Manal glorifies this 
hypothetical future by identifying some miserable outcomes of the current situation; for 
example, ‘how many girls did not continue their higher education’ ‘jobs which they quit’. 
This strategy of reminding the audience with some issues that resulted from the difficulty of 
mobility triggers their emotions generally, and females in particular. In excerpt (5.32), Najla 
examined the issue from an economic perspective and produced positive potential 
implications of lifting the driving ban. Using some simple statistics, which ought to reflect 
more credibility for the speaker, Najla predicts better results in the future. She used this 
strategy to legitimise audience through the potential advantage of allowing women to drive 
which will lead to a reduction in the number of drivers; therefore, the state will reap great 
rewards as a result. Overall, the proponents employment of the hypothetical implications 
strategy relied on highlighting the current social problems about the ban on women driving 
and the portrayal of a positive future that is linked to lifting the embargo. 
Summary 
In the previous part of the analysis, six strategies of legitimisation employed by the 
proponents were separately and extensively analysed. Those strategies demonstrated that 
legitimation can be practised through: custody, authorisation, analogous/moral evaluation, 
rationalisation, mythopesis and hypothetical/potential implications. The proponent’s 
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legitimisation through custody was constructed in three themes; enlightening public, taking 
action, and showing sympathy (Fig. 3). The second legitimisation strategy was authorisation 
that was constructed through five sub-types of authority: personal, impersonal, conformity, 
role model, and expert opinion (Fig. 4). The third strategy was the analogous/moral 
evaluation which employed through three domains: value of being nationalist, value of 
adherence to law, and analogy (Fig. 5). Regarding the strategies of rationalisation, 
mythopoesis, and the potential implication, they were employed less than the others, but all 
demonstrated their effectiveness in serving legitimacy. 
 
5.2.2 Positive self & negative-other presentations (Referentiality)  
1- Referential Strategy: Self (The Proponents) 
In this study, the proponents of women driving adopted a referential strategy that reflects a 
hedging approach when using the in-group pronouns we and us. Regarding the references to 
the self, the proponents maintained a conservative attitude in the construction of the in-group 
as it remained frequently limited to the ‘activists’ and seldom extended to include outsiders 
(e.g. non-activist Saudi women, Saudi society). In other words, the proponents’ reference to 
the Self was represented through; reference to the activists only and reference to a larger 
community where activists and other segments of society are included. The following excerpts 
illustrate how the in-group remained limited to the women driving activists only: 
 (5.33) 
Host: You say we..we, who are you? 
Manal: “Members of the initiative, myself and a female student from the Faculty 
of Islamic Sharia at King Faisal University started it.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.34) 
 “We launched the initiative to shed the lights on women driving issue” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.35) 
“We were teaching women who don’t know how to drive” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
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 (5.36) 
“We didn’t address foreign bodies” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.37) 
“We are delivering our opinion to the society; we don’t hide.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
However, in reference to the self, proponents occasionally expanded the in-group to include 
the larger community (e.g. Saudi women, Saudi Society). By using the same pronoun, ‘we’, to 
refer to Saudi women or Saudis, the speakers positioned themselves within the community to 
gain more sympathy and to accentuate their sense of belonging to the Saudi society. 
Accordingly, they refute the opponents’ (the other) allegations of them being minorities and 
being excluded from society (see excerpts 5.68 and 5.69). The following excerpts demonstrate 
how the advocates integrate themselves into the society: 
 (5.38) 
“We are waiting for a Royal Decree…just like what happened with the girls’ 
education….we hope it is a firm way to block the way against any opposition or 
anything else…we are in need.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.39) 
“Our society, our youth and our men are good; they have the manners of Islam 
that our society is adhering to” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.40) 
“We are a civil society, or we are a civil state.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.41) 
“If custom has no religious basis and is delaying us from developing, why do we 
not change this custom?” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
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2- Referential Strategy: Other (The Opponents) 
In reference to the Other, proponents adopted a professional referential approach that tends 
mainly to use neutral, rather than evaluative, references. However, the proponents’ reference 
to the Other was constructed through; neutral reference and evaluative reference. The former 
is when proponents mention the Other group solely as ‘the opponents’, while the latter is 
when other descriptions or names are linked to them (e.g. ‘religious men’). Overall, the mere 
use of a neutral reference, such as ‘the opponents’, could leave a negative impression of 
people adopting this stance, as it has adverse connotations that may portray them as a 
stumbling block to society’s progress (Porter, 2005). The following excerpts demonstrate the 
proponents’ neutral reference to the Other group:  
 (5.42) 
“The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.43) 
 “I have read many of the opponents’ reactions.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.44) 
 “If there is any incitation or anything else against us, it will be from the 
opponents.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
However, on rare occasions, the proponents’ reference to ‘the other’ was evaluative; thereby 
classifying them morally and religiously. As demonstrated in the excerpts below, the speaker 
framed the Other as ‘religious men’ (excerpt 5.45) and later ironically represented them as 
being ‘the judge and jury’ (excerpt 5.46) when they reacted to the campaign in June 2011. 
 (5.45) 
“We found out that most religious men say there is no Tahreem (religious 
ban)...those are within them” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.46) 
“They were the judge and jury…they launched the charges. Charges of a 
revolution against the King and breaking laws and they used them to attack me…I 
was not charged, and these accusations are refuted.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
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3- Referential Strategy: Women Driving 
The proponents’ referential strategy regarding women driving appeared to adopt a defensive 
and explanatory approach. The referential themes used to represent women driving were 
classified into two notions: women driving (the issue) and women driving (the campaign). 
The former was used to enlighten audiences about the inherent inequality, while the latter was 
used primarily to defend and explain the campaigns’ intentions. As an issue, women driving 
has an extensive and comprehensive meaning; it tackles the problem in a broader context and 
time scale; whereas the campaign for women driving focuses on recent attempts to lift the ban 
concerning particular people within a specific period. The following excerpts reveal how the 
proponents refer to women driving (the issue): 
 (5.47) 
“The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth, in order to begin 
demanding simple things, like the freedom of mobility.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.48) 
 “We clearly declare, driving is a choice, not a coercion.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.49) 
“We did this campaign especially to reflect the society’s voice, change and the 
growth in numbers demanding this right.” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.50) 
 “Basically, driving isn’t a religious matter to ask someone for fatwa.” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Conversely, the proponents’ construction of women driving as a campaign was slightly 
justificatory and focused on enlightening the public about the campaign/s legitimacy, 
defending and correcting any possible mistaken conceptions about the intentions behind these 
campaigns. This is obvious through the use of either negative form tied with acts that are 
considered socially unacceptable (e.g. ‘I didn’t violate a law’, ‘I didn’t rebel against the ruler’, 
‘it was not organised’), or through the direct usage of some positive assertions in reference to 
the campaigns (e.g. ‘was spontaneous’, ‘it was just an initiative to enlighten women’). 
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However, the references to women driving as a campaign are best illustrated in the following 
excerpts:   
 (5.51)  
“I didn’t violate a law, I violated a custom…I didn’t rebel against the ruler” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.52) 
 “Believe me, the initiative thing was spontaneous, it was not organised” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.53) 
 “It is neither a gathering nor a demonstration…it is only a campaign to 
support the claim” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
All three excerpts above portrayed women driving (the campaign) as a legitimate action that 
adheres to the law. It is important to highlight that the proponents’ justificatory approach 
aimed to refute the Other’s portrayal of the campaign as ‘a protest’ that is ‘aggravating the 
society’ and plans to ‘break the law’ (see Table 2, p.100). The proponents in excerpt (5.52) 
emphasise that the campaign was ‘spontaneous’ and ‘not organised’. However, Manal asserts 
that by leading this movement (women driving campaign), she did not ‘violate a law’ or 
‘rebel against the ruler’ as claimed by their opponents. 
 
5.2.3 Positive self & negative other-representations (Predicationality) 
 
1- Predicational Strategy: Self (The Proponents) 
The construction of the positive self through predicational strategy has represented the Us 
group as striving to ‘raise women awareness’, continue to fight for the right of Saudi women 
‘will not stop’ and as the group that suffered a lot and been victims of social inequality ‘we 
were heavily attacked’, ‘we have no other solutions’. The following excerpts illustrate how 
the self group was portrayed as strivers: 
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(5.54) 
“We are delivering our opinion to the society; we don’t hide…by the way, 
people who register their opinions writes their full names and they are known…we 
don’t do something wrong to hide” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.55) 
 “Our group, which started the initiative, is still active and didn’t stop even when 
I was detained.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.56) 
“We didn’t stop claiming since that time” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.57) 
“God willing, we won’t stop…we won’t stop until the issue of the first driving 
licence for a Saudi woman.” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
Another predication of self-presentation framed the Us group as being victims of social 
marginalisation, opponents’ unfair attacks and being left without options, as illustrated in the 
following excerpts: 
(5.58) 
“We have a need, and you are unable to provide us with, we have no other 
solutions” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.59) 
 “We are in need and, for this reason, we organised this initiative” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.60) 
 “We were heavily attacked for seeking help from outsiders, of course, this is not 
true” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
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2- Predicational Strategy: Other (The Opponents) 
Primarily, the proponents’ representation of the other frame two themes: the other as a group 
with an offensive attitude; and the other as selfish, sceptical and careless people. However, 
these topics were represented within the acts of the other, rather than naming or describing 
them directly. This is a professional way of drawing a negative image of the other through 
predicational strategy when adopting a mostly neutral referential approach. The construction 
of the other as an offensive group is evident in the following excerpts: 
 (5.61) 
“They were the judge and jury…they launched the charges. Charges of a 
revolution against the King and breaking laws, which they used to attack me…I 
was not charged and these accusations are refuted” 
(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.62) 
“They had some perceptions of the initiative and Manal Al-Sharif; based on which, 
they began their unjustified and violent attack” 
 (Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011) 
(5.63) 
 “If there is any incitation or anything else against us, it will be from the 
opponents” 
 (Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
The predicational representation of the Other as being offensive is a complement to the 
proponents’ self portrayal as victims (see Table 2, p.100). As we discussed previously that the 
proponents represented themselves as the victims in this dichotomous hassle, here they further 
construct the hostile image of the opponents by emphasising explicitly the Other’s offensive 
acts; for example, in the excerpts (5.61, 5.62): ‘they used to attack me’ and ‘their unjustified 
and violent attack’. Lamia in excerpt (5.63) attributes ‘any incitation’ that could cause harm 
or but the advocates in danger to ‘the opponents’. This could be taken as a speaker’s 
exaggeration rather than a fact but it still serves in the negative portrayal of the Other; 
therefore, de-legitmising them. However, the second predicational theme in the proponents’ 
discourse is portraying the Other as the selfish, careless and sceptic group, as illustrated in the 
following excerpts: 
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 (5.64) 
“If you can’t sort out my mobility issue, don’t tell me not to drive, don’t ask me to 
wait until they launch trains…you know this is not a solution…don’t disregard us 
anymore” 
(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.65) 
“The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth, before we begin 
demanding simple things, like the freedom of mobility” 
 (Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.66) 
“You are creating doubts about the moralities of our society, which adheres to 
religion and Sharia” 
(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
In their justification for organising a campaign, the advocates depicted the Other as the selfish 
group that does not care about our suffering and had a tendency to ‘disregard’ our demands. 
Consequently, we as advocates must initiate and move towards change, rather than listening 
to a group that ‘want us to wait until peace prevails earth’. Again, this exaggerated metaphor 
aids the negative presentation of the Other and legitimises the proponents’ calls for change. 
 
 
5.2.4 Summary of the proponents’ discourse 
In the previous set of data, the discourse of women driving proponents was extensively 
analysed by integrating the analytical approach of legitimisation strategies developed by Van 
Leeuwen (1996, 2007) and Reyes (2011) together with the strategies of positive self and 
negative-other presentation from Wodak (2001). On the one hand, the analysis of the 
proponents’ strategies of legitimisation, demonstrated the employment of all six strategies of 
legitimisation: custody, authorisation, moral/analogous evaluation, rationalisation, 
mythopoesis and the hypothetical/potential implication. Furthermore, the construction of 
various themes within some strategies was noted, all serving the legitimacy. In other words, 
the proponents’ custody was constructed from three themes: enlightening public, taking 
action on ground, and showing sympathy (Fig. 3). Legitimisation through authorisation was 
developed through the employment of five sub-types of authority: personal, impersonal, 
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conformity, role model, and expert opinion (Fig. 4). The third strategy used by proponents is 
the analogous/moral evaluation, which was employed by the construction of three domains: 
value of being nationalist, value of adherence to law, and the mere analogy (Fig. 5). However, 
legitimisation through rationalisation, mythopoesis and hypothetical/potential implication 
were used modestly and did not form any themes. 
Conversely, the analysis of the referential and predicational strategies of positive self-
presentation and negative-other-presentation (see Table 1, p.24) revealed the following: 
reference to the Self as (the activists only, and as a larger community) whereas reference to 
the Other was in two forms; (neutral reference and evaluative reference). Regarding women 
driving, the proponents’ referential strategy constructed women driving in two ways: the 
campaign (e.g. ‘spontaneous’, ‘initiative’) and the issue (e.g. ‘right’, ‘freedom of mobility’). 
In terms of the predicational strategies, the Self group was depicted as a group of strivers (e.g. 
still active, we did not stop’), and sometimes as victims (e.g. ‘we were heavily attacked’, ‘we 
have no other solutions’). In contrast, the proponents portrayed the Other group first as the 
offensive group (e.g. ‘launched the charges’, ‘their violent attack’), and second as the selfish 
and careless group (e.g. ‘disregard us’, ‘want us to wait until peace prevails earth’). Overall, 
it can be said that the proponents’ macro-argumentation adopted a justificatory approach that 
appeared more defensive than demanding or inciting. 
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Table 2.  The strategies of Self and Other presentation in the proponents of women driving discourse. 
Discursive 
Strategy  
Objectives Categories 
 
Referential 
 
Discursive 
construction/legitimation 
of Self 
Pronouns: 
We, Us, Our 
 
Reference to the activists only: 
‘members of the initiative’, ‘we are teaching women’, 
‘we are Saudis’, ‘we don’t hide’ 
 
Reference to a larger community: 
‘we don’t drive’, ‘we are a civil society’, ‘we have a 
need’, ‘delaying us’  
 
Discursive construction/ 
de-legitimation of the 
Other 
 Pronouns: 
They, Them, Their 
 
Neutral reference: 
 ‘the opponents’ 
 
Evaluative reference: 
‘Religious men’, ‘they were the judge and jury’.  
 
Discursive construction 
of women driving 
As a campaign: 
 ‘spontaneous’, ‘initiative to enlighten women’, ‘not a 
gathering nor a protest’  
 
As an issue:  
‘right’, ‘a social issue’, ‘a need more than a priority’, 
‘a choice not a coercion’ 
 
Predicational 
 
Discursive 
construction/legitimation 
of Self 
WE as strivers: 
‘still active’, ‘we didn’t stop’, ‘we won’t stop’ 
 
WE as victims: 
‘we have no other solutions’, ‘we were heavily 
attacked’, ‘we are in need’  
 
 
Discursive construction/ 
de-legitimation of the 
Other 
THEY as offensive: 
‘they launched the charges’, ‘they began their..violent 
attack’ 
 
THEY as sceptical and careless: 
‘you doubt’, ‘you are questioning’, ‘don’t disregard 
us anymore’, ‘want us to wait until peace prevails 
earth’ 
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5.3 Opponents’ discourse 
5.3.1 Strategies of legitimisation 
 
1- Legitimisation through custody: 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The employment of custody in the opponents’ discourse.    
Just as the proponents’ self-portrayal as custodians for others goodness, the opponents’ 
discourse demonstrates how custody can be employed to serve legitimacy by opposing 
groups. The opponents framed their custody over the Saudi society through two main themes 
by presenting themselves as: virtue defenders and people from a religious background. In the 
former, opponents emphasise their interest in and care for virtues, women’s feelings and 
safety in society. Meanwhile, the latter declares their religious backgrounds or accentuates 
that custody is part of the clerics’ duty. The highlighting of such concerns reflects the sense of 
custody over society; thereby legitimising the opponents’ presence against the calls to women 
driving. The following excerpts demonstrate how opponents adopted the custody of virtue 
defenders to achieve legitimisation: 
 (5.67) 
“The truth is when we discuss women issues we stand with women; we all stand in 
one line side by side to defend virtues” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.68) 
“We need to prepare the society; the society must be ready in terms of women 
safety when they drive” 
(Nizar, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.69) 
“From our perspective, women driving will lead to some consequences…first, it is 
an outraging for the majority of Saudi girls and women’s feelings who oppose 
driving” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Strategy
Legitimisation through 
Custody
Virtue defenders
Religious background 
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One of the most remarkable aspects of the discourse of Al-Sahwa movement during the 1980s 
is the women’s prudishness and sense of privacy. Despite the growing vulnerability in their 
discourse, many of Al-Sahwah principles remaina ta the centre of daily life in Saudi society; 
in particular, those related to women. Furthermore, many of Al-Sahwah advocates continue to 
oppose women driving, asserting the existence of a conspiracy against the virtues of the Saudi 
society; specifically, women. Their opposition is based on preserving the virtues of Saudi 
society and the safety of Saudi women. However, the major criticism levelled by liberals and 
western society against advocates of such discourse is the unnecessary restrictions 
implemented against women in many issues related to work, study and mobility. Accordingly, 
Al-Sahwah advocates tend to justify this by the highlighting their custody over society. One of 
Al-Sahwah chief advocates, Saad Al-Buraik in excerpt (5.67), begins by emphasising his and 
other opponents’ attitudes to women issues. He used the verb ‘stand with’ and the act of 
‘defend’ to reflect that they are supporting and protecting women and probably the whole 
society from an attack on their virtues. The speaker argues that they are standing shoulder-to-
shoulder with women to defend virtues. He also used ‘we all’ to explicitly create the Us group 
that unite opponents with women under one goal that is defending virtues. Similarly, in 
excerpt (5.68), the speaker constructs custody by revealing the opponents’ concern for 
women’s safety; ‘society must be ready in terms of women safety’ and to show that the 
opposition to lifting the ban is because the society is not yet safe enough and ‘we need’ to 
prepare. The use of the modal verb ‘must’ reflects the absolute need for a safer society for 
women and that opponents are aware that the Saudi society is not ready yet. Proponents’ are 
showing their custody by being worried about the possible negative consequence (morally, 
socially and physically) that may cause harm for our women. In another expression of 
custody, the opponents in excerpt (5.69) legitimise their opposition by showing their concerns 
about the majority of women’s feelings. Opponents appoint themselves as attorneys who try 
to act on behalf of the majority of Saudi women who oppose female driving. Opponents 
portray lifting the ban as an ‘outraging’ for those ‘women’s feelings’. 
However, in such a conservative society, the employment of custody from a religious 
perspective is deemed to gain a greater approval among the audience; the following excerpts 
reveal the insertion of the religious view to aid legitimisation through custody: 
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 (5.70) 
“The clerics are custodians on the society members whether men or women, by 
clarifying the right and warning about the wrong, the distinction between the 
similar issues to prevent confusion among people” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.71) 
“I’m a man who adopts a democratic Sharia approach which I don’t want people to 
be forced to anything except with their wishes. When I notice that the society is 
annoyed of any decision, I say they should have the right to vote and if they are 
happy to support it, I have no objection.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Since the speakers themselves and most of those who actively oppose women driving are 
considered religious or specialising in Sharia and other Islamic studies, the speaker in excerpt 
(5.70) was required to identify their custody over society: ‘the clerics are custodians on the 
society members, whether men or women’. This custody is legitimised by stating those 
clerics’ roles in ‘clarifying the right’, ‘warning about the wrong’, ‘the distinction between the 
similar issues’ not to be vague on people, ‘to prevent confusion among people’. This is 
thought to legitimate this custody, therefore, legitimise opponents’ position regarding women 
driving. Similarly, the speaker in excerpt (5.71) employed the religious factor to describe his 
stance by identifying himself as someone who adopts the ‘democratic Sharia approach’. The 
inclusion of a word like Sharia triggers a religious attitude, therefore, enhancing the speakers’ 
custody as a religious professor. The speaker extends further by saying: ‘I do not want people 
to be forced to anything except with their wishes’ to imply that his opposition is because a 
minority that wants to impose their opinions on the majority of people. This is another method 
of legitimisation through custody where the speaker reflects the audience his concern about 
their future and their current needs.  
Moreover, he demonstrates his commitment to their choices as long as there is a referendum: 
‘I say they should have the right to vote and if they are happy to support it, I have no 
objection’. Through this statement, the speaker cites his opposition as more for the sake of 
public democracy than personal opinion. This claim reflects the speaker’s objectivity; 
therefore, his position is afforded greater credibility. 
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2- Legitimisation through Authorisation 
 
Figure 7. The employment of authority in the opponents’ discourse.    
Opponents referred to four sub-types of authority to serve legitimisation: impersonal 
authority, personal authority, expert opinion authority and the role model authority. 
Impersonal authority is the type used most frequently. Each type will be discussed and 
analysed separately. The following excerpts - classified under each category - illustrate how 
legitimisation through different types of power was constructed: 
 
Impersonal authority 
Through impersonal authority, the opponents try to persuade the audience that some 
indifferent authorities (e.g. laws, fatwas and governmental institutions) support the ban. The 
typical form in which legitimisation through impersonal authority is expressed involves either 
a circumstance of attribution (according to,…., as affirmed by….) or a saying verb with the 
relevant authority as a subject (‘the 3rd article states…’, ‘the ministry declares….’) (Van 
Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). The following excerpts illustrate how the opponents employed 
this authority to serve legitimacy: 
 (5.72) 
“This topic is agreed upon among society and it was affirmed by the ministry of 
interior resolution to ban women driving over 22 years ago so, nothing has 
changed” 
 (Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
Strategy
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(5.73) 
“One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that 
the minority don’t impose their opinion on the majority. This exists in Sharia, law 
and everywhere around the world” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.74) 
“These ways of claim are not democratic or Sharia-legitimate; the right Sharia-
legitimate way to settle the issue and the democratic way everywhere in the world 
is to hold a referendum” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Following the first campaign to repeal the ban in November 1990, a fatwa was issued by the 
highest religious establishment in opposition to women driving. Soon after, the Ministry of 
Interiors employed this fatwa to legitimise the ban (see chapter 4, page 57). Subsequently, 
opponents have relied on the impersonal authority of the fatwa and the resolution of the 
Ministry when opposing women driving. In excerpt (5.72), Saad referred to the power and 
impersonal authority of the ‘ministry of interior resolution’ to remind the audience of the 
legitimacy of the ban. However, the speaker also used the authority of tradition; ‘this topic is 
agreed upon among society’ to persuade the audience that even our traditions oppose women 
driving. The power of the impersonal authority stems from the fact that it is a third-party 
decision purporting to be a neutral one. 
In excerpts (5.73) and (5.74), the speaker used the impersonal authority of Sharia and law to 
legitimise his opinion that ‘the minority do not impose their opinion on the majority’. Al-
Nojaimy repeated the word ‘Sharia’ and ‘democratic’ many times in the previous excerpts, 
‘This exist in Sharia, ‘Sharia-legitimate’, ‘in moral and democratic issues’ and ‘the 
democratic way’. This repetition reflects the speaker’s awareness of the impersonal authority 
power since it is considered a third-party opinion or decision. However, law was used as 
another impersonal power to enhance legitimisation through authorisation. Although no 
evidence was cited, the use of words like Sharia and law resemble legitimacy to public ears. 
Furthermore, the speaker harnesses the power of words like Sharia and democracy to 
delegitimise the women driving campaign led by some female activists. He claims the actions 
of activisits are neither democratic nor based on Sharia: ‘These ways of claim are not 
democratic or Sharia-legitimate’. He then argues that the solution to this issue is to conduct a 
referendum; describing this as ‘the right Sharia-legitimate way’. Al-Nojaimy expands further 
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by highlighting the power of democracy as a global value or law -‘the democratic way 
everywhere in the world’. Therefore, this acts as an impersonal authority that would not 
accept imposition. A verb like ‘impose’ could also hint that lifting the ban on women driving 
would not be welcomed by the majority.  
Personal authority 
Personal authority occurs when opponents depend on an opinion or a statement of a person in 
power or authority over a large group of individuals to support their own stance in 
legitimising the ban on women driving, therefore, perpetuating the status quo. Similar to the 
impersonal authority, the typical form in which legitimisation through personal authority 
expressed could be (e.g. ‘Prince Ahmad says…’, ‘the CEO announced…’). It is more about 
the influence of the person name or position rather than the organisation rules. The following 
excerpts reveal how the opponents used personal authority for this purpose: 
 (5.75) 
“There is a regulation issued and was confirmed by Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz 
the Deputy Minister of the Interior” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
 (5.76) 
“…days ago, Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz declared that there is a regulation that 
bans women driving and the ministry of interior is committed to it” 
(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
In excerpt (5.75) and (5.76), both speakers used the personal authority of ‘the prince’ or ‘the 
deputy interior minister’ to confirm the aforementioned impersonal authority of law. 
Although in both extracts almost the same piece of information was delivered, the speakers 
used the word ‘confirmed’ in excerpt (5.75) to refute any allegations of having no law that 
bans women driving and used ‘declared’ in excerpt (5.76) to deny any allegations of being 
unaware of this law. However, in excerpt (5.75), Saad’s subliminal message to the audience 
was that by organising this campaign and driving in streets, proponents are breaking a law 
that bans women driving. In excerpt (5.76), Norah declared that proponents are neglecting 
previous alerts and assertions by the authorities, probably intentionally. This is supported by 
some quotes of the opponents’ discourse, as will be seen later in the legitimisation through 
moral evaluation section. 
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Expert opinion authority 
In this type of authority, the opponents made an explicit reference to the opinion of a person 
or a group of experts not necessarily because of their powerful positions or authority over 
others, but predominantly because they are the experts. Their expertise comes from their 
knowledge based on speciality or experience in a particular field (e.g. Sharia, psychology). 
The following excerpts explain how the opponents employed this authority to serve 
legitimacy: 
 (5.77) 
 “Dr. Nizar said the society need more of maturity, awareness and safety” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.78) 
“I’m a professor in Sharia and law, I know how do they deal with it everywhere in 
the world, such controversial decisions are taken by holding a referendum not by 
force” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Expert authority had been one of the most effective strategies of legitimisation in the 
discourse of the religious establishment (Al-Rasheed, 2013). This is because it predominately 
depends on the voice of the religious experts in issuing fatwas, enacting legislations or taking 
decisions. However, it is noted that concurrently with the retreat in the religious discourse, the 
opponents’ employment of this authority is very limited in relation to women driving. In the 
above excerpts, the speakers used the expert opinion authority to serve legitimisation. In 
excerpt (5.77), to insist the society need for more maturity, Al-Buraik referred to ‘Dr. Nizar’ 
as an expert opinion in psychology to legitimise the ban and maintain the status quo. Another 
employment of expert opinion was by Al-Nojaimy in excerpt (5.78), when he declared his 
position and expertise as ‘a professor in Sharia and law’ to gain further legitimacy and to 
assure the audience that his comments stem from his knowledge and expertise, rather than 
personal opinion. 
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Role model authority 
The opponents use of this type of authority occur when they discursively refer to the opinion 
or perspective of widely popular characters (e.g. historical heroes, religious figures) in an 
attempt to convince the audience of acting like them. The following excerpt illustrates how 
the opponents used this type of authority to achieve legitimisation: 
(5.79) 
“There are matters that can be reviewed and discussed, not by protests but through 
advice. The chief of the martyrs Hamza5 is a man who stood up for an unjust ruler 
and advised him” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
 
In excerpt (5.79), Al-Buraik used the authority of a role model ‘chief of the martyrs Hamza’ 
to legitimise his refusal for the proponents’ campaigns or what he calls ‘demonstrations’. 
Hamza ibn Abdul-Muttalib was a paternal uncle of Prophet Muhammad PBUH and one of his 
companions and known of his honour and courage. The speaker used Hamza’s story as a role 
model to highlight how such a well-respected Islamic character was loyal to an unjust ruler 
and Hamza chose to advise, rather than rebel against, that ruler. This role model authority 
serves in de-legitimising the Other’s act while at the same time legitimising the Self’s 
opposition to lifting the ban. By using the example of Hamza as a role model, Saad suggests 
that women driving is a matter that should be discussed and reviewed around the table, rather 
than taking the form of street demonstrations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Hamza ibn Abdul-Muttalib the parental uncle and the companion of Prophet Muhammad PBUH. He was born in Makkah in 
54 BH/ 568 AD. He belongs to an honoured family where his father Abdul-Muttalib was the leader of Quraysh tribe in 
Makkah. Hamza is known as a skilled brave knight who converted to Islam two years after the Prophet’s call. His entry to 
Islam was remarkable as Muslims became stronger. He was killed in the battle of Badr in year 3H/ 625 AD when Prophet 
Muhammed PBUH gave him the posthumous title Sayyidush-Shuhada’ (Arabic: ءَادـَهـُّشـلا ُدـِّ يـَس, "Chief of the Martyrs").    
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3- Legitimisation through analogous/ moral evaluation 
 
Figure 8. The employment of moral evaluation in the opponents’ discourse.    
The moral evaluation strategy is intrinsic in the opponents’ discourse of legitimisation, not 
only because it is highly frequent, but also because it is based on morality from where many 
other categories of the opponents’ legitimacy were framed. As noted previously, one of the 
opponents’ themes when constructing custody was acting like virtue defender where social 
and religious values are threatened and require preservation. Furthermore, when employing 
the role model authority, the opponents implied some moral criticism of the advocates’ 
campaign (see excerpt 5.79). However, following this strategy, opponents constructed 
legitimacy in four different forms: demolishing Their analogy, constructing Our analogy, 
evaluating the Them group, and evaluating the Us group. All serving legitimacy through 
analogous/moral evaluation, the four categories are explained and analysed in the subsequent 
excerpts: 
 
Demolishing Their analogy 
In this type of assessment, the opponents attempt to falsify any analogous evaluation 
conducted by the proponents of women driving. They deconstruct any resemblance or 
comparison –made by advocates- between the Saudi society and other countries or cultures, to 
emphasise the uniqueness of the Us group. The following excerpts explain this occurrence: 
Strategy
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 (5.80) 
“First, we mustn’t analogically compare countries that adultery and mixed-sex 
solitude are normal and not prohibited by law with countries that ruled by the holy 
book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.81) 
“Many Islamic countries sell alcohol and have night clubs, does this mean they are 
right? No, they are not….therefore, neither sister Najla nor any other should 
analogically compare us with others because their situations are different.” 
 (Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.82) 
“The claim about number of drivers….how much they cost..!? 800 million Riyal or 
1 billion Riyal….how much do housemaids cost? while some ladies do not even 
work. The issue is not an issue of drivers; it is a big social one for Saudis.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
 
In all of the aforementioned excerpts, the main aim of the speakers was to destroy any 
analogy or evaluation constructed by the proponents to legitimise their calls to lift the ban. 
For instance, in excerpt (5.80), the speaker delegitimised the proponents’ analogous 
evaluation between Saudi society and other societies by rejecting the comparison for moral 
differences. His rejection to the proponents’ analogy clearly expressed using the negative 
form of a modal verb alongside the comparing verb: for example, ‘we mustn’t analogically 
compare’ and ‘neither..nor..should analogically compare’. Following this, a moral evaluation 
of our society (Saudi society) and theirs’ (western societies) takes place to differentiate 
between both sides and to falsify the proponents’ comparison. This differentiation between 
the two groups, emerges in excerpt (5.80), wherein the Them group ‘adultery and mixed-sex 
solitude are normal’ and ‘not prohibited by law’; however, in the Us group, we are ‘ruled by 
the holy book of Allah and the Sunnah of the prophet’. This differentiation serves to reject the 
proponents’ analogy and enhance the notion of the unique nature of Saudi society. Another 
demolition of their moral evaluation is in excerpt (5.81), where Al-Nojaimy uses a counter 
example to the similar one used previously by Najla to falsify hers. He morally evaluates the 
current situation in many Islamic countries as many of them sell alcohols and have nights 
clubs, he then leaves the audience with a question: Are they right in doing so? He answers No 
and continues the moral evaluation by stating: ‘the other part of our Islamic world is still 
developing’, ‘did not reach the Saudi level in terms of applying Sharia law’. This evaluation 
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to the rest of the Islamic world was to emphasise the Saudi uniqueness and lead in 
implementing Sharia, which discursively may justify the ban or other future decisions that 
differ from other Islamic states. Finally, in excerpt (5.82), Al-Nojaimy used analogous 
evaluation to refute the proponents’ claim regarding the high cost and the economic effects of 
having foreign drivers. He compared the example of drivers with the housemaid's cost. His 
example was used to minimise the importance of the proponents’ example and to deliver to 
the audience that we have more numbers of housemaids in comparison to drivers. Thus, if 
proponents are anxious about our economy, they should first consider the enormous number 
of housemaids. This was evident when the speaker left the audience with an unanswered 
question; ‘how much do housemaids cost?’ Overall, the deconstruction of the proponents’ 
analogies is deemed to diminish their credibility; thereby delegitimising their arguments. 
 
 
Constructing Our analogy 
The second form of moral/analogous evaluation that opponents used to achieve legitimisation 
discursively is the construction of our analogy. Under this category, the opponents seek to 
legitimise their perspectives through the establishment of their analogy that discursively 
concludes to the legitimacy of the status quo. The following excerpts illustrate how this 
manifests: 
 (5.83) 
“In the US, a village near to New York ban women driving and call to have its own 
privacy….the American law approved this. There are colleges that apply gender 
segregation in Britain and America.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.84) 
“Allah said: [They ask you -O Muhammad- concerning alcoholic drink and 
gambling, say in them is a great sin] no good in it…and said: [and some benefits 
for people, but the sin of them is greater than their benefit], so there is a harm and 
benefit but the harm if greater than the benefit.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
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(5.85) 
“When the British wanted to withdraw from the euro zone, they hold a 
referendum.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Constructing Our analogy was the proponents’ evaluation and comparison of the women 
driving outcomes and/or the status quo in Saudi with similar issues and/or countries where the 
final results should encourage the perpetuation of the ban. In excerpt (5.83), legitimisation is 
practised through the analogous evaluation between the ban in Saudi Arabia and the ban on 
women driving applied in the US, Lancaster by the Amish group. In response to some of the 
proponents’ most common arguments regarding the unconformity of Saudi Arabia ban on 
women driving with the rest of the world (see excerpts 5.17 and 5.18), Saad asserts the 
example of the Amish group in the US as an analogous case where privacy is respected and 
legitimised by local law. Moreover, the speaker strengthens his analogous evaluation by 
another example of colleges of some western countries, mainly the UK and the US, which 
apply ‘gender segregation’ similar to Saudi Arabia. By constructing these similar evaluations, 
the opponents delegitimise the advocates’ authority of conformity; thereby legitimising the 
status quo and their calls to maintain it. 
In excerpt (5.84), legitimisation is constructed according to the fourth principle of 
legitimisation in Islam (Qiyas) analogy, which strengthens the argument. This differs from the 
previous evaluations, whereby the speaker cites Qur’anic verses in support of his claim of 
moral evaluation. It is not using the Qur’anic verses as an impersonal authority but to 
legitimise/justify a moral evaluation. For instance, to notify audience that based on our 
Islamic teachings, we should evaluate things objectively with no bias. In excerpt (5.84), the 
speaker reminds the audience of drinking alcohol and gambling using the Qur’anic 
evaluation; 
[They ask you -O Muhammad- concerning alcoholic drink and gambling, say 
in them is a great sin and some benefits for people, but the sin of them is 
greater than their benefit]. (Al-Baqarah: 219) 
He further explains there is a ‘harm’ and there is a ‘benefit’, but ‘the harm is greater than the 
benefit’. However, although the speaker did not mention women driving, by quoting this 
verse, he communicated to his audience the number of advantages in comparison with 
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disadvantages. Therefore, drinking alcohol and gambling are forbidden in Islam for this 
reason, and other situations should be evaluated the same way, with the assumption the 
advantages of women driving outweigh the disadvantages. Furthermore, the opponents 
support their claims of being democratic and standing with the public’s will (public choice), 
the speaker in excerpt (5.85) used the the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as an analogous 
evaluation of the importance of holding a public referendum to resolve controversial issues. 
By using such an analogy, the speaker seeks to provide a reasonable example that legitimises 
his demands for a referendum. 
 
Evaluating the Them group 
The third form of legitimisation through moral assessment in the opponents’ discourse is 
evaluating the Them group. Under this category, the opponents present their evaluation of the 
proponents. These attributions are deemed to demonise the advocates, doubt their intentions, 
and harm their reputation or credibility among the public, therefore de-legitimising their calls 
to lift the ban. The following excerpts clarify how such an evaluation occurs: 
(5.86) 
“The important thing about those who raise the women driving issue and compare 
us to other societies…some of those people and I’m not saying all of them, only 
some of them has a liberal pollution, which means having a western mentality or 
something” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.87) 
“I talk about the fabrication of this crisis at this time, the sisters who participated in 
the driving campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: ‘we wanted to get the advantage of 
the situation’. Therefore there are subtle parties that want to make an advantage of 
the current situation to twist the inner organisation’s arm.” 
(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.88) 
“there is another group, they don’t care about women or women driving..but they 
want to adopt a stance to break the rules…the call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th 
June…the call to break the law…to break the prestige of the law.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
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The above excerpts aim to achieve legitimisation through analogous/moral evaluation, 
primarily by demonising the Them group. For example, in excerpt (5.86), the speaker used a 
strategy that evaluates the Them group and might serve simultaneously to delegitimise their 
analogy. In this excerpt, the speaker described some of the proponents as being polluted with 
some liberal western thought ‘has a liberal pollution’, ‘a western mentality’ to delegitimise 
their comparisons between our society and other societies ‘those who raise the women driving 
issue and compare us to other societies’. The insertion of words like liberal6, polluted and 
westernised thought is enough for many of the public to morally doubt the activists, therefore, 
rejecting the idea of lifting the ban and standing against its callers. Although such accusations 
or evaluations are more built on personal intuitions and interpretations rather than on real 
facts, it works as a useful tool in demonising the other (as will be seen later in public 
comments); thereby legitimising their rejection. 
Moreover, in excerpt (5.87), Norah continues to question the intentions of the current 
campaign by comparing the circumstances with those of the first campaign in 1990. Based on 
a previous personal experience, Dr. Norah evaluates this campaign and calls it as ‘crisis’. In 
other words, she describes its supporters as troublemakers and makes reference to a devilish 
act. However, the intentions behind such calls are an important part of the speaker’s moral 
evaluation, so she used the word ‘fabrication’ to hint to an audience that this is intentional. 
She further explains that some unknown groups are exploiting, or would exploit, the current 
situation to cause us harm; therefore enhancing their viciousness. ‘There are subtle parties that 
want to make an advantage of the current situation to twist the inner organisation arm’. This 
demonises the proponents and, specifically, the callers of the campaign.  
This demonisation continues in excerpt (5.88) when the speaker highlights that a group of 
those callers are not really concerned about women driving: ‘there is another group, they 
don’t care about women or women driving’ and ‘do not care whether women drive or not’ as 
much as they aim to break the law and cause chaos ‘they want to adopt a stance to break the 
rules’, ‘the call to break the law’. Overall, the three previous excerpts provided by Norah and 
                                                          
6 The liberalism term has a negative connotations in the Saudi context. According to Al-Khedr (2011), in their conflict with 
the conservatives, some of the enlightening elite or as they used to be called (Islamic liberals) in Saudi rushed foolishly into 
the new liberalism which simulates the extreme western liberalism. This led to the emergence of a whole new term of 
liberalism starting from 2003 which helped the Other camp (conservatives) to use the term to stigmatize their opponents in 
many different arguments.  
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Saad depict proponents as traitors to their nation and homeland, thus categorising them in  the 
‘Them’ group rather than the ‘Us’ group. They are portrayed as demons planning to transform 
our social, political cohesion into a state of chaos. 
 
 
Evaluating the Us group 
In their legitimisation through moral evaluation, the opponents forth form of assessment is 
evaluating the Us group. Unlike the previous category, the opponents here try to present an 
evaluation of their group. Positive aspects were attributed to the opponents of women driving. 
The following excerpts explain how such an assessment takes place: 
 (5.89) 
“It is proven that this religious society with its vast majority, the Saudi society 
religious pressure became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the 
country” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.90) 
“As we ask Allah to insert goodness in our rulers and in our security apparatus, we 
don’t only count on this but we strongly count with the same level or more of our 
zeal, our unity, the stability of our position and our strength gathering against any 
liberal thought or project from its beginning until we eliminate it” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
In excerpts (5.89) and (5.90), the speaker uses another strategy of legitimisation through 
moral evaluation. In this instance, rather than concentrating on the negative-other-
presentation, Saad focused on the positive self-presentation through highlighting the 
perceived good qualities of our ‘religious society’, ‘our zeal’, ‘our unity’, ‘the stability of our 
position’ and ‘our strength gathering’. This strategy along with these words are thought to 
trigger the audience emotions and help foster a hostile reaction towards the proponents’ 
position. Such an incitement was made explicitly in excerpt (5.89), where Saad portrays the 
Saudi religious society as clashing with the expanding liberal plans. He claims that the 
‘religious pressure’ of the Saudi society is ‘the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the 
country’. The incitement continues in excerpt (5.90), when Saad enhances the alignment 
‘against any liberal thought or project from its beginning until we eliminate it’. However, 
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through the intensive use of the pronouns (our) and (we), it is obvious that the speaker created 
two groups; one is the religious Saudi society where he belongs to (‘our zeal’, ‘our unity’, 
‘our position’, ‘our strength’, ‘we count on’, ‘we eliminate’), and the other is an unknown 
group that have liberal ideologies, against which we shall stand. 
 
 
4- Legitimisation through Rationalisation 
Legitimisation through rationalisation is achieved by reference to a reasonable justification of 
supporting or opposing the status quo. The speakers here try to convince the audience that 
their opposition is based on some research and facts rather than personal opinions. However, 
“it may be established in some form of common sense” (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 105). 
The opponents’ reference to rationalisation explains the existence of the current social 
practice and whether or not action is required. The following excerpts are examples of how 
opponents employed rationalisation to serve legitimisation:  
 (5.91) 
“Women driving isn’t a forbidden act in its self…there is no verse in Quran or 
Hadeeth that forbids women to drive. When we research women driving, we talk 
about the ban because of what women driving would lead to, result in and in which 
country.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.92) 
“The vast majority of Saudi, of the Saudi society men and women, don’t want 
women driving. In Al-Bayan Attaly survey; 97% of voters oppose women driving 
and 3% said they do not oppose.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.93) 
“Social issues reflect politics. Why? Because the vast majority of Saudi people 
especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority), refuse women driving. 
Maybe not for a religious reason, but for social and economic reasons.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
 
In the above excerpts, the speakers legitimise opposing women driving through rationalisation 
or common sense. Initially, Saad in excerpt (5.91) reminds the audience of being aware that 
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‘women driving is not a forbidden act in its self’ neither in Quran nor Sunnah ‘there is no 
verse in Quran or Hadeeth which forbid women to drive’. He then rationally explains that 
when women driving is researched ‘when we research women driving’, we should consider 
‘what women driving would lead to, result in and in which country’. The speaker used ‘when 
we research’ to convince the audience that women driving is banned based on some research 
that has been done to evaluate the experience of women driving in our society, it is not a 
personal preference or for a particular group interest. Moreover, in excerpt (5.92), Saad 
legitimises his opposition to women driving because the vast majority of Saudis oppose it. He 
argues that based on a survey that was conducted by the popular TV programme Al-Byan 
Attali, 97% of Saudis oppose women driving, which explains why it has not been permitted 
until now. 
In accordance with the previous excerpts, Al-Nojaimi in excerpt (5.93) discursively used a 
rational persuasive strategy to legitimise why he is against lifting the ban. To do so, he claims 
that even social issues reflects on politics and explains that using rationalisation by using no 
accurate numbers but common sense. He made this clear in his assertion that ‘Social issues 
reflect politically’. Furthermore, he raises the question ‘why?’ before answering it by 
explaining the reasons and stating some unproven claims; ‘because the vast majority of the 
Saudi people especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority) refuse women 
driving’. Overall, from the above, it is evident that the opponents’ message to the audience is 
that we did not oppose women driving until we researched its pros and cons, and some 
surveys are considered. Subsequently, they concluded that lifting the ban has some negative 
consequence and appears to be against the will of the majority. Therefore they oppose it. 
 
 
5- Legitimisation through Mythopoesis 
Storytelling can also achieve legitimation. This occurs when the tellers invent or recount a 
story that happened, and its conclusion serves his/her interest. Protagonists usually represent 
social actors within the specific social action where those who follow the legitimate social 
practice are rewarded, and those who do not are punished. However, the opponent’s discourse 
made no reference to this strategy within the given data. This could be an indicator of the 
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radical change that happened in the tone of the religious establishment as being the leading 
opponent of women driving. Storytelling used to be an intrinsic part of the religious preaching 
rhetoric in Saudi Arabia and employed extensively during the 80s and 90s (the peak of Al-
Sahawah movement) to legitimise the extreme policies of sex segregation (Abdullah, 2005, 
Al-Huzaimi, 2011). 
 
 
 
6- Legitimisation through hypothetical/ potential implications 
In this strategy, opponents practised legitimisation by highlighting some theoretical 
consequences that will happen and change the status quo (for worse) if the ban on women 
driving is lifted. They picture the calls to lift the ban as a part of a massive conspiracy that 
aims to create chaos and political instability leading to a frightening and insecure future if the 
ban lifted. Potential implications are linguistically constructed mainly by the use of some 
conditional structures (e.g. conditional if clause + main clause) or through the use of some 
markers of modalisation (would, could) together with an unpleasant future scenario 
(Fairclough, 2003; Reyes, 2011). The following excerpts demonstrate how this strategy was 
discursively employed within opponents’ discourse: 
 
(5.94) 
“Women driving will lead to traffic problems, will lead to a disruption in a family 
budget but it is a need….a real need.” 
 (Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.95) 
“Honestly, my sisters who wish to drive, we should help in making our society in a 
state of security and safety, not a further tension.” 
(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.96) 
“If a woman could realise what she will suffer from because of women driving -
besides other issues that we will discuss later- She will definitely say: this is a 
poisonous and harmful call for both women and society.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
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(5.97) 
“I told you that women driving will result in economic, social and political 
problems” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
All the excerpts above are deemed to serve legitimisation through hypothetical/potential 
implications. It is the opponents’ strategy to trigger the audience fear of a bleak future that is 
portrayed as negative if the ban was lifted. Even though these implications are hypothetical 
and predominately based on nothing but anticipations, it is claimed that the indexical meaning 
evoked by them will participate in forming a ‘shared belief’, which will be naturalised by the 
repetitive pattern in which they are represented (Lee, 2001; Reyes, 2011). For instance, in 
excerpt (5.94), using the fear of the unknown future, the speaker represents lifting the ban as 
leading to traffic troubles ‘traffic problems’ and putting families’ financial budgets into a 
crisis ‘disruption in a family budget’. Although no studies are given, stimulating the audience 
fear of future would accumulate a fear of change, therefore, hate and rejection to lifting the 
ban. Another way of using this strategy was through raising the issue of security. The speaker 
visualises audience with an irritated and unsafe society if the ban was lifted. This is seen in 
Norah’s appeal to the ladies who want to drive in excerpt (5.95) ‘we should help in making 
our society in a state of security and safety, not a further tension’. In excerpt (5.96), the 
speaker portrays female audience with a predictive conditional sentence expressing a 
theoretical implication. He argues that if the ban was lifted, women would not be happy with 
their situations in future and they would realise how harmful this will be for them and society 
as a whole. He made the statement, ‘if a woman could realise what she will suffer from’, to 
deliver to the audience an impression of certainty about what a future implication. He then 
adds, ‘she will say: this is a poisonous and harmful call for both women and society’. 
However, it seems that the speaker wanted to deliver fear to the audience of unknown 
consequences but certainly unpleasant. In a similar way, Al-Nojaimi in excerpt (5.97) evokes 
the fear of lifting the ban and asserts that it will cause ‘economic’, ‘social’ and ‘political’ 
troubles. 
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Summary 
Similar to the proponent’s six strategies of legitimisation, the opponents employed; custody, 
authorisation, analogous/moral evaluation, rationalisation and hypothetical/potential 
implications strategies except mythopoesis to legitimise their opposition to lifting the ban. The 
opponent’s custody was framed through two main themes: virtue defenders, and being from 
religious background (Fig. 6). Another main strategy in the opponents’ discourse is 
authorisation, which they used four sub-types of authority to serve legitimisation: personal 
authority, impersonal authority, role model authority, and authority of expert opinion (Fig.7). 
Moreover, the opponents employed the moral evaluation strategy to achieve legitimisation, in 
doing so their assessment was constructed through four forms: demolishing their analogy, 
constructing our analogy, evaluating the Them group, and evaluating the Us group (Fig. 8). 
Finally, the strategies of rationalisation and hypothetical/ potential implications were also 
employed as legitimisation tools in the opponent’s discourse while no reference was made to 
mythopoesis.   
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5.3.2 Positive self & negative other-representations (Referentiality) 
1- Referential Strategy: Self (The Opponents) 
Reference to the self by the opponents aimed to portray an image of the group as having 
quantitative superiority and religious backgrounds. This could be noted through the usage of 
words like: ‘majority’, ‘clerics’ and ‘preachers’ when referring to the opponents. However, 
the following excerpts highlight the portrayal of the Self quantitative superiority: 
 (5.98) 
“The vast majority of Saudi, the Saudi society men and women don’t want 
women driving.” 
 (Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.99) 
“The vast majority of Saudi people, especially those who belongs to tribes 
(whom the majority), reject women driving” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.100) 
“The evidence on how it may reflect politically is the people split into two parts; 
the majority are opposing of course.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
 
 
However, the second reference to the Self framed the opponents’ religious identity. The 
following excerpts illustrate how religious and moral identity represented the Self group: 
 (5.101) 
“It is proven that this religious society with its vast majority, the Saudi society 
religious pressure became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the 
country” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
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(5.102) 
“It was proven that clerics, people of the propagation of virtue and the 
prevention of vice, preachers, people of the sincere word and real reformers 
became a real nightmare for the liberal thought when they met and worked together 
in various fields, issues and matters.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.103) 
“The clerics are custodians on the society members whether men or women, by 
clarifying the right and warning about the wrong.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
In such a conservative society, where the religious establishment imposed itself and preserved 
a prestigious status, religious people are treated predominately as role-models; their opinions 
are widely believed and accepted without question (Al-Khedr, 2011). This hegemony over the 
Saudi discourse is recognised and maintained by the employment of religion in many cases, 
which are considered by the other groups as non-religious (e.g. women driving). However, 
reference to the opponents as people from religious backgrounds is likely to legitimise the Self 
group. 
 
 
2- Referential Strategy: Other (The Proponents) 
The construction of the Other group by opponents through the referential strategy aimed to: 
first, diminish their popularity by describing them as ‘minorities’ and second, to demonise 
them and their acts by calling them as ‘the enemies’ and ‘the liberal blocs’. However, it is 
important to know that some adjectives have a different connotation in the Saudi context; for 
instance, when a group is described as ‘liberal’, this could denote a devilish side of them as 
adopting many unacceptable western values and working to legalise these values within a 
conservative society. Furthermore, it could indicate that they are relinquishing their Islamic 
moralities and antagonising the clerics. Examples of how the Other group was diminished 
within the discourse of opponents are provided in the following excerpts: 
(5.104) 
“One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that 
the minority don’t impose their opinion on the majority.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
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(5.105) 
“We say: if it is a must, at the end you are still minorities.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
Furthermore, another negative presentation of the Other aimed to demonise the proponents 
through referential strategy. This demonisation manifests when opponents classify the 
proponents as ‘liberal’ and probably in harmony with ‘the Safavid camp’ or the 
‘westernisation project’. All previous groups are perceived as outsiders targeting the Saudi 
society; thereby delegitimising the proponents. This discursive demonisation is expressed 
clearly in the following excerpts: 
 (5.106) 
“Host: Now, you mentioned that some preachers might be accused of looking 
down to women…do not do this do not do that…do not leave the house…you job 
is to cook, raise children and take care of your husband…you have no other roles in 
life except these… 
Saad: These are the enemies’ accusations…these are the other team 
accusations. None of the authorised scholars said: a women job is cooking or 
vacuuming the house.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.107) 
“There is a attempts to exploit under these circumstances. This could assure the 
harmony between the streams working for the Safavid camp and those working 
for the westernisation or liberal project.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.108) 
“As Dr. Abdullah Al-Nofaisi said when I asked him prior to Al-Bayan Attaly show 
whether he thought the liberal blocs contributed either intentionally or 
unintentionally to serving the Safavid project? He replied: ‘Yes, they did’.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
 
The opponents references to the Other can be described as an exclusionary one. Regarding the 
above references, proponents are portrayed as outsiders or a group that share interests with 
our enemies. Advocates of women driving have always been classified as ‘liberals’ (the 
negative way) and mostly accused of working for the benefit of western parties, hence 
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excluded from society. Al-Kheder claims that Al-Sahwah and the local religious stream has a 
history of dropping the legitimacy of the others and doubting them (2011). 
 
3- Referential Strategy: Women Driving 
Similar to their counterparts when referring to women driving, the opponents adopted 
referential strategies to refer to women driving as a campaign and an issue. In the former, 
women driving was delegitimised by portraying it as a ‘protest’ and an act that aimed to 
‘break the law’; whereas in the latter, women driving was delegitimised beyond the current 
acts. It is portrayed as ‘outraging for the majority of Saudi girls’ and being ‘not a priority’. 
The following excerpts illustrate how women driving as a campaign is portrayed: 
 (5.109) 
 “You are making a protest, do you want me to say nothing..?!!” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.110) 
“The call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.111) 
“It is a matter of aggravating society by putting it in a state of congestion and 
challenge to the state’s rules.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
The above excerpts demonstrate precisely the negative presentation of women driving (the 
campaign) within the opponents’ discourse. For example, the portrayal of the campaign as a 
‘protest’ or describing it as ‘the call to break the law’ surely delegitimise it and legitimise its 
opposition. However, women driving was also depicted as an issue through the following 
excerpts: 
(5.112) 
“Host: What has the crisis in the neighbouring countries to do with a purely social 
matter in Saudi Arabia? 
Al-Nojaimi: No, it is not a social matter” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
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(5.113) 
“Women driving isn’t a forbidden act in its self…there is no verse in Quran or 
Hadeeth that forbids women to drive.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.114) 
“Women driving will lead to traffic problems, disruption to the family budget; but 
it is a need….a real need.” 
 (Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.115) 
“Huda Al-Qahtani wrote a fantastic unbiased article for both sides. She spoke 
about why we now globalise the issue, we do not downplay it, but it is not a 
priority; especially now in our society.” 
(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
The opponents appeared unsure of their reference to women driving as an issue. For   
example, while they admit it ‘is not a forbidden act’ in Quran or Sunnah and regard it as a 
‘need’, they still consider women driving as a secondary issue that should not be globalised 
because ‘it is not a priority’. Al-Nojaimi in excerpt (5.112) argues; ‘it is not a social matter’. 
This could legitimise the intervention of other religious figures in opposition to these 
campaigns. 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Positive self & negative other-representations (Predicationality) 
1- Predicational Strategy: Self (The Opponents) 
Regarding the self-presentation through predicational strategy, the opponents demonstrated a 
modest usage of this strategy that highlights two main qualities: objectivity and democracy. 
The positive self-presentation of opponents as being an objective group aimed to portray the 
Self as a fair, balanced and rational group that deals with no bias against the Other group. The 
opponents assert their objectivity when discussing women driving by avoiding the negative 
generalisation as in excerpt (2.87), ‘we don’t accuse whoever call to women driving of being 
liberal….etc’. Further, they recognise that women driving is a need for some as in excerpt 
(2.88), ‘we don’t deny…etc’ which reinforce their credibility and objectivity in their research 
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about the issue regardless of its callers whom negatively represented (see excerpts: 5.106, 
5.107, 5.108). The following extracts demonstrate the construction of the first quality of the 
opponents’ self-presentation (objectivity): 
 (5.116) 
“As we said previously: we don’t accuse whoever call to women driving of 
being liberal, westernised, refusenik or bad….etc. No, there are some who don’t 
mind lifting the ban, but he and his family are pure.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.117) 
“We don’t deny that some women need to drive because they have nobody to do 
this for them….no comfortable transportation or men to drive them around.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
The second quality constructed through the predicational strategy of positive self-presentation 
is ‘democracy’. In other words, opponents nominate themselves as being democratic and 
favouring public preference,which counts in the legitimacy of the Self as evidenced in the 
following excerpt: 
 (5.118) 
“We want to vote on many outstanding social issues, like the financial and 
administrative corruption to solve our issues democratically and by opinion and 
the other opinion manner.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
 
In conclusion, the opponent’s predicational construction of the Self as being; objective and 
democratic could be attributed to the broadly propagated representation of the religious 
stream as a dominant power that imposes its perspectives over other segments of society (Al-
Ghathami, 2004). However, it is vital to note that although none of the study objectives 
concerned about the school of thoughts to which opponents or proponents belong, the 
opponents represent themselves as traditional, religious structure, which the proponents also 
assert. In Saudi society, the opponents gain legitimacy when accentuating their religious 
orientations. 
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2- Predicational Strategy: Other (The Proponents) 
The opponents’ presentation of Other using predicational strategy mainly framed two themes; 
selfishness and betrayal. In the former, proponents are portrayed as a little group that only 
care about themselves while the latter is to describe the proponents acts as disloyal to Us (the 
state and society). The opponents’ construction of the Other selfishness is presented clearly in 
the following excerpts: 
 (5.119) 
“It is incredible that the minority imposes its opinion over the majority.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.120) 
“The sisters are from a specific class.. they watch from a high ivory 
tower….whereas the majority of Saudi women want their financial and social 
problems to be solved.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.121) 
 “I’m annoyed that they don’t accept the other opinion.” 
(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013) 
(5.122) 
“We draw a circle on those who don’t care about women status, the most 
important thing for them is to access women” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
 
From the above excerpts, the negative-other presentation through predicationl strategy is 
expressed linguistically through the use of the negative form of the model verb do (don’t) 
followed by a clause of a commonly positive action. This can be seen in excerpt (2.95); ‘don’t 
accept the other opinion’ and in excerpt (2.96); ‘don’t care about women status’. Moreover, 
this negative presentation was expressed through the use of an obligation verb ‘impose’ as an 
act that proponents are doing to force their own ‘opinion’ over the majority of the society. 
Apparently, this negative presentation is aimed to degrade the proponents’ credibility, and 
popularity; thereby delegitimising their calls. In terms of the second theme, the proponents’ 
(betrayal) is demonstrated in the following excerpts: 
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(5.123) 
“I talk about the fabrication of this crisis at this time, the sisters who participated 
in the driving campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: ‘we wanted to get the advantage 
of the situation’. Therefore, there are subtle parties that want to make an 
advantage of the current situation to twist the inner organisation arm.” 
(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.124) 
“As Dr. Abdullah Al-Nofaisi said when I asked him prior to Al-Bayan Attaly show 
whether he thought the liberal blocs contributed either intentionally or 
unintentionally to serving the Safavid project. He replied: ‘Yes, the liberal blocs 
contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid 
project’.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
(5.125) 
“There is another group, they do not care about women or women driving, but they 
want to adopt a stance to break the rules,…the call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 
17th June…the call to break the law.” 
(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011) 
One of the most sensitive charges in the exclusionary rhetoric is national betrayal, although 
the opponents did not articulate the word (betrayal) in their argument against the Other; 
rather, it was implied. The proponents’ calls were linked to situations in the outside world and 
depicted as activities that target our society. This can be observed in excerpt (2.99); ‘the 
fabrication of this crisis’, ‘to twist the internal organisation arm’, and in excerpt (2.100); 
‘serving the Safavid project’. Furthermore, Saad assert the conspiracy of the Other against our 
state rules as in excerpt (2.101); ‘to break the rules’ and ‘to break the law’. Overall, the 
opponents’ employment of the predicational strategy to achieve negative-other presentation 
appears to be in accordance with the moral evaluation discussed previously under the form 
evaluating the Them group (see page 112). 
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Table 3. The strategies of Self and Other presentation in the opponents of women driving discourse. 
Discursive 
strategy  
Objectives Categories 
 
Referential 
 
Discursive 
construction/legitimation 
of Self 
Pronouns: 
We, Us, Our 
 
Reference as the quantitative superiority: 
‘the majority’, ‘the vast majority’ 
 
Reference as religious/moral identity: 
‘clerics’, ‘preachers’, ‘people of sincere word’. 
 
Discursive construction/ 
de-legitimation of the 
Other 
 Pronouns: 
They, Them, Their 
 
Diminish reference: 
‘the minority’, ‘minorities’ 
 
Demonised reference: 
‘the enemies’, ‘the Safavid camp’, ‘the liberal blocs’  
Discursive construction 
of women driving 
As a campaign: 
‘a protest’, ‘aggravating the society’, ‘break the law’ 
 
As an issue:  
‘outraging for the majority of Saudi girls’, ‘isn’t a 
social’, ‘need’, ‘not a priority’  
 
 
Predicational 
 
Discursive 
construction/legitimation 
of Self 
WE as objective: 
‘we don’t accuse whoever call to women driving’, ‘we 
don’t deny’ 
 
WE as democratic: 
‘we want to vote’, ‘to solve our issues democratically’  
 
Discursive construction/ 
de-legitimation of the 
Other 
THEY as selfish: 
‘the minority imposes its opinion’, ‘watch from a high 
ivory tower’, ‘don’t accept the other opinion’ 
 
THEY as traitors: 
‘speak like this about her society’, ‘the fabrication of 
this crisis’, ‘to twist the inner organisation arm’, 
‘serving the Safavid project’, ‘to break the rules’  
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5.3.4 Summary of the opponents’ discourse 
Having examined both the strategies of legitimisation and the strategies of positive self and 
negative-other presentation employed by those opposed to women driving, it can be claimed 
that the macro-argumentation of the opponents’ discourse was exclusionary and doubtful 
regarding the proponents and their calls. In the analysis of the legitimisation strategies, the 
opponents' speech demonstrated the employment of the following strategies: custody, 
authorisation, analogous/moral evaluation, rationalisation and hypothetical/potential 
implications. First, legitimisation through custody, which was constructed through the Self- 
portrayal as being: virtue defenders and from religious background (Fig. 6). Second, 
legitimisation through authorisation was another strategy adopted through the use of four sub-
types of authority: personal, impersonal, role model, and expert opinion (Fig. 7). The third 
approach to legitimisation taken by opponents was the analogous/moral evaluation, which is 
their most common strategy of all. The opponents’ assessment was framed in four categories: 
demolishing their analogy, constructing our analogy, evaluating the Them group, and 
evaluating the Us group (Fig. 8). Moreover, strategies of rationalisation and 
hypothetical/potential implications were employed to serve legitimacy. 
However, the analysis of the positive self and negative-other presentation focused on the 
referential and predicational strategies adopted by the opponents (see Table 3, p.129). In 
reference to the Self, opponents portrayed as (quantitative superiority and religious/moral 
identity) whereas, in reference to the Other, opponents aimed to (diminish Them and demonise 
Them). Opponents referred to women driving as a campaign (e.g. ‘protest’, ‘break the law’) 
and as an issue (e.g. ‘not a priority’, ‘is not a social matter’). Regarding the predicational 
strategy, opponents portrayed the Self as the objective group (e.g. ‘we don’t deny’, ‘we don’t 
accuse’) and as the democratic group (e.g. ‘we want to vote’, ‘to solve our issues 
democratically’). On the contrary, the negative presentation of the Other through 
predicational strategy portrayed the proponents as selfish (e.g. ‘the minority imposes its 
opinion’, ‘don’t accept the other opinion’) and traitors (e.g. ‘to break the rules’, ‘serving the 
Safavid project’). In brief, the opponents use of the strategies of legitimisation relied primarily 
on the moral evaluation and authorisation as key ideas in the process of legitimisation while 
making no reference to mythopoesis. 
 
131 
 
 
 
5.4 Summary  
In this chapter the discourse of both the proponents and the opponents of women driving were 
analysed. From the six strategies of legitimisation (custody, authorisation, analogous/moral 
evaluation, rationalisation, mythopesis, and hypothetical/potential implications), each group 
employed all or some of them to legitimise its position. However, it was noted that even 
though the same strategy can be used by each group, the themes constructed were different. 
For instance, while the proponents’ custody was portrayed through enlightening public, the 
opponent’s custody appeared to be through defending virtues. The chapter presented a 
detailed analysis of all strategies of legitimisation used by the two dichotomous groups. 
Moreover, the referential and predicational strategies of positive self and negative other 
presentation were investigated. Reference to the Self, Other and women driving and the 
employment of predicational strategies of Self and Other were considered and extensively 
analysed.  
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CHAPTER 6:  ANALYSIS OF USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
6.1. Introduction  
The second part of data for this study is the online public reflection on women driving; it is 
the user-generated content presented through YouTube comments. This is important in 
gauging the public pulse and drawing a better understanding of how mass media content 
affects public opinions and vice versa. However, to gain the most reliable possible results, it 
was crucial to systemise the data retrieval, compilation and collection. This is achieved in 
three phases, in phase 1, the researcher retrieved the first 75 comments on all three videos 
used for analysis; this means looking at a total of 225 comments. Phase 2 classified these 
comments into three different responses either; support, oppose or neutrals. Comments in 
favour of women driving and that demonstrated an apparent support to proponents were 
classified as ‘support’, comments that clearly object women driving or reflected support to its 
opponents were classified as ‘oppose’, and finally comments that failed to articulate any of 
the previous stances were classified as ‘neutral’. Phase 3 analysed the comments of support, 
opposition and neutrals and spotting the discursive themes constructed from these 
observations. 
 
6.2 Public reflection on videos (oppose, support, neutral) 
Although there are various online platforms where public can react to the videos used in this 
study, the credibility of YouTube comments stems from their freshness and accessibility. It 
allows viewers to engage interactivelywith other’s opinions, whether through posting or just 
reading a comment/s. The total number of comments retrieved from the three videos are 225 
comments (see methodology for sampling info); only 198 were considered in this analysis, the 
remainder were excluded as being vague or completely irrelevant. With regard to women 
driving, these comments represented three different perspectives: oppose, support or neutral. 
The comments coded as oppose were those that clearly articulated a refusal to accept women 
driving, demonstrated pride or agreement with opponents, and expressed anger or discomfort 
towards its advocates. Conversely, the comments coded as support were those generating 
support for women driving, displayed pride or agreement with proponents, and expressed 
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anger or discomfort towards opponents or the status quo. Finally, neutral comments were 
those that failed to articulate any of the above and remained ambiguous. All submissions 
under each response are thematically analysed and extensively discussed in the following 
section. 
 
6.3. Themes constructed through comments 
6.3.1 Opposing comments 
A total of 68 opponents’ comments were retrieved from the three videos. These comprise 36 
comments on the #Khaliji video, and 32 on the Idaa’t video. No opposing comments were 
retrieved from Miadeen video. However, the four most dominant attitudes extracted from 
opponents’ comments are listed according to their frequency in terms of the following types 
of language: racist, sceptical, evaluative and offensive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Racist: 
Comments labelled as racist are those that articulate insults to social actors based on their race 
(e.g. non-Arabs), their religious doctrine (e.g. Shiite) and their citizenship (non-Saudis, 
immigrants). The racist attitude was highest among opponents featuring in 32% of the total 
number of the opposing comments. In this string of observations, commenters described and 
portrayed social actors in favour of women driving as outsiders, immigrants, non-Arabs or 
42%
25%
19%
14%
Opponents commenters' attitudes 
Raceist Sceptical Evaluative Offensive
Figure 9. The most dominant attitudes from the opposing comments.     
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Shiite whom only bringing troubles and interfere in our private affairs. The following 
comments illustrate how the racist theme was constructed:  
(6.1) Al-Nojaimi is a hero. May Allah create more like him, to disallow a minority 
of nationalised rabble and others from controlling the majority.  
 
(6.2) The show is full of refugees…moreover, it is in Jeddah. I don’t trust you. 
 
(6.3) Boukharstan has nothing to do in Saudi Arabia!! We call for their nationality to 
be withdrawn. 
(6.4) The foreigners and nationalised women are the only people demanding to 
drive!! I hope that Ministry of Interiors beat with an iron fist any rebelling 
woman who wants to disrupt the system. 
(6.5) Lamia Bukhari….the girl of Buoukarstan, go back to your motherland. You 
illegal residents have corrupted the country. 
(6.6) Send the refugees back to their countries and free us of their opinions. Why is 
the interviewer is hosting an Indian and other Indonesian ladies? 
In the above observations, commenters reflected on the social actors who condone women 
driving in a racist manner to degrade and classify them as outsiders. Some commenters used 
racist words and hinted at or directly accused social actors of being disruptive and interfering 
in ‘our own’ society. Others found it acceptable to label social actors as outsiders and not 
belonging to ‘our society’. Similar to the Self and Other presentation strategies used by 
speakers in mass media, the opponents aimed to express their rejection of the women driving 
calls by classifying its advocates as different group; thereby stigmatising them as outsiders or 
non-Saudis. Therefore, they expect them to be less loyal to our country, less committed to our 
Saudi conservative customs and acting as tools of foreign governments. 
 
 
Sceptical: 
Opponents’ comments that were classified under scepticism are those that articulate doubts 
regarding the Other’s intentions and portray the women driving campaign as a premeditated 
conspiracy targeting Us and Our society. The submissions raise concerns about the true 
intentions behind the campaigns (e.g. “the matter is far bigger than driving”, “the whole thing 
is planned to distract people”), and the activists’ credibility and loyalty (e.g. “backed up by 
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the trash Hilary”, “the time you picked, the Shiite camerawoman”). The comments below 
illustrate how the opponent commenters have doubts and are sceptical of the initiative and its 
advocates: 
(6.7) The time you picked the Shiite camerawoman and your statements to the 
foreign media made us sceptical about your initiative. 
(6.8) Let us think about it. When we see people like Manal and Wajiha backed up by 
the trash Hilary interested in this topic, be assured that nothing but troubles will 
arise..Will you solve women’s problems through driving? What about other 
women’s issues? Why don’t you suggest alternatives or solutions? The country 
is he biggest oil exporter country, yet all of its cities has no other transport 
except cars. 
(6.9) The matter is far bigger than driving. Think about it…it is only a tool for other 
purposes that aim to destroy the Islamic society by focusing on secondary issues 
like women driving. 
(6.10) Since she is on Al-Arabiya channel, the whole thing is planned to distract 
people attention away from bigger issues such as housing and unemployment. 
(6.11) I am a Saudi girl and thanks to Allah I belong to the peaceful and safe country 
of the two holy mosques. We are queens in our houses but wondering why the 
west wants us to drive? Why are they interested in it!? 
Drawing such a picture against the intentions of the women driving advocates reflects how 
some public are against women driving, not because the mere fact of women being behind the 
wheels; rather, they oppose it because they have doubts or do not trust its advocates. This 
could be a typical reaction to the moral evaluation of the Other proposed by opponents on 
mass media which encourage the theory of conspiracy and betrayal of the country. Based on 
the posted comments, the online opponents seem to be reproducing the same rhetoric of 
doubting the advocates’ intentions proposed in the mass media (see Chapter 5). 
 
Evaluative: 
Opponents’ comments that were classified as evaluative ones articulated some judgemental 
words regarding whether to evaluate the issue, social actors or even other commenters’ 
opinion. In terms of evaluating the social actors, positive evaluation tends to go to the Us 
group while negative ones are reserved for the Them group. The following comments 
illustrate how the online opponents constructed the evaluative theme: 
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(6.12) Regardless of my opinion of this campaign, I say if this cued lady is leading 
you, you are in trouble. I hoped she was more wise and spontaneous. By the 
way, although she prepared for this interview as she said through her account on 
Twitter, you should notice in most questions how shamefully she was reading 
from her notes and files. 
(6.13) Let me know who did say Shariah forbids women driving!? All those discussing 
the issue say it is permissible, but it will lead to catastrophes…got it?? 
(6.14) Regarding the customs, it has nothing to do with customs, I say women driving 
isn’t banned because of customs, it is because if women drive, it will lead to 
catastrophes…did you understand? You are in Saudi society, we travel abroad 
for vice how about if vice is within us….hope you got it. 
(6.15) My brothers and sisters favour women driving; the problem is not merely in 
driving, it is that all countries allowing women driving are mixed-sex societies. 
A guy in those societies will not harass a woman driving her own car, but in our 
society, controlling men is a problem. What happened with Manal (guys 
chasing her) is not an individual case as she tried to portray it. 
(6.16) Although the host was not neutral and did not give the Sheikh the right to reply, 
also the channel was not neutral, and this is obvious from their public 
interviews, Al-Nojaimy done well to refute them. I am with Sheikh Al-Nojaimy 
and against women driving. 
Most of the above comments reveal a straightforward evaluative approach arriving at one 
conclusion: we are opposed to women driving. This is because, based on their evaluation, 
women driving will lead to trouble: ‘it will lead to catastrophes’, ‘if women drive, it will lead 
to catastrophes’, ‘Riyadh is crowded while it is only men, what will happen if women drive’ 
or because the women driving advocates are evaluated as degraded people by doing socially 
unaccepted acts: ‘Does she deserve to have the reputation of the Prophet Muhammads’ 
family?’, ‘this fool is looking for fame’, ‘may Allah curse you Manal, we thought you are 
respectful’. However, the construction of the evaluative comments suggests that the online 
opponents are influenced by or agree with the portrayal of a frightening hypothetical future 
and the negative moral evaluation of the Them group presented by the opponents speakers on 
mass media (see Chapter 5). 
 
Offensive: 
The offensive comments articulated harsh, personal insults targeting the speakers’ appearance 
or morality to express anger and disagreement with the issue to women driving. What 
distinguishes these comments is that they all adopt an arrogant, hostile attitude towards social 
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actors and do not provide any logical reasoning to their opposition stances. Indeed, they find 
it sufficient to insult and threaten to harm the reputation of advocates; thereby diminishing 
their supporters. As illustrated in the following comments, they included harsh insults such as: 
‘ةسناعلا’ spinster, ‘ةلفاسلا’ immoral, ‘ةسجن اي’ dirty: 
(6.17) No driving bitch Manal.  
(6.18) All of us are against you dirty, jail is not enough for you. I think you need 
recycling away from this pure land. Unfortunately, those people gave you more 
than your dirtiness. 
(6.19) Stay at your home Manal. Otherwise, if I see you driving, I will come at you 
with my 86 GMC and pull you over. 
(6.20) OK, if this spinster drives a car, no one will know she is a lady…I am a man 
and yet I look better than her, hahahahahahaha! They should reward the 
policeman who caught her….he recognised that she is a lady. Hahahahahha! 
(6.21) The hosts, Lamia and Najla, are two faces of a deluxe secular shoe. 
Hahahahahahaha! 
(6.22) Nine thousand bitches are demanding. 
 
 
6.3.2 Support comments 
A total of 88 observations in favour of women driving retrieved from the three videos. This 
represents the highest among all three public reactions towards women driving. In total, the 
four main perspectives constructed through these comments were: supportive, evaluative, 
enlightening and feminist grievance. 
 
Figure 10. The most dominant attitudes from the support comments. 
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Supportive: 
Supportive comments are those demonstrating their agreement or support for what advocates 
are saying or doing. These observations also contained a sense of appreciation and heroes’ 
portrayal to reflect the sincere admiration to the proponents, (e.g. ‘you are heroes and strong’, 
‘your names will be written within the Saudi history’, ‘Najla and Lamia may Allah save 
you’,). They also expressed the commenters’ enthusiasm towards change and their 
encouragement to advocates of continuing, (e.g. ‘Lamia and others, go ahead and we are with 
you’, ‘go ahead’, ‘We are all with you Manal’). The comments below illustrate how the 
supportive tone was constructed: 
(6.23) Master Lamia and Master Najla your names will be written within the Saudi 
history, you are heroes and strong, and hopefully, you will see the fruit of your 
seeds. May Allah help you, I am with you in heart and soul. 
(6.24) Well-done Lamia, you are better than a thousand men. 
(6.25) Good job Lamia and others, go ahead, and we are with you, the ignorant will 
stay ignorant forever. 
(6.26) We thank Sister Najla Hariri for her good answers; we are with you in 
supporting women driving. 
(6.27) I am very proud of you the pure, free and brave Manal Al-Sharif, Allah with 
you. 
(6.28) Go ahead Manal; every great Saudi is with you. 
 
Evaluative: 
Similar to the opponents’ construction of evaluative comments, the proponents’ comments 
classified as evaluative ones articulated some judgements or decisions regarding the social 
actors, women driving issue or even other comments. They positively portrayed the Us group 
describing them as e.g. ‘senior intellects’, ‘among the best’, ‘normal human being’, while the 
Them group was negatively portrayed as e.g. ‘the godfathers of extremism’, ‘leaders of 
ignorance’. Other comments evaluated the issue without addressing social actors or other 
commenters e.g. ‘Women driving is personal freedom because of the necessity and sake of 
women privacy’, ‘women driving is a right for each female citizen’. The following comments 
explain how the online proponents framed this evaluative theme: 
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(6.29) Al-Nojaimi is provocative, he speaks as if we are the elites among people and 
our system is a democratic one from A-Z !! Is he crazy? 
(6.30) Al-Nojaimi insists on calling it a protest because he has not a good argument. 
(6.31) Women driving is personal freedom because of the necessity and sake of 
women privacy. 
(6.32) Backwards people, taxi cars are more than our cars, besides they stay a longer 
time in streets, so it will not be the case if women drove their cars....sometimes, 
while waiting for the traffic light, you find yourself surrounded by many taxis. 
It is stupid and indicates how silly you are. Are you happy with your family 
standing in the street and people are looking at them while they are waiting for a 
taxi!? 
(6.33) When opponents fail to provide any evidence from Quran or Sunnah to support 
their opinion, we find them manoeuvring to mention some of the old stories 
about women oppression in ancient times which has nothing to do with a 
necessary right for a Muslim woman. They are contradicting themselves, and 
the aim behind this is to distract the public among Muslim community……etc 
(6.34) We all know that driving is not forbidden by Shariah so it is not a shame to 
make all this noise. Some girls don't have brothers to drive them, so it is best for 
them to drive their cars instead of hiring a driver, paying his salary and dealing 
with his harassments. It is only a matter of time to lift the ban. 
 
Enlightening: 
To some extent, comments under this theme are similar to the evaluative ones but are 
characterised with their tone of admonishment and educating other readers of what is the issue 
is indeed like based on the commenter’s opinion. This could include; correcting information 
or ideas presented by opponents whether on mass media or through online comments, and or 
explaining why the ban on women driving should be lifted. These observations adopt an 
intellectual stance and rely on logic and knowledge when making an argument, which could 
indicate that people who posted these comments are characterised with a higher level of 
education or maturity. Commenters aim to raise public awareness rather than only speaking 
their support out. The following examples illustrate how enlightenment was constructed 
through online proponents’ comments: 
(6.35) Prof. Al-Nojaimi, the right is a right even for one person; it is not true that the 
minority has no rights. 
(6.36) The preacher Ayed Al-Qarni states there is no evidence (from Quran or Sunnah) 
on which opponents could rely. 
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(6.37) There is no Hadeeth or Quranic verse that indicates the ban; it is futile 
mentalities and customs…..if I don’t have a man drive and can’t hire a driver 
what shall I do!? Damn futile mentalities. 
(6.38) First, feminising the rights does not turn it into horrible topics. Second, some 
rules in Saudi forbid women from the permissible to save men from committing 
the sin!!.....in what religion and mind is this? Sick people… 
(6.39) Oh girl, Islam has nothing to do with a tribe or family roots. This is a right for 
women that has been taken from them in the homeland of Islam, the country 
that opposes women driving in cities arguing for their safety. Meanwhile, they 
travel hundreds of kilometres outside cities via dangerous roads to get to 
schools without a male guardian, even if they are in danger daily…what a 
contradiction! 
(6.40) May Allah guide us to goodness, women driving is a right for each female 
citizen. 
 
Feminist grievance: 
Comments under this theme expressed sympathy and understanding of what activists are 
calling for and the amount of suffering that Saudi women are experiencing because of the ban. 
From a micro-linguistic perspective, the feminine Arabic pronouns indicate the potential that 
all comments were posted by female users e.g. ‘تايدوعسك انل’ (for us Saudi women), ‘انتبك ةيافك’ 
(it is enough oppressing us), ‘قوسن ىتم’ (when will we drive). The comments agreed on the 
need to lift the ban by portraying a gloomy picture of the situation experienced by Saudi 
women; e.g. ‘we are suffering a lot’, ‘we complain to Allah those who oppressed us by 
depriving our right’, ‘don’t care about our girls honour’, ‘It is enough oppressing us from the 
simplest basics of life’. The examples below illustrate how feminist grievance was 
constructed: 
(6.41) I am a tribal girl and living in Riyadh; I support the ladies’ opinion…it is true we 
are suffering a lot because of the ban...we complain to Allah those who oppressed 
us through abusing religion. 
(6.42) For us Saudi women, driving is a necessity, we complain to Allah those who 
oppressed us by depriving our right. 
(6.43) Ooooooh when will we drive; we are fed up of ignorance? 
(6.44) I hope and wait for the day when our children laugh on the backwardness we are 
living now as I did on the Sheikhs of the past when they opposed girls’ education, 
mobile phones and cars. It is oppressing enough us from the simplest basics of life. 
(6.45) We want to drive….please it is enough, think maturely. 
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6.3.3 Neutrals comments 
Almost 20% of comments on the three videos adopted a neutral stance regarding women 
driving. Neutral comments are those that failed to articulate a clear-cut opinion of whether or 
not women should drive. Instead of supporting or opposing, commenters remained 
conservative or ambiguous regarding women driving. Their neutral observations resulted in 
the emergence of four main themes: evaluative, admonishing, correcting and enlightening. 
 
Figure 11. The most dominant attitudes from the neutral comments. 
 
Evaluative: 
The evaluative comments dominated almost 50% of the total number of neutral comments. In 
general, these comments were criticising social actors appearances or manner of speech rather 
than discussing the points they rose: e.g ‘you look confused’, ‘I don’t like his tone’, ‘why 
your chest is uncovered!?’ or objectively criticised both parties (opponents and proponents) 
e.g. ‘why we never see a cleric talking about the citizen main problems such as: housing and 
unemployment’, ‘look for solutions then build your civilisation’. Other evaluative comments 
criticised the show: e.g. ‘A silly interview, especially at the end’, ‘Why you didn’t let Sheikh 
Al-Nojaimi talk…you interrupt him continuously’. The comments below illustrate the 
construction of the evaluative theme by online neutral commenters:     
(6.46) A silly interview, especially at the end. 
(6.47) I think the issue is over discussed.     
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(6.48) Media is using the issue to create more action; in my opinion, the report was a 
bit biased.   
(6.49) Ryan Al-Zahrani, with all respect, you don’t evaluate what you say….you 
accused them of many bad things, I don’t know based on what?. I am not 
supporting or opposing driving, but the way you comment is a reason for them 
to drive if the opponents are morally accusing girls…how do we take their 
opinion, you are reflecting a negative image about the opponents. 
(6.50) Why you did not let Sheikh Al-Nojaimi talk…you interrupt him continuously. 
(6.51) Women driving is a mean not an aim. Uunfortunately, it became an aim for 
every Saudi women in favour of driving. 
 
Admonishing: 
Comments classified as admonishing were those that adopted a preaching style targeting other 
commenters and readers. Admonishing comments are distinguished for their social 
reformative approach; their primary concern is the people way of thinking and expression 
when discussing such issues rather than who is right or wrong e.g. ‘Disagreement doesn’t ruin 
amicability’, ‘Regardless of our stance towards women driving’. They all denounce the harsh, 
offensive comments from both sides and call to a more sophisticated way of expression e.g. 
‘think better’, ‘why cursing and showing disrespect to others? ‘, ‘may Allah forgive us about 
some comments here’. The following comments explain how this admonishing theme was 
constructed: 
(6.52) Disagreement does not ruin amicability….think better. 
(6.53) In this verse of Quran, a reminder for believers about what an individual say 
that every single saying is counted and recorded in his personal list that will be 
revealed on the Day of Judgement…..I hope we all act sincerely to Allah when 
we write each single letter. 
(6.54) Regardless of our stance towards women driving, why cursing and showing 
disrespect to others?? It is true, the little minds speak about persons, while the 
big ones discuss principles and thoughts. 
(6.55) May Allah forgive us for some comments here. Women driving is not a 
religious issue, and if we want it to be, there is disagreement among clerics. 
However, I am pretty sure that the Islamic nation, with all its sects or doctrines, 
agrees upon the criminalisation of cursing or accusing others morally without 
any evidence.  
(6.56) We all need to respect each other and comment responsibly. You should not 
hurt someone else only because he has a different opinion than yours.   
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Correcting: 
The comments classified as correcting are those that embraced modifying some mistaken 
views or information provided by social actors on TV or by commenters. For example, ‘The 
host Turki committed a mistake when he quoted Sheikh Al-Munajid opinion’, ‘A blouse not 
her chest’, ‘This date is the launch date, there was no campaigns or gatherings’. Apparently, 
since these comments hold a neutral stance regarding women driving, they failed to declare 
their posters’ positions. The following examples illustrates how the correcting theme was 
framed through neutral comments: 
(6.57) It is a T-Shirt. Hahahahaha! You thought it is her chest that prompted criticism. 
(6.58) The host Turki committed a mistake when he quoted Sheikh Al-Munajid 
opinion as if it was said about Manal. Actually Al-Munajid was talking about 
Wajiha Al-Hwaider. 
(6.59) My dear, be sincere to Allah when you talk, she is wearing a beige blouse…if 
you saw her on TV, it was obvious. 
(6.60) A blouse, not her chest….what is this stupid way of thinking? 
(6.61) This date is the launch date; there were no campaigns or gatherings. 
 
Enlightening: 
Regarding the number of neutral comments, the enlightening theme was the least frequent to 
occur. Enlightening comments provided readers with some informative suggestions that are 
unbiased, but present some potential solutions and advice to other users. For example, 
‘Whoever wants to drive should be allowed and for those who don’t want to drive, it is their 
option….the issue is solved’, ‘A public referendum on women driving should be 
done….people should choose what they want’, ‘As a precaution, teenagers should not be 
allowed to drive….the statistics of public security are full of frightening numbers of 
accidents’. The following comments are examples that show how neutral comments 
constructed the enlightening theme: 
(6.62) Whoever wants to drive should be allowed and for those who don’t want to 
drive. It is their choice….the issue is solved.  
(6.63) Some people are against development…they completely believe in the 
conspiracy theory as if the whole world is planning against them!!, my 
dear…nobody knows you. 
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(6.64) A public referendum on women driving should be done: Do you support women 
driving or not? People should choose what they want and not be left under the 
hegemony of a strict minority. 
(6.65) As a precaution, teenagers should not be allowed to drive….the statistics of 
public security are full of frightening numbers of accidents. 
(6.66) A public referendum will help us to take the right decision. 
 
 
 
6.4 Summary 
The analysis of the user-generated content represented in the public comments on YouTube is 
substantial in numerous ways; primarily, it gauges the public pulse and provides new levels of 
understanding in the case under investigation. In this regard, the analysis of the public 
comments revealed the formation of three main responses to lifting the ban on women 
driving; oppose, support and neutral. This chapter provided a theme-based analysis of the 
opposing, supporting and neutral comments, constructing different themes within each 
category. The opposing comments framed four main topics; racist, sceptical, evaluative, and 
offensive whereas thos in favour of women driving framed the following themes; supportive, 
evaluative, enlightening, and feminist grievance. Moreover, the chapter represented an 
analysis of the comments that failed to articulate any opposing or supporting response to 
lifting the ban, classified as neutral comments. These observations took on the following 
themes: evaluative, admonishing, correcting, and enlightening. Overall, the topics extracted 
from these comments represented a valuable content that demonstrates public reflection on 
the discourse of their mass media counterparts. 
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CHAPTER 7:   DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
Having analysed the strategies of legitimisation employed by the proponents and opponents of 
women driving alongside their strategies of the positive self and negative other presentation, 
this chapter attempts to combine and discuss the data obtained from both discourses. In 
Chapter 5, although some data were discussed briefly and a focus on the micro-legitimation 
strategies and devices, an overall discussion will be presented in this chapter to aid the 
understanding of the macro-legitimation scheme on which each group relied most to 
legitimise its position. First, a quantitative comparison of the similarities and differences in 
the discourse of each group will be provided, whether on mass media or through comments. 
Second, a more qualitative comparison of the strategies of legitimisation employed by both 
groups is given alongside the argumentation schemes proposed by Walton (1995). 
Furthermore, the way the proponents or opponents legitimised the Self and delegitimised the 
Other will be discussed jointly. Finally, overall remarks will be drawn to explain the 
interconnectedness between the socio-political context and the current discourse in relation to 
women driving. 
             
 
 
 
7.2 Similarities and differences in discourse of both groups 
In comparison with Van Leeuwen’s four categories of legitimisation (1996, 2007) and Reyes 
(2011), this study has confirmed, developed and proposed some new key strategies of 
legitimisation by applying them to a different social context tackling the interdisciplinary 
issue of women driving ban in Saudi Arabia. Alongside strategies of authorisation, 
rationalisation, moral evaluation and mythopesis, this study introduced legitimisation through 
custody as a new category in legitimacy. Moreover, it can be claimed that analogous 
evaluation is a distinct strategy from the ordinary moral evaluation, since it does not 
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necessarily evaluate a group or an issue morally. However, it relies on highlighting the 
similarities between a previous and current issue that eventually will yield similar outcomes. 
Hypothetical future, or as it is called in this study hypothetical/potential implications, was 
also developed as an essential strategy of legitimisation. This research investigates how such 
an approach was adopted by two dichotomous groups in the process of legitimising or 
delegitimising one particular action; namely, women driving. 
 
Table 4. Frequency of the legitimization strategies used by interlocutors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the six strategies of legitimisation were predominantly used interchangeably on 
mass media by both proponents and opponents, reference to them was made in varying 
degrees and serving two dichotomous perspectives. This could provide greater insight into 
how interlocutors view their audience and why they tend to use a particular strategy more than 
the others. Moreover, it explains what argument do speakers account for most to persuade 
public of changing or accepting the status-quo. Regarding frequency, proponents’ most 
common strategy of legitimisation was authorisation as used 19 times, followed by 
legitimisation through custody scoring 11 times. On the other hand, opponents’ most frequent 
strategy was the analogous/moral evaluation, which also was used 19 times followed by both 
strategies of authorisation and hypothetical/potential implications sharing equal usage times; 
namely, 13 times each. Although in a purely qualitative research with such limited amount of 
data, findings cannot be generalised, these variations indicate the power distributions within 
the Saudi society in which proponents show more reliance on authority –especially the 
personal authority as the most frequent used among other types- in achieving social change by 
lifting the ban. By doing this, proponents probably seek to instigate the government or some 
members of the royal family to take serious steps towards change and to embarrass the Other 
by putting them in a confrontation with public and officials. Conversely, opponents 
Legitimisation strategy Proponents Opponents 
(n) (%) (n) (%) 
Custody 11 25.58 9 15.52 
Authority 19 44.19 13 22.41 
Analogous/moral evaluation 6 13.95 19 32.76 
Rationalization 3 6.98 4 6.90 
Mythopesis 1 2.32 - - 
Hypothetical/potential implications 3 6.98 13 22.41 
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demonstrate more reliance on the analogous/moral evaluation to perpetuate the ban. This is 
probably a sign that opponents do not account for authority as much as they do with moral 
evaluation. As a social issue, they believe that if they could keep the majority of public 
against women driving and its advocates, no change will occur; therefore, the authorities 
(governmental institutions) will not lift the ban. However, interestingly in a culture where 
traditions are an intrinsic part of its heritage and daily life, the authority of tradition was not 
used by any of the groups. Additionally, legitimisation through mythopesis was not used at all 
by opponents, and only on one occasion within proponents’ discourse.  
 
Figure 12. The commenters’ responses with regard to women driving.
 
Regarding the public opinions gathered through YouTube comments, comments that favour 
women driving has scored the highest number among the three responses (support, oppose, 
neutral), with 88 comments out of 198 comments. This is followed by opponents with 68 
comments, and neutral comments with 42 comments. However, proponents’ comments were 
concerned initially with expressing support, encouragement and appreciation for speakers and 
calls to lift the ban. Second, supporters’ comments demonstrated an evaluative theme 
whereby an evaluation was provided for social actors and/or their arguments, or by assessing 
the women driving issue. Conversely, the most prevalent theme in opponents’ comments 
displayed a racist rhetoric towards advocates, in which they were excluded from society and 
portrayed as outsiders. Scepticism was the second important topic within opponents’ 
comments reflecting on and reproducing the issue of conspiracy raised by the opponents on 
mass media (e.g. ‘there are subtle parties’, ‘there is attempts to exploit’, ‘serving the Safavid 
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camp’). These themes or online public rhetoric of each group brings insights into the extent to 
which public opinion circulates or reproduces mass media discourse. Furthermore, it reveals 
some of what mainstream media may censor. 
 
 
7.3 Comparison with argumentation schemes 
The six strategies of legitimisation indicated in this study are to some extent similar or 
predominantly correspond with some argumentation schemes introduced by Douglas Walton 
(1995). These argumentation schemes converge with some of the legitimisation strategies, 
whereby they can be “inconclusive and defeasible arguments that nevertheless have a 
practical function of shifting a burden of proof in a dialogue” (Walton, 1995: ix). However, 
argumentation is something inherent to the use of language and as Diaz states; “the theory of 
the argumentation should be understood as a pragmatic semantics or a semantics which 
integrates pragmatic elements” (2009: 2). From this sense, in some cases (e.g. moral 
evaluations, rational explanations or even authority statements), the argument is powerful 
because it relies on a system of beliefs, values and norms that support it and hence performing 
beyond the limits of the content (Anscombre & Ducrot, 1994). Although argumentation 
schemes are used primarily in the process of evaluating arguments, this particular study is 
concerned solely with the strategies of legitimisation. Taking a closer look at these schemes 
could explain how some of the proponents and opponents’ arguments were accepted and 
taken for granted by public, while others were challenged, considered fallacies and rejected. 
In this study, authorisation has been used – in its different sub-types - as a useful tool in 
constructing credibility to a particular opinion through generally argumentative or persuasive 
strategies. The power of authorisation is that it allows preferential access to elite discourse 
and institutional discourse which, therefore, enhances the possibility of picking specific topics 
and organising agendas (Van Dijk, 1992; Diaz, 2009). According to Diaz, “this is the real link 
between authorisation and argumentative structures and other properties of the discourse that 
sustain it. That can be translated into an ability to set constraints on the most important 
communicative events” (2009: 7). The argumentative structure of authority relies on the long 
time process of manufacturing a vision of reality and the creation of some concepts in which 
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what is normal or what is deviant are defined and therefore legitimised over time (Martin 
Rojo & Callejo, 1995). This explains why interlocutors do not rationalise their reference to 
authority; the mere fact of using actors’ positions is used as an argument (Diaz, 2009). 
 
However, compared with Walton’s argumentation schemes, legitimisation through the 
authority of conformity at a similar or almost identical level to the argument from popularity. 
The argument here is: since the vast majority do this act, we are then no different and we 
should do it as well (e.g. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women do not 
drive). Another type of authority was the expert authority which falls under the argument 
from expert opinion where an argument is based largely on the position to know about a 
specific domain of knowledge, in which expert opinion is highly valued and conclusive (e.g. 
Dr. Nizar said the society need more of maturity, awareness and safety). Impersonal authority 
and argument from established rule are almost the references of two or more persons or 
groups to a third party position – mostly a rule- to legitimise or persuade the other/s of taking 
or not taking action (e.g. the 8th article of the basic law of government…etc). 
Legitimisation through analogous evaluation is another strategy that is probably the same as 
the argument from the analogy scheme. The argument here highlights  the similarities 
between the current and previous issue/situation, resulting in the same conclusion whether or 
not action is taken (e.g. when the British wanted to withdraw from the euro zone, they hold a 
referendum). As one of the most remarkable characteristics of the argumentation (Foucault, 
1972; Martin Rojo & Callejo, 1995), rationalisation was also used frequently to achieve 
legitimacy. In argumentation theory, rationalisation could be described as the discursive act of 
plausible reasoning as no values to be included in this kind of argumentations (Walton 1995). 
Indeed, rationalisation is powerful because it provides rational explanations of actions based 
on common sense in which opinions are contrasted with truth (Sayer, 2006). Actors tend to 
use rationalisation or plausible reasoning in order to logically make something (e.g. a value, a 
feeling, an opinion…etc) acceptable (Clyne, 2005). Rationalisation explains the use of some 
socially agreed-upon procedures or norms (study, research, analysis) that were taken into 
consideration to reach a valid opinion or conclusion (e.g. we conducted a research-like...we 
read all officials’ statements in the state and none of them is opposing). 
 
150 
 
 
 
Finally, the legitimisation through hypothetical or potential implications is more or less 
represented in the argument from consequence. Walton explains; “this type of argumentation 
is used in a delibration or critical discussions where there is a divided opinion on a 
contemplated course of action –one side supporting the action, and the other opposing it, or 
doubting the wisdom of it” (1995: 75). However, in this particular study, the proponents’ 
argument highlighted the positive aspects of lifting the ban (e.g. I would imagine the country 
economic returns will be huge). Meanwhile, the opponents’ argument concentrated on the 
negative consequences of taking such an action (e.g. women driving will lead to traffic 
problems, will result in disruption in a family budget). 
 
 
7.4 Legitimising Self and delegitimising Other 
Taking into account the historical, socio-political situation, social roles and numerous genres 
of power embedded within the construction of Saudi society, it was unsurprising that 
advocates of women driving legitimised the Self group. Overall, they adopted a justificatory 
attitude positioning themselves in a defensive zone. Here, they had to justify themselves first 
either by proving their good intentions and caring about society (e.g. ‘we are enlightening 
women’, ‘we were teaching women’, ‘we are Saudis’), or by countering the Other’s 
accusations (e.g. ‘we don’t hide’, ‘we didn’t address foreign bodies’, ‘we don’t do something 
wrong’). Learning from the past, proponents probably anticipated such accusations from the 
Other before declaring the 17th June 2011 as the campaign launch day. The reaction of 
opponents (mainly the extreme religious stream) following the 1990 campaign was an 
exclusionary one when women activists at that time were portrayed as outsiders or traitors to 
their country. Similarly, the reaction to recent campaigns was, women driving activists and 
other advocates were under a robust attack by opponents who accused them of being traitors, 
mercenaries and destroyers of virtues and values (Al-Manie & Al-Sheikh, 2013). That is 
possibly one reason why advocates tried to refute any similar allegations in advance by 
introducing themselves to mass media and taking many steps forward by using social media 
to rally public support. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that following the 
government, the religious establishment is considered the group in power within the Saudi 
society and probably the most trusted (Al-Khedr, 2011). Therefore, contradictory opinions are 
more likely to arise from the Other whom usually characterised as outsiders and enemies of 
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religion or country. Considering such historical insights may go some way to explain why and 
how power influences discourses in society, and how different groups position themselves to 
change or maintain a social practice (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). 
Another essential aspect of legitimising the Self within the proponents’ discourse is how they 
portrayed women driving. By labelling it a campaign, the proponents described it as 
‘spontaneous’ and ‘not a gathering nor a protest’ to assure the audience that it was an 
unplanned ‘initiative’ with no previous meticulous intentions. When referring to it as an issue, 
proponents legitimise their calls as pursuing a ‘social issue’ that is perceived simultaneously 
as a ‘right’ and a ‘need’. Proponents extend in legitimiszing the Self through playing the role 
of the weak, helpless group that has ‘no other solutions’ and being ‘heavily attacked’ by the 
Other. 
With regard to delegitimising the Other, proponents were cautious in their definition of the 
Other, to whom they referred frequently and simply as ‘opponents’. However, the mere 
description of ‘opponents’ has a somewhat negative connotation as it portrays the Other as 
resisting inevitable social change and perhaps creating a barrier to social development. 
Another reference to the Other was ‘religious men’, this is probably used to quantitatively 
minimise the opponents and perhaps isolate or distinguish them from public. Nevertheless, the 
de-legitimation of Other was employed primarily through predicational strategy; opponents 
were portrayed as the aggressors adopting an attacking approach (e.g. ‘they launched the 
charges’, ‘their unjustified and violent attack’, ‘they used to attack me’). Moreover, 
opponents were depicted as a group that does not care a lot about the Us group (proponents); a 
member of the Other group ‘shouldn’t impose his/her opinion’ or ‘disregard us anymore’. 
Conversely, the opponents of women driving had their discursive strategies in legitimising the 
Self and delegitimising the Other. The opponents tend to assure their quantitative superiority 
over the Other group by referring to the Self group in many occasions as representing ‘the 
majority’ or ‘the vast majority’ of Saudi society. They also positively identified some 
individuals opposed to women driving (e.g. ‘clerics’, ‘real reformers’, ‘people of sincere 
word’). Moreover, predicational strategy was employed by opponents to discursively 
construct the Self group as being the fair and rational group that understand and consider 
others’ needs. For example, ‘we don’t accuse whoever call to women driving of being liberal 
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or westernised’, ‘we don’t deny that some women need to drive’. They were also depicted as 
adopting a democratic approach that accepts nothing but people’s choice (e.g. ‘we want to 
vote’, ‘to solve our issues democratically’) to achieve legitimacy. 
 
Regarding the de-legitimisation of the Other, opponents used the referential strategy to 
construct the Them group as being ‘the minority’ but ‘the enemies’ of our unity and social 
values. In terms of numbers, degrading the Them group is thought to undermine its demands 
and aspirations. Meanwhile, the implicit portrayal of the Them group as being ‘the enemies’ 
and belonging or serving ‘the liberal blocs’ and ‘Safavid camp’ is meant to demonise its 
members and nominate them probably as a national threat. Therefore, their position is de-
legitimised. Likewise, the predicational strategy was utilised to construct a distorted image 
about the Other group discursively, they were portrayed as the selfish, arrogant group that 
‘watch from a high ivory tower’, ‘imposes its opinion over the majority’ and ‘don’t accept the 
other opinion’. In addition, the opponents raised some doubts about the Other’s loyalty to 
Saudi Arabia, while accusing them of creating unrest in society and risks to national security 
(e.g. ‘speak like this about her society’, ‘to break the laws’, ‘serving the Safavid project’). 
Nevertheless, the Other’s legitimacy was also targeted by reference to women driving. 
Regarding women driving as a campaign, opponents see it as an illegal action that may lead to 
chaos and maybe other unwanted consequences (e.g. ‘a protest’, ‘breaking the law’, 
‘aggravating the society’). Opponents also de-legitimised the Other group when referring to 
women driving as an issue; they depict it as an ‘outrage for the majority of Saudi girls’ and a 
‘thorny issue’ that probably ‘will lead to traffic problems’. Realising that religion is entirely 
disassociated with the ban on women driving, opponents’ Self-legitimisation and Other-
delegitimisation has revealed almost no direct reference to Islam or Sharia. Unlike the case in 
1990, when the whole issue was rejected in the name of religion by the issuing of a fatwa 
from the higher council of Ulama, it seems that two decades were almost enough to change 
the opponents' argument regarding the ban radically. Although they tried implicitly to insert 
religion in the construction of Self-legitimacy (e.g. ‘clerics’ and ‘preachers’) or Other-de-
legitimacy (e.g. ‘the Safavid camp’ and ‘the liberal blocs’), opponents’ discourse 
demonstrated more and explicit reliance on law and democracy rather than religion. 
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7.5 Overall remarks 
The overall structure of the analysis in this research has endeavoured to bring together levels 
of textual analysis and genre-specific categories alongside the socio-political context to 
address the processes of discourse production, distribution and consumption about women 
driving in Saudi Arabia. The discursive construction of Self and Other within the discourse of 
both proponents and opponents of women driving leaves a significant impact on the 
credibility of the legitimate argumentation which could hinder or obstruct processes of 
distribution and consumption of a particular group discourse. However, shedding light on the 
socio-political context offers “an overview of the existing body of shared knowledge, which 
may be drawn upon in the interpretation and production processes of discourse” 
(KhosraviNik, 2015: 264). For example, in this study in the case of opponents, the discussion 
of the women driving ban was positioned as part of broader frames regarding a long historical 
conspiracy that is targeting the country’s stability. It has been constructed as a conflict 
between those nationalists and patriots (the opponents) against those outsiders and 
conspirators (the proponents) who keep trying to destroy the state’s unity. Moreover, it is 
portrayed as a clash between the religious conservative values (the Self) and the western 
liberal values (the Other) targeting the Saudi women and society. 
 
The issue of women driving ban should be viewed within the development in the socio-
political context of Saudi Arabia. With regard to gender-related issues, the turning point in the 
Saudi society was significantly salient following the 1979 incident (besiege of the holy 
mosque), leading to extreme interpretations of some religious texts within the discourse of the 
religious establishment. Furthermore, the emergence of Al-Sahwah as a religious movement 
has contributed significantly to widening the gap between both sexes in almost all spheres of 
life (e.g. education, work, transportation). Between 1990 and 2011, the socio-political 
development had a notable impact on the discourse of the religious establishment that 
transformed the issue of women driving in Saudi from a merely religious to a subject that is 
used by enemies of our country to perpetuate harm on Us and create political instability. This 
radical transformation has facilitated a tangible shift in the public awareness and attitudes 
with regard to women driving (e.g. ‘we don’t care about such clerics and their fatwas’, 
‘There is no Hadeeth or Quranic verse that indicates the ban’). In fact, it developed into a 
counter argument used by advocates to invalidate opponents’ credibility (e.g. ‘we found out 
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that most religious men say there is no Tahreem (religious ban)’, ‘it is not a political or 
religious issue’). While the overall argumentation of opponents in this study did not refer 
explicitly to or rely on the persuasive authority of religion as it did in 1990, there are covert 
tendencies towards using some religious categorisation terms by portraying the Self (the 
opponents) as people with religious orientations; for example, ‘clerics’, ‘preachers’. Whereas 
the Other (proponents) are perceived as ‘the liberal’, ‘the Safavid camp’. It is important to 
highlight the negative connotations linked to the term ‘liberal’ within the general Saudi 
context. This is fundamental as  liberalism is identified by the religious establishment in Saudi 
Arabia as an oppositional mindset to the religious values. In other words, by describing the 
proponents as liberals, they are illegitimate, while Us (the opponents) are legitimate because 
we are resisting Them. 
 
It might be petulant to assign all blame to the religious establishment in perpetuating the ban, 
but their contribution is undoubtedly high. Moreover, they have mostly acted as being the 
main antagonists in such disputes. Over the past few decades, the anti-Western/liberal values 
stance of the religious establishment in a range of similar issues, especially those about 
women has established a repellent conventionalised frame of production and reception 
towards calls for social change and activating women role in the society. This stance has 
fostered a sceptical view among the public if calls for social change were not made or 
approved by the religious stream in the country. Clearly, this dependency appears to be 
favoured by the religious establishment as it seems to enhance its powerful authority, 
therefore gaining a better grip over the social identity of Saudis. The sceptical attitude of 
public in lifting the ban on women driving is promoted by the rhetoric of distrust of the Other 
framed over the years by the religious establishment to maintain the status-quo on issues, such 
as girls schooling and feminisation of shops. This overarching rhetoric has succeeded on 
many occasions to legitimise or de-legitimise social changes based on whether intentionally 
or unintentionally extreme interpretations or misinterpretations of some religious texts. 
Another intrinsic frame that has been constructed over the years by the religious establishment 
and has been used continuously to naturalise the existing situation is the uniqueness of Saudi 
Arabia as being the mecca of all Muslims around the globe. Under this frame, many issues 
(e.g. gender segregation schooling, applying Sharia law) are embedded where being 
distinctive is overly portrayed as a value. This requires Us (the Saudis) to act as models for 
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other Islamic nations and feel proud of being distinctive (e.g. ‘this country has its own 
privacy’). Lifting the ban could threaten Our uniqueness and distort Our identity (e.g. 
‘women driving will result in economic, social and political harms’). 
Conversely, it is hard to claim that advocates of women driving belong to an organisational 
structure where a specific discourse is established and constituted. This is probably because of 
their lack of power and organised physical appearance within the Saudi society, unlike their 
counterparts. As a result, this led activists to act discreetly to some extent and then organise 
such campaigns to attract attention nationally and internationally to their issue. Although 
some Saudi and international mass media (TV channels, newspapers) demonstrated some 
support and criticised the driving ban on women, locally, this support has enhanced the 
sceptical view of opponents and legitimised their allegations against activists, especially when 
the western media is involved. Furthermore, some advocates have declared being in contact 
with foreign media, embassies and probably met some political and human rights figures 
which adds further doubts and tensions among the public, therefore, diminishing the 
credibility of advocates. However, it appears that as a reaction to the usual negative portrayal 
of activists of women driving or other similar issues, advocates’ overall rhetoric tends to be 
justificatory and appeals for public trust and support (explaining who are they? what do they 
do? and why they do it?). Anyway, it is important to note that social media has heavily 
contributed in transforming the proponents’ ignored voice into a heard one; thereby granting 
them a mostly neutral platform where they can present their views, discuss, debate and argue 
with opponents. 
 
Regarding the online public comments, it is noted that this UGC has brought to the study 
some invisible aspects of arguments on mass media. The most frequent theme of opponents’ 
comments was ‘racist’, which probably would not be explicitly spoken or broadcasted on 
mass media. Generally speaking, the public voice in such dialectical issues were often 
marginalised or unheard. With regard to women driving issue, public has mostly acted as 
recipients to the discourses of (the many) opponents –led by the religious establishment- and 
(the few) proponents – individually organised- rather than sharing their views. The powerful 
discourse of the religious establishment has had its tangible impact on the opponents’ 
comments which framed ‘racist’ and ‘sceptical’ themes as the highest among comments. 
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Unsurprisingly, these two topics are embedded within the macro-analysis of the opponents 
discourse on mass media who portray advocates as outsider plotters and picture the true Saudi 
women as being opposed to driving.  
In contrast, the observations of proponents responded to the advocates’ justificatory and 
appealing rhetoric by expressing sympathy, understanding and support for them and the 
campaign of women driving. However, proponents’ enlightening comments were addressed 
primarily to their counterparts (opponents) and other uncertain or neutral readers by 
explaining them the legitimacy of women driving since it has nothing to do with religion as 
portrayed by the opponents. Compared with the opponents, the proponents’ comments 
revealed greater focus on the issue rather than targeting individuals. Overall, it can be said 
that the macro-strategies of opponents’ discourse are constructive, whereby they have 
constructed a national religious identity (e.g. Saudis vs. the outsider enemies), and 
perpetuating to justify and maintain the status-quo (e.g. the legitimation of the ban on women 
driving). In the case of the proponents’ discourse, its macro-strategies are transformational 
and destructive in which it aspires to transform or destruct the status-quo (e.g. lifting the ban 
on women driving) (Wodak 1997b, Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999).  
 
7.6 Summary  
This chapter endeavoured to present a broader understanding of the current discourse of the 
two dichotomous groups, opponents and opponents of women driving in Saudi Arabia. The 
similarities and difference in the discussion of both groups were detailed, along with a 
comparison of the argumentation schemes developed by Walton (1995). However, the 
strategies of positive Self and negative Other presentation employed by each group were both 
compared and discussed. Referential and predicational strategies worked as essential tools 
serving in the formation of the Us and Them groups, thus the construction and development of 
the exclusionary rhetoric of each group. In summary, the chapter illustrated briefly the 
discursive mechanisms that each group used to achieve legitimacy; thereby, maintaining or 
altering the status-quo. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Contribution of the study (in terms of results) 
The main purpose of conducting this study is the researcher’s belief of the major contribution 
of language to the process of legitimisation in society. The main study focus was to 
investigate the strategies of legitimisation used by both proponents and opponents of women 
driving in Saudi Arabia to legitimise or de-legitimise the ban. Accordingly, the study’s 
uniqueness lies in three different categories; theoretical, methodological and practical. 
Regarding the theoretical contribution, it provides some valuable additions to the existing 
body of literature in the field of CDA; in particular, the discourse of legitimisation. This 
research builds on the works conducted on strategies of legitimisation by Van Leeuwen 
(1996, 2007), Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), and Reyes (2011). It is developing an 
understanding of some key strategies of legimisation by applying them to a different social 
context than has been studied before and proposes a new key strategy of legitimisation. 
However, the novel contribution of this study lies in the fact that it contributes to the 
understanding of how legitimation and de-legitimation are framed within the discourse of two 
dichotomous groups that share a context. Previous works examined legitimacy in the political 
sphere and focused primarily on the discussion of the dominant group to legitimise taking 
action (e,g, military action, rejection of immigrants’ applications) against the other controlled 
group. In this particular work, the discourse of legitimacy is central to the issue of women 
driving (proponents vs. opponents); hence, the discussion of both groups within the same 
social context is considered, examined and compared regarding how each group legitimises or 
de-legitimises the status-quo. With regard to the strategies of legitimisation, the study 
proposes a new strategy; namely, legitimisation through ‘custody’, which is used extensively 
by both groups as a major category of legitimation. Furthermore, in this study, although 
‘analogy’ was introduced in alignment with the ‘moral evaluation’ strategy, ‘analogous 
evaluation’ can be claimed as an independent category of legitimisation. Another novel 
contribution of this particular work is that it takes into account the online public opinion as a 
valuable source of understanding how public opinion is shaped by the legitimation discourse 
proposed by speakers on mass media. To the researcher’s knowledge, no previous CDA work 
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incorporated both the analysis of the legitimacy discourse by key speakers on mass media and 
the analysis of the UGC of online public opinion in one study. This is a distinctive feature of 
this research, by which it presents to some extent a broader perception of how discourse is 
produced, perceived and reproduced in society. 
Regarding the methodological contribution, although CDA has been used previously to 
disclose the practice of legitimation embedded in political or institutional discourse, earlier 
works analysing discourse of legitimacy (except Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999) ignored the 
historical aspect of the issue. However, this study examines the legitimacy discourse of 
women driving by incorporating the discourse-historical approach; in particular, strategies of 
positive-Self and negative-Other. Consequently, the study contributes to the literature in 
proving the applicability and usefulness of the discourse-historical approach within a certain 
social context. To the extent of the researcher’s knowledge, the study provides a novel 
methodological contribution. It is the first CDA work to examine the employment of the 
strategies of positive-Self and negative-Other presentation alongside those of legitimisation to 
legitimise or de-legitimise a social change. For example, in ‘Legitimising immigration 
control’ by Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), although the use of DHA demystified how 
legitimisation is historically embedded within discourse, the study ignored the essential 
feature of the Self and Other representation and its role in constructing groups and identifying 
social actors and social actions. This undoubtedly influences the discourse of legitimacy or 
de-legitimacy. Furthermore, Reyes (2011) investigated the strategies of legitimisation used by 
US presidents to legitimise the so-called ‘war on terror’ with little reference to the 
nominational and predicational strategies used by one side. In this particular work, the 
strategies of Self and Other representation are intrinsic for both dichotomous groups because 
they explicitly explain why and how (de-)legitimacy is maintained. However, the emergence 
of the new category of legitimisation ‘custody’ indicates to some extent the validity of this 
methodological integration in providing new insights into the analysis of the legitimacy 
discourse. 
On a practical level, the study contributes by adding to the emancipatory project of CDA, by 
which it uncovers the hidden meanings and naturalised ideologies through discourse. With 
regard to the local context, the study is the first to tackle the women driving issue by 
considering the discourse of both the proponents and opponents via mass media and online 
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public opinion. To some extent, this study makes a unique contribution to the issue of women 
driving in Saudi Arabia and lays the foundation for further research to investigate the issue 
from a linguistic perspective. The study seeks to help eliminate the practice of inequality in 
Saudi society by enlightening the public on the construction of legitimacy, hoping to raise 
public awareness, rectifying wrongdoings and injustice; thereby leading to a positive social 
change. Furthermore, this particular work is expected to contribute to lessening the 
exploitation of the religious texts in other similar issues within the Saudi society. In addition, 
the findings of this study reveal how each group (proponents and opponents) is mutually 
representative, and how the online commenters reflect on these representations. However, for 
the sake of an essential CDA principle that is ‘self-critique’, it is an illusion if the researcher 
tries to place himself in a privileged position. In fact, this work is nothing but a single 
interpretation by a researcher who is part of the society, influenced by it and socially 
constructed by the discourses he seeks to deconstruct. 
 
8.2 Limitations of the Study 
As with any research, the present study acknowledges some limitations. Although the issue 
under investigation – women driving ban- suggests the practice of sexism, the gender aspect 
was ignored in this research by collecting and analysing data (videos and comments) without 
or with little consideration given to the gender of the social actors. Gender has the potential to 
influence the style of discourse produced by speakers or commenters. Another limitation is 
that although CDA was an appropriate and relevant methodology that provided the tools for 
an in-depth investigation of the strategies of legitimisation, the use of a larger volume of data 
with the employment of a corpus analysis could back up the analysis with quantitatively 
reliable figures. Regarding the analysis, it is crucial to highlight that although considerable 
attention was paid to the process of data translation, the mere fact that the original text has 
been translated will inevitably influence the discourse analysis; thereby adding a further 
limitation to this research. With regard to the public online comments, although the 
anonymity of commenters could carry multiple advantages for the study (see Chapter 4), it is 
hard to claim they are true public opinions, which appears as another limitation of this study 
and related research. However, these limitations and any possible others could foster future 
research and pave the way for further works related to legitimisation. 
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8.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
This section illustrates some potential avenues for further research emanating from this piece 
of work. Regarding theory, although this study provides a section where it compares the 
strategies of legitimisation with some argumentation schemes (see Chapter 7), this 
comparison is simply an insight that should encourage further research. An evaluation of the 
arguments used in the discourse of legitimisation would be of significant value and would 
contribute to the CDA literature; particularly that related to legitimacy and argumentation. 
With regard to the issue of women driving, although the study proposed some new insights, 
the researcher believes that a further research that collects a larger amount of data and adopts 
a corpus-based analysis would demystify the power abuse and strengthen the findings. While 
this study was restricted to the spoken discourse on mass media, it would be interesting to see 
some future research that includes some forms of written discourse (e.g. newspaper columns, 
articles, books) alongside the spoken dialogue to enrich the case under investigation with 
valuable data. Moreover, since this study adopted a discourse-historical approach, a dramatic 
change in the opponent’s discourse was noted; thereby suggesting the necessity for further 
comparative research to investigate and compare the discourse of women driving during the 
first campaign in the 1990s with that following the campaigns in 2011 and 2013. Moreover, 
this study remained limited to YouTube comments; another recommendation would 
encourage considering other UGC platforms when collecting online public opinions such as; 
Twitter, Facebook and comments from online journals. Considering large numbers could 
conclude to more reliable results. However, the applied framework in this research could be 
adopted in future works to fruitfully study discourses of legitimation related to the Male 
Guardianship policy, which shares similar conditions to those of women driving and could 
contribute to a better understanding of its existence. 
Overall, it is important to highlight that this research is merely a synopsis of the discourse of 
women driving in Saudi and the discussion of legitimacy in general. Any further research 
investigating the issue from a linguistic perspective by applying critical discourse analysis or 
other discourse analytical approaches will be valued and will contribute to assuring or 
developing previous works by providing new insights into the existing body of literature. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: The Proponents’ excerpts in Arabic.  
 
NO.  EXCERPT 
5.1 
 
 
 
E “We enlighten women there is nothing in religion or Sharia nor in law that forbid you from driving, 
even the officials.” 
A  دجوي لا ،ءاسنلا يعون انحإعنمي ام نوناقلا يف لاو عرشلا يف لاو نيدلا يف لاك.نيلوؤسملا لاو...  
5.2 E “We are enlightening women with their rights and there was a minor imitative called (teach me how 
to drive). We were teaching women who don’t know how to drive, we teach them driving…why? 
Because in emergency cases if a woman needed to drive she knows how to handle the situation.” 
A ركفلافة أ ةيعوت انحا هن انإ و هيف ناكو مهقوقحب ءاسنلا يعونةردابم رغصمة  ينيملع اهمساألا ءاسنلا ملعن انك , قوس يلوفرعي اما 
 مهملعن , اوقوسيةقاوسلا لأ ؟ شيل هندق لار الله  جاتحاو اراط لوقن انلخ راص أ عم لماعتت فرعت قوست اهنةبكرملا مطعتت ال.  
 
5.3 E “We did this campaign especially to show the society’s voice, change and the growth in numbers 
demanding this right” 
A حإان انه نيلماع يد ةلمحلا  صاخ ناشع يرون توصلا  ..توص عمتجملا رييغتلاو يللا لصح يف عمتجملا  ودادعلأا يتلا تديازت 
اهنأب تراص بلاطت اذهب قحلا  
5.4 E “What is happening now is that a woman unfortunately doesn’t know her rights, or she might know 
them but keeps silent.” 
A  نلآا رياص يللاأ ةأرملا هن فرعت ام ديدشلا فسلألوأ اهقوقح  مصتو اهقوقح فرعت  
5.5 E “I represent the resistant Saudi woman, who tries to live with dignity.” 
A  انأأا لثمةأرمل لاةماركب شيعت لواحت ةدعاق يللا ةحفاكملا ةيدوعس  
5.6 E “I have priorities, I ordered them…my current priority is to concentrate on the initiative because my 
concern is bigger than Manal.” 
A أ  بتر.. تايولوأ يدنع انأانم نم ربكأ يتيضق نلأ ةردابملا ىلع زيكرتلا نلآا يتيولوأ.. يتايولول  
5.7 E “After 17th June, I appeared again because this is the initiative launch date and I want to be among 
the girls (the members of the initiative). I will try to help because the issue I experienced has become 
an issue of getting my dignity back as well as all other Saudi women’s dignity who appealed for this 
right and were violently attacked. God willing we won’t stop…we won’t stop until the issue of the 
1st driving licence for a Saudi woman.” 
A  دعب17 تدع نوج  نلآا صلاخ هنلأ ءوضلل ىرخا ةرمإحو ةردابملا قلاطنا خيرات اذه انأ ابأ.. تانبلا عم نوكأوجوم نوك مهاعم ةد
ردابملا تاوضعة و  لواحبألأ.. يطعلآا هنيضقلا تراص نة للا نامك ةيضقلا تراص , اهيف  يرم يأرابتعا در ةيضق اهن  لكل و يل
لاط يللا تايدوعسلا ءاسنلاام.. لكشلا اذهب اومجوهو قحلا اذهب اوب فقون حار.ام..  فقون حارإن شالله ءاب إح دحلأا دحاولا نذ ىت
إ رادصأصخر لوة لإةيدوعس ةأرم  
5.8 E “The divorced ladies, widowed and those earning the modest social security benefits -as the Sheikh 
said- could save some of their money to buy a car instead of spending it on the driver rent, 
accommodation and visa fees… Allah knows how much these cost…they all paid from the social 
security benefits which is modest as you said.” 
A اتاقلطمل لأاولمار يللاو اهدنع نامضلا يز ام لاق خيشلا نامضلا طيسبلا اذه...يللا هوه اهاغبي هفرصت ىلع قاوسلا ..يهه نكمي 
ريال ىلع ريال ردقت يرتشت ةرايس نكل قاوسلا يللا هوه أيبذخ اهنم أراج يرهش و أيبذخ اهنم ةشيعم و أيبذخ اهنم يفاز  ـب..الله ملعي 
مكب  ..اذه لكه فيراصم نم نامضلا يللا أ ن لوقتب   اساسأ هنأ هوه طيسب  
5.9 E “She has a car but the matter is already social...it is a social matter…indeed, it relates to women in 
need. The one compelled to hire a driver and pay all his visa expenses, accommodation, and monthly 
salary…..it is a bigger burden on her.” 
A   ايعامتجا ..يه ةلأسم ةيعامتجا ..يه لاعف سمت ءاسن تاجاتحم   لاعف  ..يللا يه  already  اهدنع ةرايس  ..نكل بيجتب  ..ةرطضم 
بيجت قاوس  ..لفكتتو هتزيفب هتشيعمو و هبتار يرهشلا  ..اذه ءبع اهيلع رثكأ  
5.10 E “We read all officials’ statements in the state and none of them is opposing, they all refer to it as a 
social issue.” 
A لودلا يف نيلوؤسملا تاحيرصت لك انأرق اهنوزيعي مهلك ضراعم مهيف دحم ةأةيعامتجا ةيضق اهن  
5.11 E “Even the Saudi traffic law, the general director of traffic, Maj. Gen./ Fahad Al-Bisher assured that 
the new traffic law that will be implemented today, doesn’t include any term that forbids women 
driving, and this was published in Al-Wattan newspaper in 2002.” 
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A  يدوعسلا رورملا نوناق ىتحأ انأماظن نأ رشبلا دهف/ ءاوللا رورملا ماع ريدم دكأ كلوق رملايبطت أدبيس يذلا ديدجلا روق هلا مويلا 
أ نمضتي مرحي ينوناق صن ي)عنمي( أرملاة  ماع يف نطولا يف ترشن يذهو ةرايسلا ةدايق نم2002  
5.12 E “Let me tell you, the foreign minister himself said; for us, it isn’t a political issue, it is a social one. 
The prince Saud Al-Faisal (foreign affairs minister) said these words; - it is not a political or 
religious issue, it is a social one.-” 
A  ينلخأسم  سيل انل ةبسنلاب لاق هسفن ةيجراخلا ريزو ينعي كلوق ةيسايس ةلأإ ةيعامتجا ةلأسم اهن  
 يذه لاق لصيفلا دوعس ريملأا،ةملكلا سيل يه ةيسايس ةلأسم  أو ةلأسمةينيد ةيعامتجا ةلأسم يه  
5.13 E “The Saudi society heard the king..he said it clearly, the crown prince Sultan also said it…it was said 
many times that it is a social matter, a society decision and the society should make its decision.” 
A عمتجملا يدوعسلا عمس كلملا  ..اهلاقو لكب حوضو و يلو دهعلا اهلاق ريملأاو ناطلس الله همحري اهلاق  .. لاقنا اذك هرم بهنأ اذه نأش 
يعامتجا ررقي عمتجملا و عمتجم رارق و  
5.14 E  "The 8th article of the basic law of government is: [Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic Sharia].” 
A  ةداملاةنماثلا  ةيبرعلا ةكلمملا يف مكحلا موقي( مكحلل يساسلأا ماظنلا يفىروشلاو لدعلا ساسأ ىلع ةيدوعسلا  
 ةعيرشلا قفو ةاواسملاو)ةيملاسلإا  
5.15 E “I drove my car in Jeddah more than once, each time I was stopped by the police they look at my 
driving licence and instantly let me go. I was also told by many officers that we have commands not 
to stop you.” 
A  قس اذك ةرم يف ةدج  ..اذك ةرم ينفقو رورملا ..ناكاو اوفوشيب يتصخر ينيشميبو ىلع لوط و  عمس ةياكح إهن اانح عاندن 
تاهيجوت مدعب إمكفاقي نم اذك طباض  
5.16 E “You say we are minorities…Ok, we are minorities and wherever in the world, the minorities’ rights 
don’t fall. The world recoils for human rights and minorities’ rights.” 
A أوتنا اولوقتب انحا أتايلق ..انولخ أتايلق  ,لأاتايلق لا طقست مهقوقح يف ملاعلا هلك امنيأ اوناك  ..ملاعلا موقيب بودعقي ىلع قوقح ناسنلاا 
ناشع قوقح تايلقلأا  
5.17 E “Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women don’t drive.” 
A اهيف دوقت لا ةأرملا يتلا ملاعلا يف ةديحولا ةلودلا يه ةيدوعسلا 
5.18 E “We are 1% or 3% of Muslims around the world, we are the only country that do not allow women 
driving…so, are we the only Muslims who know that women driving is forbidden!?. How about the 
rest of 97%, are they non-Muslims or do not understand religion properly.” 
A انحا دحاو أو 3 يملابه نم ددع نيملسم ملاعلا هلك افانح نيديحولا ينعي ةديحولا ةلودلا يف ملاعلا يللا ام حمستب دايقبة ةأرملا ..بناجلا 
ينيدلا يز أوتن اولوقتب أهن بناج ينيد لهف حاان نيملسملا نيديحولا يللا فرعن أهن ةدايقلا ةمرحم ؟  ةيقبو لا 97 ةيملاب لاوذه مهلك 
يللا وسيباوق مهئاسن ..ام مه نيملسم لاو ام مه نيفراع نيدلا طوبزم!  
5.19 E “Sheikh Al-Muhimeed, other Sheikhs like Ahmad bin Baz, bin Jubair, and many others talked about 
the topic, now Alqarni talked as well and they all said the origin of the case is permissibility.” 
A خيشلا ديميحملا ,خويش لثم دمحأ نب زاب  ,خويش لثم نب ريبج ,خويش نيريثك اوملكت يف عوضوملا ,نلآا ملكت لاينرق مهلك اولاق نأب 
لصلأا وه لإاةحاب  
5.20 E “Qais Al-Mubarak, a member of the senior council of Ulama and a professor in Fiqh (jurisprudence) 
at King Faisal University said: the question about women driving should be directed to the traffic 
department of the kingdom…why it is directed to a scholar like me.” 
A و ءاملعلا رابك ةئيه وضع هوه كرابملا سيقلصيف كلملا ةعماجب هقفلا ذاتسأ:لاق... لإ هجوي ةأرملا ةدايق نع لاؤسلاةراد  رورملا
ةكلمملاب؟ نيد لجرك انأ يل هجوي هيل ينعي..  
5.21 E “Harassment exists in all societies…it is shameful that someone accuses our youths. In our initiative, 
we have Saudi boys who are among our biggest proponents and supporters, how do you dare to 
accuse the Saudi man of being a sexual predator that cannot control himself if a woman drive..!!." 
A شرحتلا هوه أ  لاص دوجوم يف عيمج اعمتجملا ،توالله ءيش يزخم إهن ناسنلاا مهتي انبابش ..انحا اناعم سان يف ةردابملا ..نم ربكأ 
نيديؤملا نيمعادلاو انل...بابش يدوعس .........أ ن فيك أ ن مهتت لجرلا يدوعسلا هنأب هوه بئذ يرشب لا مكحتي يف غهزئار إاذ 
 علط ةأرملا  قاس  
5.22 E “We didn’t address foreign bodies, this is clear. None of the initiative members addressed or got help 
from any foreign body. Although some of the human rights organisations tried to help us, we 
refused, we said: we are Saudis and the change is in our hands. I believe that the change happens 
from inside and if you tried to make it happen from outside you will fail.” 
A مل  تاهج بطاخنأيبنجة  نم دحأ لاو , ةحضاو يذه,أ ةهج يأ بطاخ ةردابملا ءاضعأ ةهج يأب ناعتسا وأ ةيبنجأيبنجة  عمإف هن هي
للا تامظنم يز ةيبنجأ تاهج فورعم يه تامظنملا هذه .. هيه يإ اناعم اولواح.. ةيقوقح اهنإ انودعاسي مهنإ ,انضفر انحإق انح انل
إو نييدوعس انحإديب انح .. لا انأ انأ نمؤإو لخادلا نم يتأي رييغتلا هنإ اذأ لواحت يبت  نإخلا نم يتأي رييغتلا.. كنلشفت حار جرا  
5.23 E “I didn’t violate a law, I violated a custom…I didn’t rebel against ‘wali al-amr’ (the ruler)” 
A لأا يلو نع جرخأ ملو , فرع  فلاخ , نوناق فلاخأ مل رم  
5.24 E “When you make doubts about the society acceptance to women driving or what immoral acts may 
result from women driving, it means you are making doubts about the moralities of our society 
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which adhere to religion and Sharia.” 
A أ ن امل ككشت في لبقت عمتجملا و دسافملا ةيقلاخلأا يللا جتنتتح نم ةدايق ءاسنلا  ..اذه هتانعم أ ن ككشتب يف تايقلاخأ انعمتجم يللا 
وه كسمتم نيدلاب ةعيرشلابو  
5.25 E “I trust our society that there will be no harassments or assaults because they are committing to 
Islamic moralities, there will not be any of these because I tried it myself I was not 
harassed..….because our society, our youth, and our men are good, they have the manners of Islam 
that our society is adhering to” 
A أان أقث يف انعمتجم   ادج أهن وه عمتجم  ..يبراب لك دمحلا  ..يلحتم لأابقلاخ لإاةيملاس  ..لاو لصحيح هيف يأ تاشرحت ولا يأ 
تاءادتعا هنلا أان  برج  ..و عم فسلأا  ..خيشلا كيد مايلأا يلاق :كنلأ نم دعاوقلا نم ءاسنلا  ..ايف يبر كل دمحلا  ..أان من دعاوقلا 
نم ءاسنلا نكل  ينمت أهن وه يلوقي إن أان ام  ضرعت شرحتلل ..مو ناشع ادك  ..إون انعمتجم انبابشو و رانلاج مهيف لاريخ مهيفو 
أقلاخ نيدلا لإايملاس يللا إانح انعمتجم كسمتم هيب  
5.26 E “Girls’ education is a big and important example that changed the history in Saudi Arabia.” 
A ميلعت تانبلا اندنع لاثم اي خيش   ..ميلعت لاتانب اندنع لاثم ريبك اي خيش مهمو  ..ريغ خيراتلا يف ةيدوعسلا  
5.27 E “We conducted a research-like; we found that officials don’t oppose women driving. We read all 
officials’ statements in the state and none of them is opposing.” 
A  انيقل ةساردلا يز انيوس نيلوؤسملا لا،اوضراعي  ضراعم مهيف دحم ةلودلا يف نيلوؤسملا تاحيرصت لك انأرق  
5.28 E “We have studied it; we did that from a legality perspective.” 
A  انأرق ينعيإةينوناق ةيحان نم اهانسرد امل, اهانسرد انح  
5.29 E “This was the result of a study and deep reading; we found that there isn’t any reason to ban women 
driving except the society itself. Even the officials used to say the society… the society.” 
A ءارقو ةسارد جاتن ناك اذهة  اندجو هنعمتمإ  لاعف هن لا ام دجوي  عنميلاإ ئاد ناك نيلوؤسملا ىتح.. عمتجملا وهملا نولوقي ام عمتج
عمتجملا 
5.30 E “I was leaving my clinic in AL-Dhahran Street, they closed the clinic and I had no driver to drive me 
home back. It was 9:00 pm, I walked for 45 mins looking for a taxi but I could not find one. 
Someone in a car kept following me and I was terrified. I threw a stone at him because I had no other 
options for defending myself. “ 
A اوس  يقل ام ينعي ءاج امو ةدايعلا اوركس..  لواحو  علطو نارهظلا عراش يف يتدايع يف  نكزنف  يبلا ينعجري ق عراشلا يف  ل
أ لواحأرود  يشم , نيزوميل ىلع45  ةعاسلا  ناك ليللا يف عراشلا يف ةقيقد9 رايسلا و ةرايس ينتقحلف , نيزوميل  يقل ام ءاسملا ة
ينعي يذه  , ةياهنلا يف ينقحلي ناك ينبعرأام ان شلا اذه تركذ ءيتيمر و ضرلأا نم رجح تذخأ ,وهيف ناك ام هنلأ هيب ه  يأ يدنع
 عافد ةليسو 
5.31 E “Once you give this right to a woman, you are opening her a wide welcoming space, how many girls 
didn’t continue their higher education because there was no mean of transportation or jobs which 
they quit because they pay half or 3/4 of the salary to their drivers….this is real and I have names 
and numbers" 
A  درجم ينعيإام تانب نم مك ينعي بحرو عساو ءاضف اهل حتفتب قحلا اذه ةأرملا يطعت كن بسب يلاعلا ميلعتلا اولمك دوجو مدع ب
 ..يدصق مهميلعت.. تلاصاوم ةليسوأ ببسب اهنع اولخت فئاظو وإ بتارلا صن عفدتب اهنأ ثلاثوأو اذهو بتارلا عابر يدنعو عقاأ ان
أ ماقرءامسأو  
5.32 E “Economically, we have over 800 thousand hired drivers who transfer about 2 billion Riyal monthly 
outside the kingdom so, I would imagine the country economic returns will be huge.” 
A إاذ ايداصتقا إانح اندنع  ..قوف ـلا 800 فلأ قئاس  ..اولوحيب ابيرقت 2 رايلم ريال ايرهش جراخ ةكلمملا  ..نظأف دئاعلا نوكيح 
يداصتقا ىلع دلبلا ريبك   ادج  
5.33 E Host: You say we. We, who are you? 
Manal: “Members of the initiative, myself and a female student from the Faculty of Islamic Sharia at 
King Faisal University started it.” 
A م  دقملا :  نأ  يلوقتإ انحإ نم انحأمتن ؟ 
لانم: أ , انأدب يللا ةردابملا ءاضعأ  نك ان اهتأدبأ ةعيرش ةعماج يف ةبلاطو انإلصيف ةعماج يف ةيملاس  
5.34 E “We launched the initiative to shed the lights on women driving issue” 
A ردابملا قلطنة  ثيحبا ونإلا طلسن انحملا ةدايق ةيضق ىلع ءوضرأة  
5.35 E “We were teaching women who don’t know how to drive.” 
A ام يللا ءاسنلا ملعن انك  اوقوسي اوفرعي  
5.36 E “We didn’t address foreign bodies” 
A مل  تاهج بطاخنأيبنجة  
5.37 E “We are delivering our opinion to the society, we don’t hide” 
A  ىبختنب لاو سدننب ام انحن و  عمتجملل انيأر لوقنب انحن 
5.38 E “We are waiting for a Royal Decree…just like what happneed with the girls’ education….we hope it 
is a firm way to block the way against any opposition or anything else…we are in need.” 
A فإح..هظفحي الله كلملا رارق رظتننب ان م يز رظتنن .. تانبلا ميلعت يف لصح اإطقي ينعي , مزاح رارق نوكي هوه هن يأ ىلع قيرطلا ع
ضراعم .. ينعي يعاد هلام ملاك يأ وأ ةإ تاجاتحم انح  
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5.39 E “Our society, our youth and our men are good; they have the manners of Islam that our society is 
adhering to” 
A إون  و انبابشو انعمتجمر مهيفو ريخلا مهيف انلاجألإا نيدلا قلاخ يللا يملاسإ هيب كسمتم انعمتجم انح 
5.40 E “We are a civil society or we are a civil state” 
A إ وأ يندم عمتجم انحإ ةيندم ةلود انح 
5.41 E “If custom has no religious basis and is delaying us from developing, why do we not change this 
custom?” 
A لا فرعلا اذا  روطتلا نع انرخأيب فرعلا اذهو .. ينيد ساسأ هل سيل ....؟ فرعلا اذه ريغن ام شيل روطتلا بكر قحل نع  
5.42 E “The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth.” 
A  ىنتسن انوغبي .. ينعي نيضراعملاإ ضرلأا معي ملاسلا نيل  
5.43 E “I have read many of the opponents’ reactions.” 
A أنيضراعملا نم ريثك لاعفأ دودر تأرق ينعي ان  
5.44 E “If there is any incitation or anything else against us, it will be from the opponents.” 
A  ضيرحت يأ ينعي هيف ولأجاح وة نيضراعملا نم لصحت اهدب انحن اندض ينعي 
5.45 E “We found out that most religious men say there is no Tahreem (religious ban)….those are within 
them.” 
A  اندجوأا مظعم ن نولوقي نينيدتملا لاجرلأ هن لاميرحت دجوي.. مهنم ينعي 
5.46 E “They were the judge and jury…they launched the charges. Charges of a revolution against the King 
and breaking laws and they used them to attack me…I was not charged and these accusations are 
refuted.” 
A  مصخلا اوناك همه امه.. مكحلاوألاا اوقلط .. تاماهتأ يأ يل هجوت مل انا.. تاماهتافلاخمو رملأا يلو ىلع جورخ تاماهت نيناوقلا ة
دودرم تاماهتلاا يذهوة موجهلل ةدعاقك اهومدختساو مهيلع 
5.47 E “The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth, in order to begin demanding simple 
things, like the freedom of mobility.” 
A  .. ينعي نيضراعملا ىنتسن انوغبيإةطيسب ءايشأب بلاطن أدبن ناشع.. ضرلأا معي ملاسلا نيل ح يه يللا .. ادك يز..طقف لقنتلا ةير  
5.48 E “We clearly declare, driving is a choice not a coercion” 
A بو لوقنب انحنإو نلاع ةملك لكب   سيلو رايخ ةدايقلا .. اهلوقنبإرابج 
5.49 E “We did this campaign especially to reflect the society’s voice, change and the growth in numbers 
demanding this right.” 
A  يد نيلماعصاخ ةلمحلا جملا يف لصح يللا رييغتلاو عمتجملا توص .. توصلا يرون ناشع عمتيتلا دادعلأاو  اهنأب تديازت
قحلا اذهب بلاطت تراص 
5.50 E “Basically, driving isn’t a religious matter to ask someone for fatwa.” 
A أ لاصينيد نأش يهام ةدايقلا دحأ يتفتسن ناشع  
5.51 E “I didn’t violate a law, I violated a custom…I didn’t rebel against the ruler” 
A  رملأا يلو نع جرخأ ملو , فرع  فلاخ , نوناق فلاخأ مل 
5.52 E “Believe me, the initiative thing was spontaneous, it was not organised” 
A ةردابملا عوضوم  ينقدص .. ناك ينعي..يوفع ناك ..ش ناك ام ءيمظنم  
5.53 E “It is neither a gathering nor a demonstration…it is only a campaign to support the claim.” 
A  ةجاح يأ لاو ةرهاظم لاو عمجت لا... ةبلاطملا دييأتل ةلمح يه.طقف 
5.54 E “We are delivering our opinion to the society, we don’t hide…by the way, people who register their 
opinions writes their full names and they are known…we don’t do something wrong to hide” 
A عمتجملل انيأر لوقنب انحن لاو سدننب ام انحنو ىبختنب كلاب اهمسا بتكتب ةركف ىلع اهيأر لجستب يللا سانلا .. امه نم نيفورعم و لما
ىبختن ناشع طلغ ئش يوسنب ام انحن .. 
5.55 E “Our group, which started the initiative, is still active and didn’t stop even when I was detained.” 
A إوجوم انتعومجم انح هسلو ةردابملا انأدب يه يللا ةدإانفقو ام يفيقوتي.. يلوخدب ىتح انفقو امو نيدوجوم انح  
5.56 E “We didn’t stop claiming since that time” 
A  يذه نينسلا لكإنح ةبلاطملا نع انفقوت ام ا  
5.57 E “God willing, we won’t stop…we won’t stop until the issue of the first driving license for a Saudi 
woman.” 
A ام رام.. فقون حا  فقون حارإاش ن ءب للهإ ىتح دحلأا دحاولا نذإ رادصألإ هصخر لوةيدوعس ةأرم  
5.58 E “We have a need and you are unable to provide us with, we have no other solutions” 
A و هجاح اندنع انحنإوتنا وتنم ام انحن.. هيه انل اورفوت نيرداق ا لولح نيقلاىرخأ  
5.59 E “We are in need and, for this reason, we organised this initiative” 
A إانلمع اذك ناشعو تاجاتحم انح ةلمحلا يذه  
5.60 E “We were heavily attacked for seeking help from outsiders, of course this is not true” 
A  يعيبط ريغ لكشب انيلع موجهلا متإ هنإتسن انحشلا اذه اعبطو ةيجراخ فارطأب نيعءي حيحص ريغ  
5.61 E “They were the judge and jury…they launched the charges. Charges of a revolution against the King 
and breaking laws, which they used to attack me…I was not charged and these accusations are 
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 ”detufer
ن ة القوانيومخالفنا لم توجه لي أي اتهامات ..اتهامات خروج على ولي الأمر أطلقوا الاتهامات .. أهمه كانوا الخصم والحكم ..هما  A
  عليهم واستخدموها كقاعدة للهجوم ةوهذي الاتهامات مردود
 deifitsujnu rieht nageb yeht ,hcihw no desab ;firahS-lA lanaM dna evitaitini eht fo snoitpecrep emos dah yehT“ E 26.5
 ”kcatta tneloiv dna
  وعلى أساسها هاجموا هجوم كان غير مبرر وغير طبيعي الشريف وعن منالكان عندهم أفكار عن المبادرة  A
 ”stnenoppo eht morf eb lliw ti ,su tsniaga esle gnihtyna ro noitaticni yna si ereht fI“ E 36.5
 يعني ضدنا نحنا بدها تحصل من المعارضينه حاج وألو فيه يعني أي تحريض  A
 yeht litnu tiaw ot em ksa t’nod ,evird ot ton em llet t’nod ,eussi ytilibom ym tuo tros t’nac uoy fI“ E 46.5
 ”eromyna su dragersid t’nod…noitulos a ton si siht wonk uoy…sniart hcnual
 ما ماأولي لا .. يا تق يوهإقشني بأنه لا تسوقي .. يا تقولي تنقل بكره بالسيارة .. لا تناأقدر أنا كيف أن إن  ما تقدر تحللي قضيتي أذا إ A
فوا فينا أكثر يعني ..  لا تستخ هما عليحل ..  وما هنستنى ... يعني تعرف .. هذا ما هو حل .. هذا  تجي تقولي نستنى يبنوا قطارات و
 من كذا
 ,sgniht elpmis gnidnamed nigeb ew erofeb ,htrae sliaverp ecaep litnu tiaw ot su tnaw stnenoppo ehT“ E 56.5
 ”ytilibom fo modeerf eht ekil
 لين السلام يعم الأرض ..عشان نبدأ نطالب بأشياء بسيطة ..زي كدا .. اللي هي حرية التنقل فقطإالمعارضين يعني .. يبغونا نستنى  A
 ”airahS dna noigiler ot serehda hcihw ,yteicos ruo fo seitilarom eht tuoba stbuod gnitaerc era uoY“ E 66.5
 ن  بتشكك في أخلاقيات مجتمعنا اللي هو متمسك بالدين وبالشريعةأ A
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Appendix II: The Opponents’ excerpts in Arabic. 
 
NO.  EXCERPT 
5.67 E “The truth is when we discuss women issues we stand with women; we all stand in one line side by 
side to defend virtues” 
A ةقيقحلا امنيح شقانن اياضق ةأرملا ..نحن فقن عم ةأرملا و انلك يف فص دحاو   ابنج ىلا بنج نم لجأ عافدلا نع ضفلالئا  
5.68 E “We need to prepare the society; the society must be ready in terms of women safety when they 
drive” 
A جاتحن إىل أن عمتجملازهجن ..ينعي عمتجملا مزلا نوكي زهاج نم ةيحان لأانام ةبسنلاب ةأرملل ينعي إاذ تداق ةرايسلا  
5.69 E “From our perspective, women driving will lead to some consequences…first, it is an outraging for 
the majority of Saudi girls and women’s feelings who oppose driving” 
A ةرايسلل ةأرملا ةدايق ىلع بترتي  .. نحن انرظن ةهجو نم رومأ ةدعأ  لاو  نألا تانبو ءاسن نم ةيرثكلأا رعاشمل كاهتنا هيف ةكلمم
 ةدايقلا نضفري يئلالا 
5.70 E “…the clerics are custodians on the society members whether men or women by clarifying the right 
and warning about the wrong, the distinction between the similar issues to prevent confusion among 
people” 
A أوله ملعلا ةعيرشلاو أءايصو ىلع عمتجملا هلاجرب هئاسنو يف نايب قحلا و يف ريذحتلا نم لطابلا و يف لصف لأاومر لأاوقارو 
ةطلتخملا ىتح لا هبتشت ىلع سانلا  
5.71 E “I’m a man who adopts a democratic Sharia approach which I don’t want people to be forced to 
anything except with their wishes. When I notice that the society is annoyed of any decision, I say 
they should have the right to vote and if they are happy to support it, I have no objection.” 
A أان لجر اي إميهارب أجهتن جهنملا يعرشلا يطارقميدلا يذلا لا أدير أن ضرفي ئش ىلع سانلا إلا رإبمهتدا .. اذهو يرجي في أان يأ 
رارق ىرأ أهن جعزني هنم عمتجملا  ..ألوق  ُيىتفتس عمتجملا إفاذ قفاو عمتجملا  ..سيل يدل عنام  
5.72 E “This topic is agreed upon among society and it was affirmed by the ministry of interior resolution to 
ban women driving over 22 years ago so, nothing has changed” 
A اذه رملأا ررقم يف اذه عمتجملا و هداز   اريرقت و   اسيركت   اخيسرتو نيحام ردصأ  ..أتردص ةهجلا ةينعملا ةرازو ةيلخادلا نمذ رثكأ 
نم 22 ةنس  َارارق عنمي ةدايق ةأرملا و نم مث ملف ريغتي ءيش  
5.73 E “One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that the minority don’t 
impose their opinion on the majority. This exists in Sharia, law and everywhere around the world” 
 
A  اهيأر ضرفت لا ةيلقلأا نأ ملاعلا يف ةيطارقميدلا اياضقلا يفو قلاخلأا اياضقلا يف روملأا طسبأ نم, ةيرثكلأا ىلع يف دوجوم اذه
ملاعلا ءاحنأ عيمج يف دوجومو نوناقلا يف دوجومو ةعيرشلا 
5.74 E “These ways of claim are not democratic or Sharia-legitimate; the right Sharia-legitimate way to 
settle the issue and the democratic way everywhere in the world is to hold a referendum” 
A هذه بيلاسلأا يف ةبلاطملا .. سيل بيلاسأ ةيطارقميد و لا بيلاسأ ةيعرش  ..بولسلأا يعرشلا حيحصلا إاذ اندرأ أن نمسح هذه 
ةيضقلا و ىتح بولسلأا يطارقميدلا يف عيمج ءاحنأ ملاعلا أكن  ُتيرج ءاتفتسا ىلع اذه عوضوملا  
5.75 E “There is a regulation issued and was confirmed by Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz –the Deputy 
Minister of the Interior” 
A هيف ماظن رداص و دكأ هيلع ريملأا دمحأ نب زيزعلادبع بئان ريزو ..بئان ريزو ةيلخادلا  
5.76 E “…days ago, Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz declared that there is a regulation that bans women 
driving and the ministry of interior is committed to it” 
A ريملاا أمحد نب دبع زيزعلا أاهنلع ذنم أماي أن كانه ماظن عنمي ةدايق ةأرملا ةرايسلل  وةرازو ةيلخادلا ةمزتلم اذهب ماظنلا  
5.77 E “Dr. Nizar said the society need more of maturity, awareness and safety” 
A روتكد رازن هازج الله ريخ  ..لاق عمتجملا جاتحي إىل ديزم نم جضنلا و يعولا ةملاسلاو  
5.78 E “I’m a professor in Sharia and law, I know how do they deal with it everywhere in the world, such 
controversial decisions are taken by holding a referendum not by force” 
A انأ ذاتسا ةعيرش و ذاتسأ نوناق فراعو ةيلمعلا يذه اهلك يف جعيم أءاحن ملاعلا ..يف ايندلا اهلك  ..تارارقلا ةريثملا تيم ءاتفتسلاا 
اهيلع لاو ضرفت نم قوف  
5.79 E “There are matters that can be reviewed and discussed, not by protests but through advice. The chief 
of the martyrs Hamza is a man who stood up for an unjust ruler and advised him” 
A كانه أروم نكمي أن شقانت عجارتو ..ام شقانت تارهاظملاب ..كانه ةحيصنلا ديس ءادهشلا ةزمح وهو لجر ماق ىلا إمام أفرئاجهرم  
5.80 E “First, we mustn’t analogically compare countries that adultery and mixed-sex solitude are normal 
and not prohibited by law with countries that ruled by the holy book of Allah and the Sunnah of the 
prophet” 
A أ  لاو بجي أن لا سيقن عقاو دلاب ةولخلا ةشحافلاو ةبسنلاب اهل أرم يعيبط  ..لا بقاعي هيلع ماظنلا ..عم دلاب الله سروهلو مكحي ..ينعي 
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باتك الله ةنسو هيبن كحتم هذه دلابلا  
5.81 E “Many Islamic countries sell alcohol and have night clubs, does this mean they are right? No, they 
are not….therefore, neither sister Najla nor any other should analogically compare us with others 
because their situations are different.” 
A رثك لودلا ةيملاسلاا ..عابت اهيف رومخلا و عابت اهيف لاـ  ..اهيفو صقارم اهيفو نكامأ  ..لهف ىنعم اذه مهنأ ؟نوبيصم .......يلاتلابف 
اذه ملاكلا لا يغبني  خلأل ءلاجن لاو اهريغ أاهن سيقت ىلع لآانيرخ لأن مهفورظ فلتخت  
5.82 E “The claim about number of drivers….how much..!? 800 million Riyal or 1 billion Riyal….how 
much do housemaids cost? while some ladies do not even work. The issue is not an issue of drivers; 
it is a big social one for Saudis.” 
A و لوقلا نأب ددع لاـ  ..ـلا  ددع نيقئاسلا ..مك  ...800 نويلم ريال أو رايلم ريال   ...مكف نفلكي تامداخلا ءاسنلاو نهضعب تاسلاج يف 
 يبلا ..ةيضقلاف  سيل ةيضق نيقئاس  ..ةيضقلا ةيعامتجا ةريبك دنع نييدوعسلا  
5.83 E “In the US, a village near to New York ban women driving and call to have its own privacy….the 
American law approved this. There are colleges that apply gender segregation in Britain and 
America.” 
A تايلاولا ةدحتملا راوجب كرويوين ةيرق عنمت ةدايق ةأرملا بلاطتو اهتيصوصخب  رقأواهل ماظنلا لأايكيرم ..دجوي يف ايناطيرب 
أواكيرم تايلك عنمت طلاتخا لأادلاو تانبلاب  
5.84 E “Allah said: [They ask you -O Muhammad- concerning alcoholic drink and gambling, say in them is 
a great sin] no good in it…and said: [and some benefits for people, but the sin of them is greater than 
their benefit], so there is a harm and benefit but the harm if greater than the benefit.” 
A الله زع و لج لاق (كنولأسي نع رمخلا  ،رسيملاولق امهيف إمث ريبك) لا ريخ هيف  ..لاق  و(عفانم سانلل) ,انهف ةدسفم و انه ةحلصم 
نكل  بلغ ةدسفملا إو(امهمث أربك نم امهعفن)  
5.85 E “When the British wanted to withdraw from the euro zone, they hold a referendum.” 
A   اي يخأ امل ايناطيرب تدارأ اهنأ بحسنت نم ةلمعلا ةيبورولأا اورجأ ءاتفتسا ىلع كلذ  
5.86 E “The important thing about those who raise the women driving issue and compare us to other 
societies…some of those people and I’m not saying all of them, only some of them has a liberal 
pollution, which means having a western mentality or something” 
A رملأا مهملا نيذلا نوشقاني ةيضق ةدايق ةأرملا و اننونراقي تاعمتجمب  ..ضعب تاعمتجملا يتلا رظني إاهيل نم ملكتي وةصاخ نمم ينعي 
ضعب ..ضعب لاو ألوق لك ..ضعب نم ثدحتي يف اذه لاعوضوم ..دجت هدنع هثول ةيلاربيل لاو هدنع ثولت ينعي يف ..يف ركف يبيرغت 
أو هريغ  
5.87 E “I talk about the fabrication of this crisis at this time, the sisters who participated in the driving 
campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: ‘we wanted to get the advantage of the situation’, therefore there 
are subtle parties that want to make an advantage of the current situation to twist the inner 
organisation’s arm.” 
A أان أثدحت لآان نع إلاعتف هذه ةمزلاا يف هذه ،ةلحرملا تاوخلاا يتلا نكراش يف ةدايقلا اقباس يف 1411 اولاق يل نهتنسلأب انك ديرن 
أن ديفتسن نم فقوملا إنذ لآان هيف ينعي اياضق ةيفخ ديرت أن ديفتست نم اذه فقوملا يولل عارذ ميظنتلا يلخادلا  
5.88 E “..there is another group, they don’t care about women or women driving..but they want to adopt a 
stance to break the rules…the call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law…to 
break the prestige of the law.” 
A هيف ةفئاط أىرخ ,سيل اهمه أن دوقت ةأرملا و ةيضقلا ..ةأرملا لا اهينعت يف ئش نكل ديرت أن ىنبتت فقوم رسكي نلأاةمظ ..ينعي ةيضق 
ةوعدلا إىل ةرهاظم يف 15 بجر ةوعدلا إىل أن دجوت.. دجوي لمع رسكي ماظنلا ..شو ىنعم رسك ماظنلا ينعي رسك ةبيه ماظنلا  
5.89 E “It is proven that this religious society with its vast majority, the Saudi society religious pressure 
became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the country” 
A نكل  بث أن اذه عمتجملا نيدتملا هتيبلاغب ةقحاسلا هداوسو لأامظع ..عمتجملا يدوعسلا أحبص هطغض ينيدلا  ربكأعملقر تاعورشملل 
ةيلاربيللا يف دلبلا  
5.90 E “As we ask Allah to insert goodness in our rulers and in our security apparatus, we don’t only count 
on this but we strongly count with the same level or more of our zeal, our unity, the stability of our 
position and our strength gathering against any liberal thought or project from its beginning until we 
eliminate it” 
A نمو مث اننإف لوقن امك أانن وجرن الله أن لعجي ةكربلا يف ةلاو رملأا و يف أةزهج نملأا إلا أانن لا لوعن طقف ىلع كلذ لب لوعن   لايوعت 
  اريبك سفنب ةجردلا أو أىلع اهنم ىلع انتريغ ىلعو ةدحو انفص ىلعو تابث انفقوم ىلعو ةوق انعمجت يف ةهجاوم لك ركف و عورشم 
يلاربيل نم هتيادب ىتح هضهجن  
5.91 E “Women driving isn’t a forbidden act in its self…there is no verse in Quran or Hadeeth that forbids 
women to drive. When we research women driving, we talk about the ban because of what women 
driving would lead to, result in and in which country.” 
A ةدايق ةأرملا ةرايسلل  سيل   ارمأ   اعونمم يف هتاذ ..ينعي ام هيف آةي يف آرقلان لاو ثيدح يف آرقلان عنمي ةأرملا أاهن ضتع اهدي ىلع 
دوقم ةرايس أو بكرت ىلع ةبكرم ..ىلع يسرك قئاسلا، ةدايقلا امنيح اهثحبن ..ملكتن يف عنملا نم ةهج لاآئملات تنلاوجئا و يأ دلب  
5.92 E “The vast majority of Saudi, of the Saudi society men and women, don’t want women driving. In Al-
Bayan Attaly survey; 97% of voters oppose women driving and 3% said they do not oppose.” 
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A داوسلا لأامظع ةيبلاغلاو ةيدوعسلا نم عمتجملا يدوعسلا لأاجر ءاسنو لا نوديري قةداي ةأرملا .. يوصتلا يف نايبلا لايلات 97 ةئملاف 
نوضفري ةدايق ةأرملا نم نيتوصملا و 3 يف ئملاة نولوقي لا عنام أو سيل كانه ام عنمي  
5.93 E “Social issues reflect politics. Why? Because the vast majority of Saudi people especially those who 
belongs to tribes (whom the majority), refuse women driving. Maybe not for a religious reason, but 
for social and economic reasons.” 
A لإا اياضقلا  ايسايس سكعنت ةيعامتج لأا نلأ ؟ اذامل .. ةيبلغنم ةقحاسلا  يدوعسلا بعشلاأ ةصاخوءانب ئابقلا تانبو ل ةيرثكلأا مهو
نوضفري.. ةقحاسلا ةيداصتقا يحاون نمو ةيعامتجا يحاون نم نكلو ةينيد ةيحان نم نايحلأا ضعب هنوضفري لا دق.. اذه 
5.94 E “Women driving will lead to traffic problems, will lead to a disruption in a family budget but it is a 
need….a real need.” 
A  يدؤتس ةدايقلاإةيرورم تلاكشم ىل معن  يدؤتسإا ةينازيم يف للخ ىللأجايتحا ةقيقح.. جايتحا اهنكلو ةرس  
5.95 E “Honestly, my sisters who wish to drive, we should help in making our society in a state of security 
and safety, not a further tension.” 
A ةقيقح اي أيتاوخ تابغارلا يف ةدايقلا دبلا أن نيعن ىلع أن نوكي انعمتجم يف أنم أونام سيلو   اديزم نم لإاناقتح لإاولاعفن  
5.96 E “If a woman could realise what she will suffer from because of women driving -besides other issues 
that we will discuss later- She will definitely say: this is a poisonous and harmful call for both 
women and society.” 
A ول رعشت ةأرملا ةقيقح ام فوس هيناعت هيقلاتو نم اذه رملأا   لاضف نع أروم فوس يتأن إاهيل  لاقل والله هذه ةوعد ةماس ضةرا 
عمتجملاب  وةأرملاب  
5.97 E “I told you that women driving will result in economic, social and political problems.” 
A أان  لق مكل أهن بترتت اهيلع أرارض ةيداصتقا ةيعامتجاو ةيسايسو   
5.98 E “The vast majority of Saudi, the Saudi society men and women don’t want women driving.” 
A داوسلا لأامظع ةيبلاغلاو ةيدوعسلا نم عمتجملا يدوعسلا   لااجر ءاسنو لا نوديري ةدايق ةأرملا .. يوصتلا يف نايبلا لايلات 97 ةئملاف 
نوضفري ةدايق ةأرملا نم نيتوصملا و 3 يف ئملاة نولوقي لا عنام أو سيل كانه ام عنمي  
5.99 E “The vast majority of Saudi people, especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority), 
reject women driving” 
A لأا ةيبلغنم ةقحاسلا  يدوعسلا بعشلاأ ةصاخوءانب .. اذه نوضفري.. ةقحاسلا ةيرثكلأا مهو لئابقلا تانبو   
5.100 E “The evidence on how it may reflect politically is the people split into two parts, the majority are 
opposing of course.” 
A  ليلدلاوكلذ ىلع  فيكأن هل أ نلآا .. ةيسايس رارضأ سانلا اومسقنا .. حبصإ نلاا نيمسق ىل ةعيبطب ةيرثكلأا ..احلاةضراعم ل  
5.101 E “It is proven that this religious society with its vast majority, the Saudi society religious pressure 
became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the country” 
A   بثأ ننيدتملا عمتجملا اذه لأا.. هداوسو ةقحاسلا هتيبلاغب يدوعسلا عمتجملا.. مظعأ ينيدلا هطغض حبصأ تاعورشملل لقرعم ربك
دلبلا يف  ةيلاربيللا 
5.102 E “It was proven that clerics, people of the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice, preachers, 
people of the sincere word and real reformers became a real nightmare for the liberal thought when 
they met and worked together in various fields, issues and matters.” 
A   بثأ , ءاملعلا نألآا نيرم فورعملاب ن ونملا نع نيهانلا , ركأا ن , ةاعدلأ نأ ةقداصلا ةملكلا باحصألإا لاجر ن .. يقيقحلا حلاص
وبه امل و مهعامتجاا دحاو ةبهة م يف يف ةددعتم اياضق يف ..ىتش تلااجأ , ةعونتم رومأ ىلع مثج .. ىلع سوباك لعفلاب اوحبص
يلاربيللا ركفلا رودص 
5.103 E “The clerics are custodians on the society members whether men or women, by clarifying the right 
and warning about the wrong.” 
A وأ ةعيرشلاو ملعلا لهأتجملا ىلع ءايصوو قحلا نايب يف هئاسنو هلاجرب عم لطابلا نم ريذحتلا يف 
5.104 E “One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that the minority don’t 
impose their opinion on the majority.” 
A  اهيأر ضرفت لا ةيلقلأا نأ ملاعلا يف ةيطارقميدلا اياضقلا يفو قلاخلأا اياضقلا يف روملأا طسبأ نم ةيرثكلأا ىلع  
5.105 E “We say: if it is a must, at the end you are still minorities.” 
A وقن نحن لإ .. دب لاو ناك اذأوتنا يف تايلقأ اوقبت  ةياهنلا 
5.106 E “Host: Now, you mentioned that some preachers might be accused of looking down to women…do 
not do this do not do that…do not leave the house…you job is to cook, raise children and take care 
of your husband…you have no other roles in life except these... 
Saad: These are the enemies’ accusations…these are the other team accusations. None of the 
authorised scholars said: a women job is cooking or vacuuming the house.” 
A لاعيذم  :الآ نأذ  ن ينعي تركأا ن ..ينعي نورظني مهريغو ةاعدلأ ُي دق وومهتا أ اهنأب ةأرملل اورظني مهنأ يلعفت لا.. ىوتسملا نم لق
لا اذك يلعفت لا اذك فتـ .  يبلا نم يجرخت لاو طقف  يبلا .أدب  ا أ  ن و لافطلأا ةيبرتل  يبلل و خبطلل..  جوزلا نوؤش ىلع مايقلل ينعي
لأاودلاو يكل سيل و.. طقف  ةايحلا يف رودإ.. اذه لا 
لأا مهت هذه : دعسلآا قيرفلا مهت هذه.. ءادع.. رخ نم دحأ امأ ُي نيذلا ملعلا لهو لاق.. مهب دتعاللهلزنملا سنكل ةأرملا لاو خبطلل ةأرملا  
5.107 E “There is a try for exploitation under these circumstances. This could assure the harmony between 
the streams working for the Safavid camp and those working for the westernisation or liberal 
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project.” 
A ف دكؤي اذه.. للاغتسا ةلواحم كانهأو مغانت كانه ن اسعملا عم مجسنت يتلا تارايتلا نيب ام ماجسنملا دئاز يوفصلا رك يبيرغتلا ططخ
أيلاربيللا و  
5.108 E “As Dr. Abdullah Al-Nofaisi said when I asked him prior to Al-Bayan Attaly show whether he 
thought the liberal blocs contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid 
project? He replied: ‘Yes, they did’.” 
A دبع روتكدلا لاق امكهتلأسو يسيفنلا الله...لا روتكدلا ةقلح لبق: هل  لق يلاتلا نايبلا يف يسيفن... ىرت لهأن   مهسأ ةيلاربيللا لتكلا
خ يف يردت ثيح نم يوفصلا عورشملا ةمدأيردت لا و ؟لاقمعن :  
5.109 E “You are making a protest, do you want me to say nothing..?!!” 
A ظم ةلماع  نأةرها  وةجاح لوقأ ينيغبت ام !؟  
5.110 E “The call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law.” 
A ةرهاظم ىلإ ةوعدلا  يف15 وعدلا بجرأ ىلإ ة دجوت نماظنلا رسكي لمع  
5.111 E “It is a matter of aggravating society by putting it in a state of congestion and challenge to the state’s 
rules.” 
A أت ةيضق يهلإا نم ةلاح يف هعضوو عمتجملا ميز ةلودلا ةمظنلأ يدحتلاو ناقتح 
5.112 E “Host: What has the crisis in the neighbouring countries to do with a purely social matter in Saudi 
Arabia? 
Al-Nojaimi: “No, it is not a social matter.” 
A عيذملاو : متجا رمأب ةيدوعسلاب ةطيحملا تامزلأا ةقلاع اما ؟ ةيدوعسلل ةبسنلاب  حب يع 
 لا : يميجنلا رمأ سيل وهايعامتج .  
5.113 E “Women driving isn’t a forbidden act in its self…there is no verse in Quran or Hadeeth that forbids 
women to drive.” 
A   ارمأ  سيل ةرايسلل ةأرملا ةدايق   اعونمم  ينعي.. هتاذ يفام رقلا يف ةيآ هيفآرقلا يف ثيدح لاو نآ ةأرملا عنمي نأضت اهن ىلع اهدي ع
ةرايس دوقم 
5.114 E “Women driving will lead to traffic problems, disruption to the family budget; but it is a  need….a 
real need.” 
A  يدؤتس ةدايقلاإ يدؤتس معن ةيرورم تلاكشم ىلإلأا ةينازيم يف للخ ىل اهنكلو ةرسإ ةقيقح.. جايتحإجايتح 
5.115 E “Huda Al-Qahtani wrote a fantastic unbiased article for both sides. She spoke about why we now 
globalise the issue…. we do not downplay it, but it is not a priority; especially now in our society.” 
A ناجلل ةفصنم ةلاقم.. ةعورلا ةمق يف ةلاقم  بتك يناطحقلا ىدهلآا انل فيك نع  ثدحت نيب لودن ناةيضقل، م نوهن لا اهنكلو اهن
لأا نم  سيلصوصخ تايولو  ا لآاانعمتجم يف ن  
5.116 E “As we said previously: we don’t accuse whoever call to women driving of being liberal, 
westernised, refusenik or bad….etc. No, there are some who don’t mind lifting the ban, but he and 
his family are pure.” 
A  ىعد نم لك مهتن لا انلق امك وإأب ةدايقلا ىلغتو يلاربيل هنس و يضفار و يبيرءي نم عنامي لا نم كانه لا.. هنأ و هنأو قلا و ةداي
و هحلاص عم نكل كلذ ىنمتي  فافعأهله  
5.117 E “We don’t deny that some women need to drive because they have nobody to do this for them….no 
comfortable transportation or men to drive them around.” 
A  ركنن لا نحنأنع ن نجتحي لعفلاب ءاسنلا نم ددع اندإةمدخلا هذه ىل لا اهب موقي نم دوجو مدعل اجر لاو ةحيرم لقن لئاسو نوموقي ل
اهب 
5.118 E “We want to vote on many outstanding social issues, like the financial and administrative corruption 
to solve our issues democratically and by opinion and the other opinion manner.” 
A إ ديرن انحأ ةقلعملا ةيعامتجلاا اياضقلا نم ريثك ىلع يتفتسن ن داسفلا اهنمو .. يلاملا داسفلا اهنمولإان ناشع يراد اناياضق لح
رخلآا يأرلاو يأرلا بيلاسأبو .. ةيطارقميد بيلاسأب 
5.119 E “It is incredible that the minority imposes its opinion over the majority.” 
A ةيعامتجلاا ةيحانلا نم اذه.. ةيرثكلأا ىلع اهيأر ضرفت ةيلقلأا نأ لقعي لاف 
5.120 E “The sisters are from a specific class.. they watch from a high ivory tower….whereas the majority of 
Saudi women want their financial and social problems to be solved.” 
A  لحت نأ ندري ةكلمملا ءاسن نم ةيرثكلأاو يلاع ناكم نمو ... رصق نمو يجاع رصق نم نرظني.. ةنيعم ةقبط نم تاوخلأاف
ةيعامتجلااو ةيداصتقلاا نهلكاشم 
5.121 E “I’m annoyed that they don’t accept the other opinion.” 
A نأ نهنوك نم رجضتم ارخلآا يأرلا نلبقي لا  
5.122 E “We draw a circle on those who don’t care about women status, the most important thing for them is 
to access women.” 
A و ةيضق مهينعي لا نيذلا ىلع ةرئاد عضن واللهملا عضو .. هاد يف ةأر مهملا مهل ةبسنلاب ةيأ عيطتسن اننأ لخدن نإ ولخنو ةأرملا ىل
و ةأرملاب  اهب لصن 
5.123 E “I talk about the fabrication of this crisis at this time, the sisters who participated in the driving 
campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: ‘we wanted to get the advantage of the situation’. Therefore, 
 381
 
 
 
 renni eht tsiwt ot noitautis tnerruc eht fo egatnavda na ekam ot tnaw taht seitrap eltbus era ereht
 ”.mra noitasinagro
بألسنتهن كنا نريد  قالوا لي 1114في  خوات التي شاركن في القيادة سابقا  زمة في هذه المرحلة, الأن عن افتعال هذه الأتحدث الآأنا أ A
  ن تستفيد من هذا الموقف للوي ذراع التنظيم الداخليأن فيه يعني قضايا خفية تريد ذن الآإن نستفيد من الموقف أ
 eh rehtehw wohs ylattA nayaB-lA ot roirp mih deksa I nehw dias isiafoN-lA halludbA .rD sA“ E 421.5
 divafaS eht gnivres ot yllanoitnetninu ro yllanoitnetni rehtie detubirtnoc scolb larebil eht thguoht
 ot yllanoitnetninu ro yllanoitnetni rehtie detubirtnoc scolb larebil eht ,seY‘ :deilper eH .tcejorp
 ”.’tcejorp divafaS eht gnivres
لكتل الليبرالية أسهم  في ن اأهل ترى ..النفيسي في البيان التالي قل  له:دكتور قبل حلقة ال ...كما قال الدكتور عبدالله النفيسي وسألته A
و أحيث تدري  دم  المشروع الصفوي من: نعم بالتأكيد الكتل الليبرالية خقال؟ و لا تدري أدمة المشروع الصفوي من حيث تدري خ
 لا تدري
 a tpoda ot tnaw yeht tuB .gnivird nemow ro nemow tuoba erac t’nod yehT .puorg rehtona si ereht..“ E 521.5
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نظمة ..يعني ر الأكسن تتبنى موقف يأد لكن تري يءالقضية ..المرأة لا تعنيها في ش ن تقود المرأة وأخرى, ليس همها أفيه طائفة  A
  .يوجد عمل يكسر النظام..ن توجدألى إرجب الدعوة  51في  ةلى مظاهرإقضية الدعوة 
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Appendix III: The Opponents’ comments from YouTube 
 
NO.  COMMENT 
6.1 E Al-Nojaimi is a hero. May Allah create more like him, to disallow a minority of nationalised rabble 
and others from controlling the majority. 
A ةيرثكلأا يف يف مهريغو نيسنجملا نم عاعرلا ةيلقا مكحتي يك يميجنلاي كلاثما نم رثكي الله لطب يميجنلا 
6.2 E The show is full of refugees…moreover, it is in Jeddah. I don’t trust you. 
A  جمانربلامكنم يدي لساغ انا ةدج يفو لا شورط ولك  
6.3 E Boukharstan has nothing to do in Saudi Arabia!! We call for their nationality to be withdrawn. 
A هيسنجلا بحسب بلاطن هيدوعسلاب اهلخد شو ناتسراخب 
6.4 E The foreigners and nationalised women are the only people demanding to drive!! I hope that 
Ministry of Interiors beat with an iron fist any rebelling woman who wants to disrupt the system. 
A كل ديدح نم ديب برضلا ةيلخادلا ةرازو نم ىنمتا !!ةرايسلا ةدايقب ةبلاطملا ةديحولا ةئفلا مه تاسنجتملاو تايبنجلااديرت ةدرمتم ل 
ماظنلاب للاخلاا 
6.5 E Lamia Bukhari….the girl of Buoukarstan, go back to your motherland. You illegal residentshave 
corrupted the country. 
A ا كتلودل عجرا يحور...... يراخب ءايمللانيفلختماي دلبلا وتدسفا.... ىراخب  نباي م  
6.6 E Send the refugees back to their countries and free us of their opinions. Why is the interviewer is 
hosting an Indian and other Indonesian ladies? 
A لله دمحلا هيسوندنا هيناثلاو هيدنه هدحو هيل شورط عيذملا بياج مهراكفا نم انوكفو اهدلبل هدحو لك رحبلا شورط وعجر انافاع يذلا  
6.7 E The time you picked the Shiite camerawoman and your statements to the foreign media made us 
sceptical about your initiative. 
A تردابم يف قثن لا انلعج يجراخلا ملاعلال كروهظو هيعيشلا هروصملاو هيترتخا يذلا  قولا 
6.8 E Let us think about it. When we see people like Manal and Wajiha backed up by the trash Hilary 
interested in this topic, be assured that nothing but troubles will arise..Will you solve women’s 
problems through driving? What about other women’s issues? Why don’t you suggest alternatives or 
solutions? The country is he biggest oil exporter country, yet all of its cities has no other transport 
except cars. 
A نقيت عوضوملاه يف نيمتهم ةلابزلا يرلايه مهاروو نبتلا ةهيجوو  فزلا لانم لاثمأ فوشن امل ةطاسبب اهبسحن انولخ هارو ام نا و
ج صخت يللا ةيناثلا روملأل مكتاردابم نيو بيط انميرح لكاشم وتيلح ءاسنلا ةقاوسب ينعي !! بياصملاو رشلا لاإ هيل ةأرملا بنا
ق لئادبو لولح نوحرطتامنعام اهندم عيمجو طفنلل ردصم ةلود ربكا نلاا ةيدنه ملافا انل نووستو انيلع نوعجعجتام لب ةليسو اهد
ةرايسلا لاإ تلاصاوم 
6.9 E The matter is far bigger than driving. Think about it…it is only a tool for other purposes that aim to 
destroy the Islamic society by focusing on secondary issues like women driving. 
A مدت ةدحو ةياغلا ىرخا ضارغا يف مدختسيل باب طقف اذه الله قلخ اي يوش وركف ةقاوسلا درجم نم ربكا اهداعبا ةلاسملا عمتجملا ري
ةارملل ةقاوسلا لثم ةهفات روما يف قيقدتلا قيرط نع ةقيرط ياب ةهج لك نم يملاسلاا نايكلاو 
6.10 E Since she is on Al-Arabiya channel, the whole thing is planned to distract people attention away 
from bigger issues such as housing and unemployment. 
A هلاطبلاو ناكسلاا لكاشم لثم مها اياضق نع سانلا ءاهللاا ربدم عوضوملاف هيبرعلا يف  علط اهماد 
6.11 E I am a Saudi girl and thanks to Allah I belong to the peaceful and safe country of the two holy 
mosques. We are queens in our houses but wondering why the west wants us to drive? Why are they 
interested in it!? 
A لا دلاب يف ينا للهدمحلاو.. هيدوعس انايسلا قوسن نا انم نودري برغلا اذامل نكلو انتويب يف تاكلمو ناماو ناما نيمرح اذامل تارا
!!..رملاا مهمهي 
6.12 E Regardless of my opinion of this campaign, I say if this cued lady is leading you, you are in trouble. 
I hoped she was more wise and spontaneous. By the way, although she prepared for this interview as 
she said through her account on Twitter, you should notice in most questions how shamefully she 
was reading from her notes and files.   
A ِـّقـلـُملا [ هذه  ناك نا لوقأ ةلمحلا هذه نم يفقوم نع رظنلا ضغبت نأ  ينمت ةحارصب مكنيعي للهاف مكدوقت نم يه ] ةـن رثكأ نوك
أ لاا ةقلحلا هذه يف اهنم رهظ يذلا مثعلتلاو ةأتأتلاو كعلا اذه لك عم ةركف ىلع عطقملا اذه يف تدهاش امم ةيئاقلتو ةحاجر دق اهن
يوت يف يه  لاق امك ءاقللا اذهل ةعقوتملا ةلئسلااو تافلملا نم ديدعلا اقبسم تزهجلئسلأا بلغأ يف اهنا اوظحلاو رت اهقاروأ نم أرقت ة
لجخم لكشب اهتافلمو 
6.13 E Let me know who did say Shariah forbids women driving!? All those discussing the issue say it is 
permissible, but it will lead to catastrophes…got it?? 
A ح هارملا هقاوس نا لاق نيمارملا هقاوس نا نولوقي اهنومرحيو هارملا هقاوس ع نوملكتي يلا لك ؟.. لاق نيم مهفا يبا ؟؟.. مار للاح ه
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؟؟..  مهف ثراوك رجت حار اهتقاوس نكل ىلع زكر نكل 
6.14 E Regarding the customs, it has nothing to do with customs, I say women driving is not banned 
because of customs, it is because if women drive, it will lead to catastrophes…did you understand? 
You are in Saudi society, we travel abroad for vice how about if vice is within us….hope you got it. 
A ةبسنلاب  ضراعا اناو تاداعلا لخد اهلام تاداعلا يلةقاوسلا  نم وم. هلح الله يش مرحت ناك اذا تاداعلا نعلي الله تاداع لجا انا .
وك اهارو يجت حار ميرحلا وقاس اذا ناشع هعونمم لوقن انحا تاداعلا  سسسيل هيدوعسلا يف هارملا هقاوس عنم ببس لوقا ثرا
ىنمتا اندنع راص بارخلا ول فيك برخن يبن اذا ارب حورن انحا مهفا يدوعس عمتحم يف  نا  مهف همولعملا  لصو اهنا  
6.15 E My brothers and sisters favour women driving; the problem is not merely in driving, it is that all 
countries allowing women driving are mixed-sex societies. A guy in those societies will not harass a 
woman driving her own car, but in our society, controlling men is a problem. What happened with 
Manal (guys chasing her) is not an individual case as she tried to portray it. 
A يمج نأ هيلعفلا هلكشملا اهتاذ دحب ةرايسلا ةدايق  سيل ةلكشملا ةرايسلل ةأرملا ةدايقل نيديؤملا يتاوخأو يناوخألا ع اهيف حمسي يتلا لود
لاف انعمتجم يف امأ اهترايس دوقت ةأرما ىلا هثيبخ نيعب رظني نل كانه باشلاف هطلتخم تاعمتجم يه ةدايقلاب ةأرملل بابشلا يه هلكشم
ك ةيدرف هلاح سيل فسلأل )اهل بابشلا ضعب ةقحلام نم( لانم  خلأا عم ثدح ام مهزئارغ ىلعو مهيلع ةرطيسلا هيفيك وواح ام  ل
روصت نأ يه 
6.16 E Although the host was not neutral and did not give the Sheikh the right to reply, also the channel was 
not neutral, and this is obvious from their public interviews, Al-Nojaimy done well to refute them. I 
am with Sheikh Al-Nojaimy and against women driving. 
A ، درلاب هقح خيشلا يطعي لا و زياحم ريغ هقلحلل مدقملا نا عم ، هقلحلا لاوط مهمحفا .. يميجنلا خيشلا ىلع الله ءاش ام  هانقلا كلذكو
هرايسل هأرملا ةدايق دضو يميجنلا خيشلا عم انا و !! عراشلا هانقلا ءاقل نم حضاو اذه و هدياحم ريغ 
6.17 E No driving bitch Manal.  
A هيفام ةقاوسو ةبلستاي لانماي كسفن عم 
6.18 E All of us are against you dirty, jail is not enough for you. I think you need recycling away from this 
pure land. Unfortunately, those people gave you more than your dirtiness. 
A نلكنم رثكا كوطعا ءلاؤه فسلالو ةرهاطلا دلابلا نع كداعباو ريودتلا نيجاتحت دقتعا نجسلا كافك اما ةسجن اي كدض ا كتخاسو  
6.19 E Stay at your home Manal. Otherwise, if I see you driving, I will come at you with my 86 GMC and 
pull you over. 
A  سمجلاب يكيجلأ نيقوست كتفش ول يبرو كل كربا لانماي كتيب يمزلا86 يدكرا فيصرلا ىلع كدحاو  
6.20 E OK, if this spinster drives a car, no one will know she is a lady…I am a man and yet I look better 
than her, hahahahahahaha! They should reward the policeman who caught her….he recognised that 
she is a lady. Hahahahahha! 
A  ههههههههههههههههه ....اهنم ىلحاو لاجر انا يمع اي ...همرح اهنا فرعي حار دحا ام يذه هسناعلا  قاس ول لاصا بيط
ش ام ...اهكسم يللا يركسعلا اوئفاكي ضورفملاهمرح اهنا زيمي ردق هيلع الله ءا هههههههههههه  
6.21 E The hosts, Lamia and Najla, are two faces of a deluxe secular shoe. Hahahahahahaha! 
A و ءايملو عيذملاهههههههههه رخاف يناملع ةمزجل هيجو ثلاث ءلاجن  
6.22 E Nine thousand bitches are demanding. 
A بلاطت هبحق فلاا ةعست 
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 TNEMMOC  .ON
 seoreh era uoy ,yrotsih iduaS eht nihtiw nettirw eb lliw seman ruoy aljaN retsaM dna aimaL retsaM E 32.6
 ni uoy htiw ma I ,uoy pleh hallA yaM .sdees ruoy fo tiurf eht ees lliw uoy ,yllufepoh dna ,gnorts dna
 .luos dna traeh
مرات جهودكم ريي استاذه لمياء واستاذه نجلاء.. اسمكم بينكتب في التاريخ السعودي.. انتم بطلات وقويات وان شا الله رح تشوفون ث A
  ♥♥♥يوفقهم وانا معكم قلبا وقالبا 
  .nem dnasuoht a naht retteb era uoy ,aimaL enod-lleW E 42.6
  انها عن الف رجلكفو والله يالمياء والله  A
 .reverof tnarongi yats lliw tnarongi eht ,uoy htiw era ew dna ,daeha og ,srehto dna aimaL boj dooG E 52.6
 لمياء والباقيات روحوا وحنا وياكم والجاهل بيكون جاهل للابد برافو عليكم A
 .gnivird nemow gnitroppus ni uoy htiw era ew ;srewsna doog reh rof iriraH aljaN retsiS knaht eW E 62.6
 نشكر الأخ  نجلاء حريري على حسن إجاباتها ونحن معكم في تأييد سياقة المرأة السيارة A
 .uoy htiw hallA ,firahS-lA lanaM evarb dna eerf ,erup eht uoy fo duorp yrev ma I E 72.6
  الحره الشجاعه .. الله معك كلي فخر فيك يا منال الشريف الشريفه A
 .uoy htiw si iduaS taerg yreve ;lanaM daeha oG E 82.6
 منال الى الامام، كل سعودي شريف معك A
 a si metsys ruo dna elpoep gnoma setile eht era ew fi sa skaeps eh ,evitacovorp si imiajoN-lA E 92.6
 ?yzarc eh sI !!Z-A morf eno citarcomed
 النجيمي مستفز بكلامه كأننا شعب الله المختار و نظامنا ديموقراطي من . . . . إلى ؟ مجنون هذا ؟ A
 .tnemugra doog a ton sah eh esuaceb tsetorp a ti gnillac no stsisni imiajoN-lA E 03.6
 النجيمي مصر أنها مظاهرة لأن ماعنده حجة قوية A
 .ycavirp nemow fo ekas dna ytissecen eht fo esuaceb modeerf lanosrep si gnivird nemoW E 13.6
 قيادة المرأة حرية شخصية لضرورة أوضاعها وظروف بيتها A
 ti os ,steerts ni emit regnol a yats yeht sediseb ,srac ruo naht erom era srac ixat ,elpoep sdrawkcaB E 23.6
 uoy ,thgil ciffart eht rof gnitiaw elihw ,semitemos....srac rieht evord nemow fi esac eht eb ton lliw
 yppah uoy erA .era uoy yllis woh setacidni dna diputs si tI .sixat ynam yb dednuorrus flesruoy dnif
 a rof gnitiaw era yeht elihw meht ta gnikool era elpoep dna teerts eht ni gnidnats ylimaf ruoy htiw
 ?!ixat
ويل يعني مو شعب متخلف صحيح السائق يضر المجتمع وسيارات الأجرة أكثر من سياراتنا هذا غير انها تبقى في الشوارع وق  ط A
للي ان  شايفه مثل لو قادت المرأه السيارة بتقضي مشوارها وتوقف سيارتها اما سيارة الأجرة تبقى تحوم في الشوارع مسببة كل ا
اضي لأهلك من زحام لدرجة احيانا توقف في اشارة ضوئية كال اللى حوليل سيارات ليموزين امر مضحك ويدل على تفاهتكم ان  ر
 يركبو بل يقفو في الشارع تنظر لهم الأعين وهن ينتظرن ليموزين
 ew ,noinipo rieht troppus ot hannuS ro naruQ morf ecnedive yna edivorp ot liaf stnenoppo nehW E 33.6
 semit tneicna ni noisserppo nemow tuoba seirots dlo eht fo emos noitnem ot gnirvueonam meht dnif
 gnitcidartnoc era yehT .namow milsuM a rof thgir yrassecen a htiw od ot gnihton sah hcihw
 cte……ytinummoc milsuM gnoma cilbup eht tcartsid ot si siht dniheb mia eht dna ,sevlesmeht
رق أخرى عندما يفلس المعترضون على قيادة المرأة للسيِّارة من إيجاد دليل من الكتاب أو السنِّة يسند رأيهم نجدهم يلجؤون إلى ط A
رة المسلمة لها بموضع حاجة ملحِّ ة للمرأة والأسمنها الدِّبج ونقل الكثير من أقوال وظلم المرأة في عصور الأمم السِّابقة والتي لاعلاقة 
وام من وكأنِّهم يناقضون أنفسهم وهذه المحاولة لن تكلِّفهم أكثر من (قص ولزق) والهدف من كلِّ ذلك هو محاولة فاشلة لتتويه الع
حدِّودات بموضوع لتلك ال المسلمين والذين بعضهم لن يجد حتى الوق  لقراءة تلك القصص والتي هي أشبه بالحدِّودات لاعلاقة البتِّة
زعبلات قيادة المرأة للسيِّارة , ثمِّ أنِّ تلك الأمم الغابرة هي أمم كافرة (وهل بعد الكفر ذنب) وبعض قادة الجهل يتطوِّ عون بطرح خ
للسيِّارة تفقدها ة وخرافات يسمِّ ونها بدراسات علما أنِّ دراساتهم مجرِّ د تتفيه لعقول النِّاس مثل تلك الخزعبلة التي تقول أنِّ قيادة المرأ
ول بأنِّ عذريِّتها !!!!! ؟؟؟؟ (شر البليِّة ما يضحك) , وكان آخر خزعبلاتهم تلك الهرطقة التي أسماها صاحبها بدراسة وخرافته تق
ساء قيادة المرأة للسيِّارة تؤثِّر على المبايض والحوض , ومع أنِّ مناظرة صاحب تلك الخزعبلة مع أحد استشاريِّي أمراض النِّ 
قط بل تلك وهو الدكتور محمد البقنة كان  فضيحة لها أجنحة أساءت لصاحب تلك الخزعبلة وهو شيخ له سمعته ليس هذا فوالولادة 
رِّ ون عليها الخزعبلة أساءت للكثير من علماء الدِّين بل وشكِّك  بصحِّ ة الكثير من فتاويهم . أصحاب الأهواء يدلون بآرائهم ويص
نداتها أنِّه ضحيِّة لأفكار وتوجيهات جهات خارجيِّة مشبوهة لها أج ملا يعلمنطق والكثير منهم مهما كان  مخالفة للدِّين والعقل وال
فهم ما  نلا يدركو الخاصِّ ة تتربِّص في بلادنا الدِّوائر عليهم دائرة السوء هؤلاء الضِّ حايا وبسبب ضحالة علمهم وخبرتهم وثقافتهم فهم
  لتدميره.وتهدف  يدور حولهم وحول العالم الإسلامي من مؤامرات تسعى
 emoS .esion siht lla ekam ot emahs a ton si ti os hairahS yb neddibrof ton si gnivird taht wonk lla eW E 43.6
 a gnirih fo daetsni srac rieht evird ot meht rof tseb si ti os ,meht evird ot srehtorb evah t'nod slrig
 .nab eht tfil ot emit fo rettam a ylno si tI .stnemssarah sih htiw gnilaed dna yralas sih gniyap ,revird
م اخو اول شي الكل اتفق ان القياده غير محرمه لذلك هي موعيب ولا شرك اكبر عشان تسوي هالهوليله لذلك في بناات ما عنده A
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ملاو هتاشرحتو هبتارو قاوسلا لادب نودوقي مه لضفلأا نمف مهيدوي): لاا  سيل هينمز هلأس  
6.35 E Prof. Al-Nojaimi, the right is a right even for one person; it is not true that the minority has no rights. 
A ساسا هل سيل ةيلقلاا قح نا حيحص سيلو ةلودلا يف دحاو صخشل ناك ول ىتح قح قحلا يميجنلا ذاتسلاا 
6.36 E The preacher Ayed Alqarni states there is no evidence (from Quran or Sunnah) on which opponents 
could rely. 
A يقل نوضراعملا هيلإ دنتسي نأ نكمي ) ةنسلاو نآرقلا نم(ليلد يأ دجوي لا هنإ ينرقلا ضئاع .روتكدلا خيشلا ةيعادلاةرايسلل ةأرملا ةدا  
6.37 E There is no Hadeeth or Quranic verse that indicates the ban; it is futile mentalities and customs…..if 
I don’t have a man drive and can’t hire a driver what shall I do!? Damn futile mentalities. 
A جوي لاد لاو ثيدح  ذا هميقع تايلقعو ديلاقتو تاداع ايه سب ميرحتلا ىلع لدت هيادنع امي لاو ينيدوي لاجر بيجا ردقا  شا قاوس
 تايلقعلل ابت !؟يوسحةميقعلا  
6.38 E First, feminising the rights doesn’t turn it into horrible topics. Second, some rules in Saudi forbid 
women from the permissible to save men from committing the sin!!.....in what religion and mind is 
this? Sick people… 
A لا ىتح للاحلا نم ةأرملا عنمت ةيدوعسلا يف نيناوقلا ضعب :  ايناث .. ةعشب عيضاومل اهل ِّوحي لا قوقحلا ثينأت ..  لاوأ يف لجرلا عقي 
.. ىضرم ؟ آذه نيدو لقع يأ !!! مارحلا 
6.39 E Oh girl, Islam has nothing to do with a tribe or family roots. This is a right for women that has been 
taken from them in the homeland of Islam, the country that opposes women driving in cities arguing 
for their safety. Meanwhile, they travel hundreds of kilometres outside cities via dangerous roads to 
get to schools without a male guardian, even if they are in danger daily…what a contradiction! 
A اي  بسن لاو هليبقب لخد هلام ملاسلاا للاحلا  نب٬  قح اذهةأرملل  ملاسلاا دلب يف اهنم بولسمو٬  ندملاب اهتدايق ضفري يللا دلب
 اهيلع فوخلا هجحب٬ عطقت نا اهل حمسي و و مرحم نودب رجه و ىرقب سرادمل هرعو قرط يف اهتنيدم جراخ تارتموليكلا تائم نا
ضقانت توملاب ايموي تدده 
6.40 E May Allah guide us to goodness, women driving is a right for each female citizen. 
A هنطاوم لكل قح هرايسلل هارملا هدايق ريخلا انل بتكا مهللا 
6.41 E I am a tribal girl and living in Riyadh; I support the ladies’ opinion…it is true we are suffering a lot 
because of the ban...we complain to Allah those who oppressed us through abusing religion. 
A  ضايرلاب هشياعو هيليبق  نب اناملاك ديؤاو ح لاعف تاديسلاظ نم لك ىلع الله انبسح الله لاا اهب ملعيلا هاناعمب ان نيدلا ةحيبش نم انمل
مهعاعر و 
6.42 E For us Saudi women, driving is a necessity; we complain to Allah those who oppressed us by 
depriving our right. 
A ةدايقلا لا معنو الله انبسحو تايدوعسك انل هحلم هجاحانقح نم انمرح ملاظ لك يلع ليكو  
6.43 E Ooooooh when will we drive; we are fed up of ignorance? 
A .لهج ييفكي قوسن ىتم فووووووووا 
6.44 E I hope and wait for the day when our children laugh on the backwardness we are living now as I did 
on the Sheikhs of the past when they opposed girls’ education, mobile phones and cars. It is 
oppressing enough us from the simplest basics of life. 
A رح امنيح سملأا خياشم ىلع انأ كحضأ امك نلآا هشيعن يذلا فلختلا اذه ىلع انءانبأ هيف كحضي موي يتأي نأ الله لأسأ ميلعت اوم
ةأرملا ! ةايحلا تايساسأ طسبأ نع انتبك ةيافك .. تارايسلا و , تلااوجلا و ,  
6.45 E We want to drive….please it is enough, think maturely. 
A تراصام مكلوقع وربكو وربكا صلاخ نووووووووووفكت قووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووسن يبن 
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Appendix V: The Neutrals’ comments from YouTube 
 
NO.  COMMENT 
6.46 E A silly interview, especially at the end. 
A اهرخا اصوصخ ةفيخس ةلباقم 
6.47 E I think the issue is over discussed. 
A ةدايزب  شقون ةيضقلا دقتعأ 
6.48 E Media is using the issue to create more action; in my opinion the report was a bit biased  
 A نشكأ يوسي ناشع ةيضقلا مدختسي ملاعلإايوش زيحتم ناك ريرقتلا يرظنب ،  
6.49 E Ryan Al-Zahrani, with all respect, you don’t evaluate what you say….you accused them of many bad 
things, I don’t know based on what?. I am not supporting or opposing driving, but the way you 
comment is a reason for them to drive if the opponents are morally accusing girls…how do we take 
their opinion, you are reflecting a negative image about the opponents. 
A نا يمارتحا لك عم ينارهزلا نايرلا عم وم انا قح يأب يردام مهضرعب  نعطو مهتفذقو مهتمهتاو كملاك نمثت لا ناسنا يت لاو هدايق
عت  نا يزيزع اي مهيار ذخان فيك تانبلا ضرعب نونعطي نيضراعملا ناك اذا نلا مهتدايقل ببس كبولسا نكل اهدض هروص سك
نيرهاظملل هيبلس 
6.50 E Why you did not let Sheikh Al-Nojaimi talk…you interrupt him continuously. 
A هعطاقم يوش لك ملكتي خيشلا وتيلخام هيل 
6.51 E Women driving is a means not an aim. Unfortunately, it became an aim for every Saudi women in 
favour of driving. 
A اغ  حبصأ فسلأل نكلو ةياغ  سيلو ةليسو ةرايسلا ةدايق. ةيدوعسلا يف ةرايسلا ةدايقب ةبغار لكل ةي  
6.52 E Disagreement does not ruin amicability….think better. 
A رييييكفتلاب وقترا . . ةيضق دولل دسفيلا يأرلا فلاتخا 
6.53 E In this verse of Quran, a reminder for believers about what an individual say that every single saying 
is counted and recorded in his personal list that will be revealed on the Day of Judgement…..I hope 
we all act sincerely to Allah when we write each single letter. 
A  وأ هل بوسحم لوق لك ؛تاملك نم همف نم جرخي امو نينمؤملل ريكذت ةيلآا هذه يف لجس يف ةدوصرم ةملك لكو ،هيلع
لله ةينلا نيصلخم  اعيمج نوكن نأ وجرأ...ءازجلا نوكيو باسحلا فشكني ةمايقلا مويو ايندلا يف ناكلملا هلجسي...هلامعأ يف لجوزع 
هتباتكب نوموقن فرح لك يف لجوزع الله يقتن نأو .. رذحلا ىخوتن  نأو بتكن ام لك 
6.54 E Regardless of our stance towards women driving, why cursing and showing disrespect to others?? It 
is true, the little minds speak about persons, while the big ones discuss principles and thoughts.  
A ؟؟ صاخشلاا نم صاقتنلااو متشلاو بسلا اذاااامل .. دايقلا دض وا عم انك رظنلا ضغب ثدحتت ةريغصلا لوقعلا .. لاعف  نع
! ركفلاو ادابملا شقانتف ةريبكلا لوقعلا اما !! صاخشلاا 
6.55 E May Allah forgive us for some comments here. Women driving is not a religious issue, and if we 
want it to be, there is disagreement among clerics. However, I am pretty sure that the Islamic nation, 
with all its sects or doctrines, agrees upon the criminalisation of cursing or accusing others morally 
without any evidence. 
A ب فذقي يللاو نعلي يللا اي مكسفنا ىلع اوهبتنا انه تاقيلعتلا ضعب نم ميظعلا يلعلا الله رفغتسا!!سانلا تان  ةرايسلل ةارملا ةيضق
نأ ةدكأتم انأف فذقلاو نعللا اما .ةلأسملاه يف ءاملعلا لاوقلأ اوعجرا فلاخ اهيفف ةينيد اهانيلخ ولو ةينيد ةيضق بوهام  ةملأا
.قح هجو ريغب مهنعليو سانلا فذقي نم م ِّرجت اهبهاذمو اهفئاوط لكب ةيملاسلإا 
6.57 E   We all need to respect each other and comment responsibly. You should not hurt someone else only 
because he has a different opinion than yours.  
 A  ضعب مرتحن جاتحن انلكةيلوؤسمب قلعنوضورفملا ، .كنع فلتخي هيأر نأ درجمب صخش حرجت ام  
6.58 E It is a T-Shirt. Hahahahaha! You thought it is her chest that prompted criticism. 
A هزهاج سان هههههه ردص هوتيلخ هوهاي تريش يت 
6.59 E The host Turki committed a mistake when he quoted Sheikh Al-Munajid opinion as if it was said 
about Manal. Actually Al-Munajid was talking about Wajiha Al-Hwaider. 
A ا ةهيجو يه دجنملا ملاك نم دوصقملاف ، ،لانم قح يف هنأ ضارتفا ىلع دجنملا خيشلا ملاك لقن امدنع ليخدلا يكرت أطخأ.رديوحل  
6.60 E My dear, be sincere to Allah when you talk, she is wearing a beige blouse…if you saw her on TV, it 
was obvious. 
A زيزع ايحضاو ناك يف يتلا ىلع اهتفش ولو جيب اهنول هزولب هسبلا كملاك يف الله يقتا ي  
6.61 E A blouse, not her chest….what is this stupid way of thinking? 
A يبغلا ريكفتش ردص وم ةزولب 
6.62 E This date is the launch date; there were no campaigns or gatherings. 
A هنونزحي مهلاو عمجتلاو ةلمح هيف سيلو ةقلاطنلإا ءدب وه خيراتلا اذ  
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6.63 E Whoever wants to drive should be allowed and for those who don’t want to drive. It is their 
choice….the issue is solved.  
A  هلهس ةلأسملا ربجنتام يبتام يلا و قوست اهولخ قوست يبت يلا 
6.64 E Some people are against development…they completely believe in the conspiracy theory as if the 
whole world is planning against them!!, my dear…nobody knows you. 
A لك ملاعلا نأكو .. ةرماؤملا ةيرظنب لماك ناميإ نونمؤيو .. روطتلا نوضفري نمم ضعبلا كانهيزع !!! هدض ططخيو ربدي ه ... يز
كنع ىرد دحم اللهو ىرت 
6.65 E A public referendum on women driving should be done: Do you support women driving or not? 
People should choose what they want and not be left under the hegemony of a strict minority. 
A  ظورفملاا راتخي نأ بجي . " ديأت لا وأ ةرايسلل ةأرملا ةدايق ديأت له " ةرايسلل ةأرملا ةدايق ىلع يبعش ءاتفتسأ لمع و ديري ام بعشل
.هتمذتم ةيلقأ ةمحر  حت نوكن لا 
6.66 E As a precaution, teenagers should not be allowed to drive….the statistics of public security are full of 
frightening numbers of accidents. 
 
A "ثداوحلل ةعجفملا ماقرلأاب ةئيلم ماعلا نملاا تايئاصحا .. ةدايقلا نم نيقهارملا عنم .. دسافملا ءرد باب نم" 
6.67 E A public referendum will help us to take the right decision. 
A حصلا رارقلا ذختن اندعاسيب ءاتفتسلااحي  
 
 
 
 
 
 
